This Practice Note considers the ‘doctrine of separability’ of arbitration agreements in international arbitration. The doctrine of separability The ‘doctrine of separability’ treats an agreement to arbitrate contained within a contract as an independent agreement that is deemed to be separable from the main contract. The doctrine preserves the validity and enforceability of arbitration as the chosen mechanism for resolving disputes, even if the main contract is invalid and unenforceable. As a consequence of the doctrine, an arbitration agreement may still be valid and enforceable, even though the main agreement in which it is contained is itself found to be invalid and unenforceable. Thus, the parties are considered to have entered into two distinct agreements which are separable. The issue of separability will arise whenever there is a challenge to the validity of the main agreement; for example, if English law were to apply, the main agreement could be challenged on a number of grounds including, but not limited to: • an absence of authority

Practising solicitors, and others involved in the provision of legal services through a regulated SRA firm, must comply with strict requirements about the types of services which they can provide through any business which is not regulated by the SRA or another approved regulator.

The SRA Standards and Regulations permit law firms and legal service providers to structure their business in a number of ways depending on whether they provide reserved legal activities. The options include: • single SRA-regulated entity providing reserved and non-reserved services • SRA-regulated entity providing reserved legal services with some or all non-reserved services provided by a separate non-SRA regulated business (which crucially can employ SRA-regulated solicitors) • non-SRA regulated entity providing non-reserved legal services only, employing SRA-regulated solicitors • freelance solicitor—see Practice Note: Dealing with freelance solicitors This Practice Note provides guidance for law firms on operating a separate business, including dividing a client’s matter between the law firm and separate business, which will involve unbundling legal services. It reflects the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA 2007), and the SRA Standards and Regulations, together with separate business guidance issued by the SRA. Unless otherwise indicated, references in the Practice Note to: • ‘solicitor’ includes Registered European Lawyer (REL), Registered Swiss Lawyer (RSL) and Registered Foreign Lawyer (RFL) • ‘law firm’ includes alternative business

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: This case concerns an application by the company to convene meetings of two individual creditors, each of whose claims are pari passu ranked and arise under the same financial instrument, pursuant to section 901C of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) and to approve a restructuring plan under CA 2006, Pt 26A. It considers the different roles of those creditors and their subsequent treatment in relation to the convening meetings, and what should be done practically to manage a contested restructuring plan application. It also considers the principles of Condition B of CA 2006, s 901A(3)(i), which requires the company to propose a ‘compromise or arrangement’ with its creditors, namely whether there was sufficient ‘give and take’ in the restructuring plan. The court held that due to their differing economic roles, differing forms of consideration and their differing future role in the company's future, together with the fact of their disagreement in principle to the restructuring plan, it was appropriate to place them in separate creditor meetings to vote on the restructuring plan. The court also approved extensive case management directions in advance of the sanction hearing. Written by Stephen Alexander, partner at Mourant and Roxanna Lackschewitz-Martin, associate at Mourant.

This Practice Note considers the concept of separate legal personality for a registered company, and considers the relevant case law concerning the limited circumstances in which it may be possible to ‘pierce the corporate veil’. The note also distinguishes the specific piercing or lifting of the corporate veil from the potentially more common circumstances where the veil is circumvented on the basis of another legal or equitable right. Corporate legal personality—the Salomon principle A properly formed registered company is a separate legal entity from its shareholders and has distinct rights and liabilities as an autonomous legal person. This principle is colloquially described as the corporate veil or the Salomon principle, being most famously stated by Lord MacNaghten in the case of Salomon v Salomon: ‘The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent

Family analysis: This case involved an application by the children (brothers, aged 12 (A) and 10 (B)) to be represented separately from their Cafcass guardian. After the making of a final return decision and the Court of Appeal’s refusal in respect of their mother’s application for permission to appeal that decision, the solicitor instructed directly by the children sought the High Court’s permission for separate representation and set aside of the final return decision. The children already had party status due to the parallel asylum proceedings. The application for A to be separately represented was refused, despite his solicitor (a ‘most experienced professional’) having assessed him as having sufficient understanding (per Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, r 16.29,) to give instructions on his own behalf. B did not yet possess such an understanding and the fact that his older brother did was immaterial. The proposed set aside application was held to be unarguable and to have no prospect of success. The President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane, provided helpful guidance for practitioners on separate representation applications, particularly where the relevant child’s views have been compromised by a parent’s influence. David Wilkinson, solicitor at Slater Heelis, examines the issues.

An agreement between separating spouses/civil partners setting out the terms of their separation that generally relates to financial arrangements.

This document provides general guidance regarding separation agreements. Your family lawyer will be able to provide specific advice based on your circumstances. What is a separation agreement? People who are already married or in a civil partnership can enter into a written agreement setting out what they intend to happen to their money, property and other practical issues as a consequence of their current or planned separation. This written agreement is called a separation agreement. Separation agreements are usually entered into by parties who are separating, but who do not want to divorce or dissolve their civil partnership at that time, perhaps for religious or practical reasons. The legal rules about these agreements come from the usual laws that apply to divorce/dissolution of civil partnership, and also a decision of the Supreme Court in 2010 (Radmacher v Granatino) where the court said: ‘The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair

Source of the doctrine of the separation of powers The origins of the doctrine of the separation of powers are often traced to John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1689), in which he identified the 'executive' and 'legislative' powers as needing to be separate. ‘…it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make…’ Its classic exposition is however that of the Baron de Montesquieu, writing about the constitution of England in L’Esprit des Lois (1748), in which he identified judicial power as the third branch of government. ‘When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again,

If a relationship breaks down as a result of domestic violence or a relationship ends due to the death of the sponsoring partner, there are provisions allowing a partner with leave under Part 8 or Appendix FM (the 'applicant partner') to apply for indefinite leave to remain in their own right. See Practice Notes: Bereaved partners and The domestic abuse provisions. For those whose relationship ends for other reasons, the position is more complicated. Once the relationship has broken down permanently, the applicant partner ceases to meet one of the core requirements of the rules under which they were granted leave (namely, that they are in a genuine and subsisting relationship with their sponsoring partner) and therefore that leave is liable to be curtailed under the Immigration Rules, Part Suitability. If they leave the UK and attempt to re-enter, their leave can be cancelled for the same reason. Partner applications are usually made under Appendix FM of the Immigration

This Practice Note gives an introduction to separation orders for civil partnerships where proceedings were issued before 6 April 2022. It explains the requirement to prove one of the four facts in the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004), namely, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, separation for two years with consent and separation for five years. It also explains about making an application for dissolution following a separation order. The Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 (DDSA 2020) came into effect on 6 April 2022. Proceedings issued by the court on or after 6 April 2022 are subject to the provisions of DDSA 2020 and the changes to procedure under the amended Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2020), SI 2010/2955. For further information, see Practice Note: Introduction to the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020. Proceedings issued by the court on or before 5 April 2022 continue to progress under the pre-DDSA 2020 law. Such applications are not impacted by the coming into force of DDSA 2020, nor the consequential changes to procedure. This document

MLex has reported that Sephora Cosmetics România has been fined €2,000 by the Romanian Data Protection Authority for failing to meet the rules on a data subject's right to object under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (EU GDPR). The company continued sending the person promotional material despite the individual not wanting their telephone number used for marketing purposes, the regulator said.