Arguably the most significant of these ‘statutory’ aspects of parliamentary privilege is freedom of speech in Parliament, which is protected by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688. Exclusive cognisance Arguably, Parliament’s key privilege is its exclusive jurisdiction to regulate, and judge the lawfulness of, its own procedures. Blackstone wrote in the 18th century that: ‘The whole of the law and custom of Parliament has its original from this one maxim, “that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that House to which it relates, and not elsewhere”. Blackstone, Commentaries (17th ed. (1830)), volume 1, page 163’ In R v Chaytor Lord Phillips said that the phrase 'exclusive cognisance': ‘…describes areas where the courts have ruled that any issues should be left to be resolved by Parliament rather than determined judicially. Exclusive cognisance refers not simply to Parliament, but to the exclusive right of each House to manage its own affairs without interference from the other or from outside Parliament.

In brief Section 34 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FIA 2000) provides an exemption from the normal section 1 duties—the duty to ‘confirm or deny’ whether information is held, and the duty to provide it—where necessary to avoid a breach of parliamentary privilege. The exemption is absolute, which means there is no public interest test. A certificate signed by the appropriate authority (the Speaker, in relation to the Commons, or the Clerk of the Parliaments, in relation to the Lords) certifying that exemption is, or at any time was, required for the purpose of avoiding an infringement of the privileges of either House of Parliament shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. How does Parliamentary privilege relate to freedom of information? As well as the protection offered by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights against the questioning of proceedings in Parliament, Parliamentary privilege also protects the right of each House to manage its own affairs and to exercise sole jurisdiction over its own proceedings. This right is known as ‘exclusive cognizance’.

Types of Bill Most Bills are Public Bills, aimed at a change the law as it applies to everyone. Most Public Bills are government Bills, introduced by ministers either as part of their planned legislative programme, or in response to events. A Public Bill introduced by an MP or a Member of the House of Lords who is not a government minister is called a Private Member’s Bill. Relatively few Private Members’ Bills become law. It is important to keep Private Members’ Bills distinct from Private Bills. Private Bills aim at changing the law in a way that only affects particular individuals or organisations, rather than changing the general law affecting everyone. Each year a number of them are promoted in Parliament by outside organisations. For example, Transport for London (TfL) promoted the Transport for London Bill, aimed at giving TfL further financial and management powers. This Bill became the Transport for London Act 2016. Other examples are the University of London Bill, promoted by the University, which became the University of London Act 2018, and the Highgate Cemetery

Essential to Parliament’s legislative supremacy is the principle that Parliament is not bound by its predecessors, and cannot bind its successors. It follows that, where a later Act of Parliament conflicts with an earlier one, the later one cannot be read as conditioned by, or subject to, the earlier. Rather, the later statute is considered to have repealed the earlier one by implication, to the extent of the conflict. However in recent decades it has become accepted that at least in certain legal contexts (particularly in the context of European Union law and the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA 1972), and perhaps other 'constitutional' statutes) Parliament can enact provisions which, unless expressly repealed or amended, condition and limit the effect of later, conflicting enactments. Origins The principle was laid down by a court in Dean and Chapter of Ely v Bliss. This was a dispute about the payment of tithes by the occupier of land. The occupier defended himself on the basis that an Act of Parliament had extinguished the right of the Dean and Chapter to

It is not possible to successfully argue that an Act of Parliament is invalid because of flaws, or even fraud, in the legislative process. Early origins of the principle Arguably the principle is derived from that laid down in The Prince's Case. The case involved a challenge to the grant of the Duchy of Cornwall by charter made by authority of Parliament. Coke CJ decided that it was an Act of Parliament, having been assented to by King, Lords and Commons, and therefore had the full force and authority of an Act of Parliament. 'If an Act of Parliament be penned by assent of the King, and of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons, or, it is enacted by authority of Parliament, it is a good Act;…there are a good many statutes which are indicted quod dominus Rex statuit: yet if they be entered in the Parliament roll, and always allowed for Acts of Parliament, it shall be intended that it was by authority of Parliament…' Bill of Rights In

Parole refers to the conditional release of a prisoner before the end of their custodial sentence, subject to supervision and compliance with specified licence conditions. It allows an offender to serve the remainder of their sentence in the community, with recall to prison possible if conditions are breached or risk increases.In England and Wales, “parole” is closely linked to the work of the Parole Board under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and related legislation, particularly for indeterminate and certain extended or long determinate sentences. In Northern Ireland, parole functions similarly, with decisions involving the Parole Commissioners under the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. In Scotland, the process is administered by the Parole Board for Scotland under the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. In Ireland, comparable early release mechanisms exist under the Criminal Justice Act 1960, with proposed reforms towards a statutory Parole Board.Across these jurisdictions, key issues include risk assessment, public protection, rehabilitation, licence conditions, recall procedures, and the prisoner’s right to make representations and, in some cases, to legal representation at parole hearings.

The parole evidence rule is a rule of contractual construction which means that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary the provisions of a written agreement. It effectively means that the written contract contains the whole agreement between the parties to it. It can be rebutted, and does not apply when a party is seeking rectification of a contract.

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has published guidance on the Secretary of State’s new power under section 32ZAA of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, which allows certain Parole Board release decisions to be referred to the High Court. This power applies only in exceptional cases involving individuals convicted of serious offences, such as murder, rape, causing or allowing the death of a child and terrorism-related offences. A referral may be considered where release could undermine public confidence in the parole system and where there is a real possibility that the High Court would not be satisfied that continued confinement is no longer necessary for public protection. If both requirements are met, the Secretary of State may refer the case and the High Court will determine whether the statutory release test has been satisfied.

Dispute Resolution analysis: The question for the court was whether Part 18 requests in relation to a policy of After the Event (ATE) insurance should be answered, whether as part of solicitor own client costs assessment (SOCA) or as part of the court’s consideration of the solicitor-client cash account. The court held that there was no strict requirement for a prima facie or arguable case prior to the raising of a Part 18 request in respect of the solicitor-client cash account; a reasonable suspicion was sufficient grounds. Part 18 in this context did not impose the same threshold requirements as disclosure. The specific Part 18 request subject of the appeal related to details of secret commissions paid as part of the solicitor arranging ATE insurance for the lay client to use in a CFA funded personal injury claim. A conflict in previous authorities as to whether such policies can and generally should be subject of Part 18 request was resolved in favour of Part 18 applying. Written by Lauren Godfrey, barrister at Gatehouse Chambers.

[IN THE COUNTY COURT AT [INSERT] OR IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE] [ [Specify division] ] [ [Specify Specialist court] ] [ [Insert location] ] Claim No: [Insert claim number] Between [Insert name and details of the Claimant]        Claimant and [Insert name and details of the Defendant]        Defendant and [Insert name and details of the Third Party]        Third Party Defendant's Additional Claim against Third Party 1 The Claimant claims damages as per the Particulars of Claim against the Defendant. The Defendant intends to defend the claim as per the Defence. 2 The Third Party is and was at all material times a sub-contractor of the Defendant.

SCCO Guide defines this as applications made by any party which relate to existing or intended detailed assessment proceedings. The notice of application should be in Form N244.

SWS Holdings Limited and Greensands Financing PLC (both part of the Southern Water group) applied for two inter-conditional Part 26 schemes of arrangement (scheme) at a convening hearing in September 2025 and sanction hearing in October 2025. The key points appear below (capitalised terms not defined herein are as defined in the convening and sanction judgments). Name of companies SWS Holdings Limited (SWS) and Greensands Financing Plc (Midco) Industry sector Water Place of debtors’ incorporation and jurisdictional factors Both incorporated in England and Wales.SWS executed a deed of contribution in favour of the SWS Borrowers and similarly, MidCo entered into a deed of contribution to make it joint principal obligor under the MidCo Facility Agreement. Legal counsel involved SWS: Mr D Bayfield KC and Mr R Perkins (instructed by Latham & Watkins LLP)MidCo : Mr W Willson and Mr E Lupi (instructed by Jones Day)PP Noteholders: Mr J Curl KC Timeline 11 July 2024: OFWAT rejected SWS's business plan