Arbitration analysis: The Commercial Court dismissed a challenge under section 68(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) to an LCIA tribunal’s costs award, holding that Article 28.3 of the LCIA Rules 2020 constituted a complete contractual regime for the assessment of legal costs and displaced the default provisions in AA 1996, s 63. The judgment reinforces the primacy of party autonomy in arbitral procedure and confirms the narrow scope of Section 68 challenges, distinguishing between an excess of power and an alleged error in exercising an existing power. The decision provides important guidance on the interpretation of Section 63(3), the level of costs particularisation required in arbitral proceedings, and the limited circumstances in which costs awards may be challenged.

Section 66 of the Law of Property Act 1925 empowers an absolute owner in their own right to confirm an estate intended to be granted, and also to confirm all estates and interests derived from and dependent on the validity of that estate. Other limited owners may also do so, but only with the leave of the court. Although the passage referred to from the Encyclopaedia

Arbitration analysis: The High Court has confirmed the high threshold for success in a challenge under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996). Mr Justice Foxton rejected a challenge by LMH to an award made in favour of EGK, finding that ‘there was nothing about the course of the arbitration or award which was in any way surprising or outside the contemplation of reasonable parties who have agreed to arbitrate their disputes’. The judgment confirms that section 68 is concerned with matters of due process, and that the court will not interfere with a tribunal’s assessment of the evidence or its judgments on matters of quantum, including where the tribunal has made an error. Written by Susan Field, senior associate, solicitor advocate, international arbitration and pro bono, at Herbert Smith Freehills LLP.

Private Client analysis: This case principally concerned the exercise by HMRC of the power in section 684(7A)(b) of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (ITEPA 2003), and its interaction with the Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003 (the PAYE Regulations), SI 2003/2682. In general, the PAYE Regulations , SI 2003/2682 place the obligation to collect tax in respect of an employee’s employment income on employers or deemed employers (or other ‘payers’, as defined). HMRC argued that, by exercising the power in ITEPA 2003, s 684(7A)(b), they had removed the obligation that otherwise rested on the end users of the claimants’ services to operate PAYE, leaving the employee-claimants with the obligation to pay the tax due. The court accepted that the power had validly been exercised by HMRC, and that the result was that the tax due in respect of the claimants’ employment income fell to be collected from the claimants. The court also held that, in the circumstances of Mr Hoey’s appeal, a challenge to the exercise of the power in ITEPA 2003, s 684(7A)(b) was not justiciable in the First-tier Tribunal (FTT). HMRC’s fallback argument in relation to a charge under the transfer of assets abroad (ToAA) provisions also did not succeed. Written by Marika Lemos, barrister at Devereux Chambers who acted for HMRC in the case.

Arbitration analysis: The Commercial Court dismissed a section 69 appeal against an arbitral award that granted charterers contract/market damages after shipowners failed to provide a vessel for a declared October shipment under a contract of affreightment. The court held that the tribunal had correctly characterised the owners’ conduct as non-performance of the shipment required by the charterers’ September declaration, rather than delayed performance. A later shipment carried on different terms and involving a different cargo did not extinguish the charterers’ accrued rights or amount to performance of the original obligation. The decision emphasises the separable nature of individual shipment obligations under a contract of affreightment and confirms the orthodox measure of damages where a declared shipment is not performed.

Arbitration analysis: This decision concerns Olam Global Agri Pte Ltd’s (Seller or Olam) section 69 appeal under the Arbitration Act 1996 (the ‘Act’) against a Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) Board of Appeal (BOA) award (BOA Award) in favour of Holbud Ltd (Buyer or ‘Holbud’) arising out of a GAFTA 49 FOB sale contract dated 19 November 2021 (the ‘Contract’). The appeal raised two issues: (a) whether an innocent party must prove its own ability to perform its contractual obligations in order to recover substantial damages where the counterparty has repudiated the contract by wrongly declaring force majeure; and (b) whether Clause 6 of GAFTA 49 (‘Clause 6’) permits a substitute vessel to be nominated at any time before the innocent party accepts that repudiation. In setting aside the BOA Award, the Commercial Court held that a wrongful force majeure notice does not, without more, relieve the Buyer of the need to prove it could have performed its own obligations to recover substantial damages. The court also found that Clause 6 does not permit substitution of a nominated vessel outside the clause’s strict timing requirements. Holbud’s claim for substantial damages therefore failed. The case underscores the corrective function of section 69 of the Act (‘Section 69’) and provides important guidance on the application of the compensatory principle in assessing damages following repudiatory breach. Written by Dr Ademola Bamgbose, solicitor advocate and senior associate at Hogan Lovells, London and Sofie Gowran, trainee solicitor at Hogan Lovells, London.

This Practice Note outlines the change to workplace accident claims effected by the enactment of section 69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA 2013). In relation to accidents at work occurring from 1 October 2013, civil liability no longer arises from a breach of statutory duty unless the relevant regulation provides for it, even though criminal sanctions for breach remain in place. Claimant practitioners are left to plead such cases in negligence relying on breach of health and safety regulations in support of the allegations of negligence. This Practice Note is provided specifically to set out the fundamental change to workplace accident claims brought about by the enactment of ERRA 2013, s 69. The provision Coming into force on 1 October 2013, ERRA 2013, s 69 rewrote section 47 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HSWA 1974). Prior to this, in workplace accident claims, claimant practitioners were accustomed to pleading that the employer (or organisation with control) was in breach of its statutory

Section 69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA 2013), amending section 47 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA 1974), introduced a fundamental change to workplace accident claims. It means that for accidents at work on or after 1 October 2013, a breach of health and safety regulations will generally not give rise to a civil right of action, subject to any express statutory exception, even though criminal sanctions for breach remain in place. A claimant may nevertheless establish liability in negligence or another available cause of action. Relevant regulations may inform the content of the common law duty of care without automatically determining whether that duty has been breached. This case tracker should be read in conjunction with Practice Note: Section 69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. Case name and details Key s 69 conclusions Further reading Wetherell v Student Loans Company Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 645Court of Appeal22 May 2026 The Court of Appeal considered whether

Arbitration analysis: African Distribution Company S.a.R.L (ADC) and AASTAR Trading Pte Ltd (AASTAR) were parties to a London-seated arbitration in which ADC did not participate. After the expiration of the 28 day time limit in section70(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996), ADC sought to challenge the award under AA 1996, ss 67, 68 and 72(1) on the ground that it was not properly served with the notice of arbitration.

Planning analysis: The court allowed a challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) against an inspector’s decision refusing his appeal against the local planning authority (LPA)’s non determination of his application pursuant to TCPA 1990, s 73 (‘s73’) by which he sought the removal of two conditions imposed upon a s73 permission involving the use of land for ‘34 self-catering holiday units’, which prevented reliance upon the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (‘the UCO’) to change the use of such units to permanent dwelling houses. The s73 application also sought the removal of the equivalent conditions under the original permission. The principal issue was whether the inspector had misdirected herself in law by concluding that the appeal could not succeed on the basis that s73 does not permit the removal of conditions in such a way that the new s73 permission would give rise to a ‘fundamental change’ to the use of the land which would itself be an unlawful conflict (or otherwise inconsistent with) the description of the development. Written by Celina Colquhoun, barrister at 39 Essex Chambers.

Planning analysis: This case is about the ambit of the power under section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) to impose conditions on the new permission, granted on application in respect of an extant permission to undertake that development without compliance with one or more of the conditions on the extant permission. The court decided that section 73 could not be used to create a new permission which was inconsistent with the operative part of the original permission. That did not mean that a section 73 application could not result in a development which was different to that consented under the original permission. Written by Richard Kimblin KC, leading counsel in planning and environmental law at No5 Chambers.

THIS PRACTICE NOTE APPLIES TO DEFINED BENEFIT (DB) OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES A contingent debt is a debt that is dependent on the occurrence of some future event. It is not immediately payable but may become payable in the future and is provable in insolvency proceedings. Trustees’ unilateral powers DB trustees are given certain powers under the scheme’s trust deed and rules which can sometimes take the form of a unilateral power to carry out certain actions if the scheme is underfunded. This includes: • setting the scheme’s contribution rates (although due to overriding provisions in the Pensions Act 2004 in relation to DB scheme funding, the trustees will usually be required to obtain the employer’s consent when setting the schedule of contributions, save in certain prescribed circumstances where it is merely necessary to consult the employer). For more information, see Practice Note: Statutory funding regime and the interaction with scheme rules) • commissioning an early valuation, or • winding up the scheme Particularly, under the provisions of a scheme’s trust