A type of periodical payments order in family proceedings where the term of the order is limited and non-extendable by virtue of the provisions of MCA 1973, s 28(1A). If a term order does not include such provision, then an application may be made to extend the term before the end of the original term.

Arbitration analysis: This decision has a significant bearing on arbitrations in India because it expounds on the scope of section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Act’), a much-debated provision which does not have a parallel in other domestic arbitration jurisdictions. Section 29A provides that in domestic arbitration matters, the arbitral award shall be made within a period of twelve (12) months from the date of completion of pleadings or within the additional period of six (6) months as extended by mutual consent of the parties. Section 29A(4) stipulates that if the award is not made within the period specified in section 29A(1) or 29A(3), then the mandate of the arbitrator shall terminate unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period. In the present case, the Delhi High Court held that section 29A of the Act allows the court to extend the arbitrator’s mandate even in cases where the application for extension has been filed after the time provided under section 29A(1) and 29A(3) for completing the proceedings and rendering the arbitral award has expired. The judgment clarifies the law in relation to a recent judgment of a coordinate Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Rohan Builders (India) (P) Ltd v Berger Paints India Ltd where the court observed that upon expiry of the period for the making of the award, the arbitrator’s mandate terminates after which no application can be made to the court under section 29A(4) seeking extension of time for completing the arbitral proceedings and making the award. The judgment clarifies that section 29A does not contemplate that the arbitral process is subject to inflexible timelines. On the contrary, it empowers the court to extend the timeline if the circumstances of the case so justify even if the party seeking such extension has moved the required application after expiry of the stipulated period. This judgment will have the effect of preserving arbitrations that have been delayed for no fault of the arbitrator or the party(ies) and where the proceedings are at an advanced stage. Written by Ila Kapoor, partner, and Ramkrishna Veerendra, associate, Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co, advocates & solicitors.

By section 3(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, where the landlord’s interest in a premises, which consist of or include a dwelling is assigned, the new landlord is obliged to give notice in writing of the assignment, and of his name and address, to a tenant of those premises by no later than the next rent due day or the end of a two month period, if later. There is no specific equivalent requirement on a commercial landlord to inform a tenant of an assignment. However if the lease was entered into after 1 January 1996, it may be that the landlord, as part of the assignment,

Section 3 of the Leasehold Property (Repairs) Act 1938 (LP(R)A 1938) has not been the subject of any authoritative reported case law and there is very little guidance on its meaning and effect. LP(R)A 1938 was introduced in order to protect tenants from the risk of having their leases forfeited for disrepair or of being sued for damages. Prior to LP(R)A 1938, a landlord might serve a notice under section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 on a tenant in relation to disrepair at the premises. If the disrepair was not remedied within a reasonable period of time, then

Section 32 of PACE 1984 empowers a constable to search an arrested person following arrest where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person might pose a threat of danger to themselves or others, or to search for items which might assist the arrested person to escape lawful custody or which might be evidence relating to an offence. Where the offence for which the person has been arrested is an indictable offence, Section 32 also confers a constable the power to search premises which may hold evidence.

An annuity contract introduced by section 32 of the Finance Act 1981 to transfer liability from an occupational pension to the insurer of a pension arrangement.

What is a section 32 buy-out policy? A term which may be often heard within the pensions arena is that of the ‘section 32 buy-out policy’—also sometimes referred to as a section 32 policy or pension buy-out bond. It is a type of buy-out policy whose name derives from the legislation which originally applied in respect of such policies, namely section 32 of the Finance Act 1981 (FA 1981), and which has now been repealed. Section 32 buy-out policies were very popular before 1988 (ie before personal pension schemes were introduced). Like other buy-out policies, a section 32 buy-out policy is a deferred annuity contract. It is bought from an insurance company and, as the name suggests, is used to ‘buy out’ a member’s deferred benefit entitlements (including, where applicable, deferred contracted-out benefits) held under a pension scheme, so that the benefits are transferred from the scheme to be held under the policy. Section 32 buy-out policy are ‘one member’ arrangements. The policy will be distinct from the pension scheme which originally held the member’s

Pensions analysis: The Pensions Ombudsman has rejected a complaint about increases to Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP). Martin Scott of gunnercooke LLP looks at the decision.

Schemes into which SERPS were transferred.

We have assumed that the debtor company is unconnected with the creditor for the purposes of the loan relationships rules, applies an amortised cost basis of accounting to the loan in the relevant period, that the loan is not hedged, and that there is no release of ‘relevant rights’ (within the meaning of section 358 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009 (CTA 2009)). The starting position is that a company is required to bring profits and losses arising from its loan relationships and related transactions into account for corporation

Section 33 EPA refers to section 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, the core UK provision creating criminal offences relating to waste management. In legal practice it is most commonly cited in prosecutions and regulatory enforcement for unlawful waste disposal, fly‑tipping and operating waste facilities without the necessary environmental permit or licence. Section 33 EPA (England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) makes it an offence to deposit, recover or dispose of controlled waste in a manner likely to cause pollution of the environment or harm to human health, or otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit. It provides for strict liability offences, due diligence/statutory defence arguments, and significant penalties, including unlimited fines and, for serious or persistent offending, imprisonment. The provision is defined and applied through the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and extensive case law on concepts such as “deposit”, “controlled waste”, “knowingly permitting” and “management of waste”. In Ireland, there is no direct equivalent “section 33 EPA 1990”; waste offences are primarily governed by the Waste Management Acts and the Environmental Protection Agency Acts, so Irish lawyers generally encounter section 33 EPA only in cross‑border or comparative UK environmental law contexts.

The Secretary of State for Business, Environment & Industrial Strategy, Rt Hon Grant Shapps MP, has directed under section 35 of the Planning Act 2008 (PA 2008) that the Lighthouse Green Fuels Project is to be treated as a nationally significant infrastructure project for which development consent under the PA 2008 is required. This means that the project will now proceed under the PA 2008 regime.