TMT analysis: Judit Garrido-Fontova, associate at Kemp Little, discusses the data protection law in relation to the creation and sharing of deepfakes, what remedies are available, and considers guidance provided by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and the European Data Protection Board (EDPB).

There is little point in collecting data on a firm's financial performance if that data is not used to improve its performance. A firm’s fee income, fee-earning capacity and fees per fee earner are all critical indicators of its current financial performance. This Precedent can be used to analyse these indicators and to undertake a modelling exercise to understand the potential financial impact if any of the current variable figures change. To complete this analysing and modelling exercise you need to follow a three–step process: • step 1—calculate key variables • step 2—calculate and analyse the firms current fee income, fee-earning capacity and fees per fee earner • step 3—undertake a modelling  exercise to understand the potential financial impact of adjusting any of the variables This Precedent will assist with steps 2 and 3. It should be used in conjunction with Precedent: Variable calculations, which will assist with step 1 of this process. Please click for an Excel version of this Precedent. In this version each worksheet has auto-calculation

There is little point in collecting data on a firm's financial performance if that data is not used to improve its performance. A firm’s fee income, fee-earning capacity and fees per fee earner are all critical indicators of its current financial performance. This Precedent provides a worked example showing how to analyse these indicators and undertake a modelling exercise to understand the potential financial impact if any of the current variable figures change. To complete this analysis and modelling exercise you need to follow a three-step process: • step 1—calculate key variables • step 2—calculate and analyse the firm’s current fee income, fee-earning capacity and fees per fee earner • step 3—undertake a modelling exercise to understand the potential financial impact of adjusting any of the variables This Precedent illustrates how you would undertake steps 2 and 3 of this process. A blank version of this Precedent is available for use—see: Analysing fee income, fee-earning capacity and fees per fee earner—blank. Please click for an Excel

This Practice Note summarises the EU Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to horizontal co-operation agreements (Horizontal Guidelines). The Practice Note also refers to the revised Research and Development Block Exemption Regulation (R&D BER) and the Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation (SBER), together referred to as the Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations (HBERs). The Horizontal Guidelines provide guidance on how to apply the HBERs and how to assess other types of cooperation agreements, such as R&D agreements, production agreements, purchasing agreements, commercialisation agreements, information exchange, standardisation agreements, standard terms and sustainability agreements. NOTE—This Practice Note does not cover the HBERs or sustainability agreements in full detail. See the following separate Practice Notes: EU competition law and research and development agreements, EU competition law and joint production agreements and Sustainability and EU competition law. Introduction What is a horizontal agreement? A ‘horizontal agreement’ is an agreement entered into by separate undertakings that operate at the same level of the supply chain (ie actual or

This Practice Note summarises the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) guidance on the application of the Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 (CA 1998) to horizontal agreements (Horizontal Guidance). The Horizontal Guidance replaces the European Commission Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, which no longer apply in the UK. This Practice Note also refers, where appropriate, to the Competition Act 1998 (Vertical Agreements Block Exemption) Order 2022 (VABEO) and the CMA’s guidance on the VABEO (VABEO Guidance). NOTE—The Horizontal Guidance includes an outline of the application of the block exemptions for research and development (R&D) and specialisation agreements, which came into force on 1 January 2023. These block exemptions are covered in summary only in the Practice Note. Sustainability is not covered by the Horizontal Guidance; it is subject to separate guidance and is not covered in this Practice Note. Introduction What is a horizontal agreement? A ‘horizontal agreement’ is an agreement entered into by separate undertakings that operate at the same level of the supply chain (ie, actual or potential competitors),

Local Government analysis: Holly Bontoft, associate at Fieldfisher, summarises the key changes introduced by the Children and Social Work Act 2017 (CASWA 2017) and considers the implications for local authorities and social workers.

Law360, London: On 10 September 2024 , the UK's Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) launched a criminal prosecution against Olumide Osunkoya, the first of an owner of a firm enabling crypto asset trading, who pled guilty to the charges. The regulator announced that it had secured its first conviction on 30 September 2024 for two offences relating to the unlawful operation of multiple crypto automated teller machines that were not registered with the FCA.

This Practice Note is intended to serve as a guide to assessing vertical agreements that fall outside The Competition Act 1998 (Vertical Agreements Block Exemption) Order 2022 (VABEO). It primarily draws from and provides an overview of the CMA’s Guidance on vertical restraints (2022 Guidance). This Practice Note assumes familiarity with VABEO and the Chapter I prohibition under section 2 of the Competition Act 1998 (CA 1998). For a full analysis of the availability of VABEO, including the application of the 30% market share thresholds, and the hardcore and excluded restrictions, see further, Introduction to the application of Chapter I to vertical agreements and The Competition Act 1998 (Vertical Agreements Block Exemption) Order 2022. In addition, more generally, see Chapter I prohibition. Starting position Where vertical agreements fall outside the safe harbour of VABEO (eg where the 30% market share thresholds are exceeded or there are hardcore/excluded restrictions present), there is no general presumption that they will fall within the Chapter I prohibition or that, if they do, they will not

This Practice Note is intended to serve as a guide to assessing vertical agreements that fall outside the Vertical Agreement Block Exemption Regulation 2022/720 (VBER 2022). It contains (amongst other things) an overview of the Commission’s 2022 Guidelines on vertical restraints (2022 Guidelines) which set out detailed guidance for the parties to follow in this context. This Practice Note assumes familiarity with the VBER 2022. For a full analysis of the availability of the VBER 2022, including the application of the 30% market share thresholds, and the hardcore and excluded restrictions, see further, Introduction to the application of Article 101 TFEU to vertical agreements and The Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2022/720. It also assumes a familiarity with Articles 101(1) and (3) TFEU. See further, Article 101(1) TFEU—the prohibition on restrictive agreements and Individual exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU. Starting position Where vertical agreements fall outside the safe harbour of VBER 2022 (eg where the 30% market share thresholds are exceeded or there are hardcore restrictions present), there is no general presumption

ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. On 10 May 2022, the Commission adopted a new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2022/720 (VBER 2022). The VBER 2022 replaced the previous Vertical Restraints Block Regulation 330/2010 (VBER 2010, also referred to as the VRBE in this Practice Note) on 1 June 2022. This Practice Note was drafted for the VBER 2010. NOTE—The VBER 2010 expired on 31 May 2022 and was replaced by the VBER 2022 with effect from 1 June 2022. Under Article 10 VBER 2022, there was a 12 month transition period (ending on 31 May 2023) to accommodate pre-existing vertical agreements already in force on 31 May 2022 which satisfied the conditions for exemption provided in the VBER 2010 on 31 May 2022 but which did not satisfy the conditions for exemption provided in the VBER 2022. This Practice Note is therefore for background information only. For an assessment of the VBER 2022, see further, Introduction to the application of Article 101 TFEU to vertical agreements

ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. This Market Standards Trend Report looks at reporting by premium listed commercial companies in 2022 on the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). The report provides an overview of the regulatory regime, examines how FTSE 350 companies have responded to the reporting requirements and includes examples of best practice reporting. The report also includes commentary and practical guidance from leading practitioners in this area. What does the Market Standards trend report cover? This report looks at the

This Practice Note summarises statutory and regulatory requirements for the preparation of a directors’ remuneration report by quoted companies in relation to directors’ remuneration reports for financial years beginning on or after 11 May 2025. These requirements do not apply to companies with shares admitted on AIM. The Companies (Directors’ Remuneration and Audit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (SI 2025/439) came into force on 11 May 2025. These Regulations removed certain overlapping requirements from the directors’ remuneration reporting framework that were introduced in 2019 in order to implement EU law. These Regulations also meant that unquoted traded companies are no longer required to produce a directors’ remuneration policy or report. The Regulations therefore have mostly reverted the legislative position back to the position that existed before 2019 (although the requirement introduced in 2019 to treat a CEO who is not on the board as a director for the purposes of the regime has been retained, as has the requirement to seek a further vote on the remuneration policy at the next AGM if there