The answer depends entirely on the contract between the parties. Standard form contracts provide for the granting of extensions of time and these usually include a provision for force majeure which would include the effects of coronavirus (COVID-19). The JCT standard forms of building contract contain an extension of time provision which defines the contractor’s entitlement to an extension of time by reference to ‘relevant events’. The definition of relevant events includes ‘force majeure’. The JCT standard forms do not contain a definition of force majeure, therefore, it is necessary to consider the common law position as it pertains to frustration. In Davis Contractors v Fareham UDC, the House of Lords gave what is now regarded as the classic definition of the doctrine when it said that frustration: ‘…occurs wherever the law recognises that without default of either party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called

This Q&A considers whether a contractor on a residential construction project may sue its sub-contractor under the Defective Premises Act 1972 (DPA 1972), section 1. Overview of DPA 1972, s 1 DPA 1972 provides homeowners, leaseholders, and others affected by defects in residential properties, with rights of action against the parties responsible for the defects. In terms of DPA 1972, s 1(1), a person who, in the course of a business, takes on work for, or in connection with, the provision of a dwelling owes a duty to ensure that the work is done in a workmanlike or professional manner, with proper materials, so that on completion of the work, the dwelling is fit for habitation (the ‘section 1 duty’). The section 1 duty is owed to: • any person who acquires a legal or equitable interest in the dwelling (s 1(1)(b)), and • ‘if the dwelling was provided to the order of any person, that person’ (s 1(1)(a)) If a contractor was owed

A local authority is required to ensure that relevant tenancy checks are completed before they can serve notice in respect of a right to buy (RTB) application. However, how this verification is carried is not mandated by legislation or guidance and is a matter for each local authority to determine to ensure that fraudulent or ineligible applications are identified and rejected promptly. For the tenant to satisfy eligibility conditions, they must: • be an individual, who occupies the dwelling house as their only or principal home, as set out in section 81 of the Housing Act 1985 (HA 1985). For more information, see Practice Note: The tenancy condition • not be subject to any exceptions relating to the property

A counterparts clause is a common boilerplate clause which provides that the parties to an agreement may execute separate copies of it, rather than all parties having to sign the same copy of the agreement. It is common practice to sign an agreement in counterparts although there is no statutory basis for it in England

It is open to parties to compromise a dispute in litigation, and reach a settlement. It will often be the case that such an agreement will form a consent order, which will then be a binding order made by the court. Alternatively, the case can be settled by way of a Tomlin order, which provides for a general stay of proceedings save for the purposes of enforcing the agreed terms of a schedule to that order. The benefit of a Tomlin order is that the schedule can contain provisions that a court would not otherwise be able to order. The court does not have any role

This Q&A considers whether there is a court fee payable for an application for an order for leave to prove a nuncupative Will or copy Will under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 (NCPR 1987), SI 1987/2024,

A covenant is a method of controlling elements relating to property to the benefit of other properties in the surrounding area or for a person with a superior interest, such as a landlord. A covenant that restricts the use of a dwelling-house to a single private residence is not uncommon, and may act as a fetter on the right of a tenant of the property to sub-let that property. In Falgor Commercial SA v Alsabahia Inc, the Court of Appeal considered the meaning of a clause that required use as a single private residence in one occupation only and held that it prevented the granting of occupational licences for short stays. In Nemcova v Fairfield Rents Ltd(not reported by LexisNexis®), the Upper Tribunal considered whether a covenant

Section 77 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974) is silent on this specific point. However, CCA 1974, s 77(3) does stipulate that the requirement to provide information to the debtor does not apply in the following circumstances: '(a)

The material scope of the General Data Protection Regulation The General Data Protection Regulation (the GDPR), Regulation (EU) 2016/679 applies to the processing of personal data: • wholly or partly by automated means—eg personal data held in electronic form on a computer or other such device, or • other than by automated means, where that personal data forms part of, or is intended to form part of, a filing system—eg this could include chronologically ordered sets of manual records containing personal data For these purposes, the definitions of Key definitions under data protection law—Personal data and Key definitions under data protection law—Processing are potentially very wide. For

We have assumed that the finance agreement is one to which Part V of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974) applies. We refer you to CCA 1974, s 73 and to Commentary: Part V Entry Into Credit Or Hire Agreements: Goode: Consumer Credit Law and Practice, which gives commentary on CCA 1974, s 73 as well as other sections in CCA 1974, Pt V. Goode has the following to say about the general effect of CCA 1974, s 73. This section provides that unless, before the end of the period of ten days beginning with the date of cancellation, part-exchange goods are returned to the debtor in a condition substantially as good as when they were

We have assumed that the husband and wife owned the bank account as joint tenants. Debts are choses in action (see Brice v Bannister). Among other debts such as mortgage debts, money in building society or savings banks accounts are also choses in action (See R v Marland and Jones (1985) 82 Cr App Rep 134, CA) (not reported by LexisNexis®). For further information, see: Debts: Halsbury's Laws of England [5]. Joint ownership of property occurs where two or more persons concurrently owns an asset. See: Co-Ownership: Halsbury's Laws of England [828] for more information. The right of survivorship attaches to a joint tenancy of personalty, including choses (or things)

Generally, a deed of appointment is not always necessary when appointing capital out of a discretionary trust. Needless to say that is not the end of the matter. Appointment of capital from a discretionary trust is pursuant to the exercise of a power and, in general, no formality is required for the exercise of a power. Statute, however, does impose formalities in certain cases and the settlor frequently does. If the capital to be appointed to the beneficiaries is formed of shares in a company, then an informal appointment will be sufficient to pass the beneficial interest but, in order to pass the legal interest, a share transfer must be executed. If the capital is land then the disposition of the land, or an interest in the same to a beneficiary, can only be