Commercial analysis: The English High Court recently considered the validity of a franchisor’s counter notice opposing the extension of a franchise agreement. In the case of Winkworth Franchising Ltd v Goble (not reported by LexisNexis®UK), the franchisee had failed to provide accounts within the time frame required under the agreement. By way of summary judgment, the court granted a declaration in favour of the franchisor. Written by Gordon Drakes, partner at Fieldfisher.

Arbitration analysis: Referred to as ‘the most important case about international arbitration to be heard in London for a very long time’, this judgment follows the earlier 23 October 2023 judgment which decided that the Award on Liability and the Final Award (the ‘Awards) for USD$11bn in favour of P&ID were obtained by fraud and procured in a manner contrary to public policy. In this judgment, the court refused P&ID’s leave to appeal and found that the Awards should be set aside. The discussion surrounding leave to appeal centred around the court’s alleged errors and/or mistakes, including findings in relation to section 68(2)(g) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) and AA 1996, s 73. Five other compelling reasons were also advanced by P&ID, but to no avail. The court also considered the circumstances in which an award should be set aside. Written by Gordon Blanke, Founding Principal at Blanke Arbitration and Farhan Shafi, associate at Blanke Arbitration.

The English High Court recently delivered its judgment in the case of A1 and others v P in respect of a claim made under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996), where the claimants (A1, A2, and A3) sought an order from the court setting aside a London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) award on the basis that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to decide the dispute. This significant judgment explores whether a solicitor has the usual (or implied) authority to bind its clients to contracts with third parties and why it is important for parties to consider the merits of any potential jurisdictional challenges at the outset of a dispute.

Law360: English nationalism is not a legally protected philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010), the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) has ruled in a claim by a health worker—the latest in a string of cases that seek a legal shield for controversial, non-religious worldviews.

This News Analysis considers the recent Singaporean case of Re BKR [2015] SGCA 26 (Singapore Court of Appeal). Although an international matter, the Singaporean Mental Capacity Act (SMCA) is identical to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and English case law was analysed in the judgment.

Arbitration analysis: In the first of two separate judgments, the London Circuit Commercial Court (LCCC) found that it was able to determine whether an arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to hear a dispute under an arbitration agreement, under section 32(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996). In the second judgment, the court granted a declaration sought by Barclays Bank plc (Barclays) that an arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear a claim brought by VEB.RF (VEB) under a currency swap agreement. This declaration was made in circumstances where Barclays had validly served a notice on VEB pursuant to the terms of an arbitration agreement, requiring VEB's claim to be heard by the English courts. Written by Tatiana Minaeva, partner, and Ana Margetts, associate, at Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP.

Dispute Resolution analysis: The English High Court has ordered a cryptocurrency exchange (Huobi) to transfer into the jurisdiction a defendant’s cryptocurrency held outside the jurisdiction to facilitate the claimant’s efforts to enforce its judgment against those assets. Under the court’s order, the cryptocurrency is first to be converted into fiat currency and then transferred to the Court Funds Office, either directly or via the claimant’s solicitors. Philip Lis, senior asssociate and Vrinda Vinayak, associate at Herbert Smith Freehills examine the decision.

Arbitration analysis: On 31 July 2023, after a 21-week trial, Mr Justice Calver handed down a 407-page judgment in Suppipat and others v Narongdej and others in which he found for the claimant companies. The complex claim, brought by Thai entrepreneur, Mr Nopporn Suppipat, is the latest in a number of proceedings in multiple jurisdictions, including Thailand, the BVI, Singapore and London. Mr Suppipat and his associated companies (‘C2-4’) were successful in their tortious and contractual claims, and in claiming that this activity was part of a wider asset-stripping strategy by 17 defendants (including former colleagues and his nominee shareholder) in an attempt to avoid payment of partial awards rendered by ICC arbitral tribunals. The case is important because it demonstrates that the English courts will not hesitate to apply conflicts of law methods to establish the liability of third party ‘enablers’ in intricate fraud schemes involving an interplay of foreign laws, where the enablers did not directly benefit from the schemes but assisted in the fraud. It also shows the interplay between arbitral tribunals and the English courts, which, in this scenario, became an indirect supervisory court for the enforcement of arbitral awards. Written by Krysteen Ormond (solicitor) and Noor Kadhim (counsel) of the Dispute Resolution team at Fieldfisher.

Arbitration analysis: This decision arises from two applications in connection with A&N Seaways and Projects PVT Limited’s (the ‘Claimant’ or ‘Charterer’) claim form against Allianz Bulk Carriers DMCC (the ‘Respondent’ or ‘Owners’), seeking to challenge an award under section 72 (2) (a) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (the ‘1996 Act’) (the ‘Section 72 Challenge’): I. The claimant’s application for permission to amend its claim form to include new particulars of fraud (the ‘Amendment Application’); and II. The respondent’s application to strike out the section 72 Challenge (the ‘Strike-Out Application’). In addressing the Amendment Application, the court emphasized that the 28-day time limit for challenging an award in section 70 (3) of the 1996 Act, reflects the principles of speed and finality in arbitration. The court applied the principles established by Colman J in Kalmneft JSC v Glencore International AG [2001] 2 AER (Comm) 577 and later restated by Popplewell J (as he then was) in Terna Bahrain Holding Company WLL v Al Shamsi [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 86, regarding extensions of time to challenge an arbitration award. For the purposes of the Strike-Out Application, the court also considered the circumstances under which a party is deemed to ‘take no part in the proceedings’, as required for challenges under section 72 of the 1996 Act. In its decision, the court dismissed the claimant’s Amendment Application and granted the respondent’s Strike-Out Application. Additionally, the court applied the principles set out by Mr Justice Miles in Libyan Investment Authority v King [2023] EWHC 434 (Ch) and awarded the respondent its costs on an indemnity basis. Written by Dr. Ademola Bamgbose, solicitor advocate and senior associate at Hogan Lovells, London and Bethany Pedder, associate at Hogan Lovells, London.

Dispute Resolution analysis: The High Court granted declarations as to the validity of swap transactions and the effect of terms in two settlement agreements. The claimant banks, Deutsche Bank (DB) and Dexia, asked the court to grant this relief because the defendant Italian local authority (Brescia) had launched new proceedings in Italy in contravention of the earlier settlement agreements in which it had accepted the validity of the transactions and waived the arguments it now sought to advance in Italy. The court was satisfied that it should grant the declarations as these would be effective in preventing the defendant from undercutting the settlements. Written by Madeleine Brown, senior knowledge lawyer and Robert Daniell, senior counsel at Macfarlanes LLP.

ARCHIVED: This archived Practice Note considers the public sector ‘fluency duty’, ie the requirement for workers in customer-facing roles in public authorities to be fluent in the English language (or in Wales, in English and Welsh). The fluency duty Since 21 November 2016 there is a statutory requirement for workers in customer-facing roles in public authorities to be fluent in the English language (or, in Wales, in English and Welsh). This measure was introduced because it was thought that sufficient fluency and comprehension in all interactions with the public would help ensure more efficient and effective public services. The duty is for those workers to be able to speak English (and/or Welsh) fluently. In this context, fluently mean that they have a command of spoken English (and/or Welsh) which is sufficient to enable the effective performance of their role. A draft statutory Code of Practice to assist employers in complying with the fluency duty was published in October 2016 and then an updated version was produced in November

Most simplified work, study and business routes have an English language requirement which applies to applications for entry clearance and permission to stay. In some cases, main applicants will be required to meet an English language requirement also at the settlement stage, while all dependant partners and dependant children applying for settlement will need to meet one. This Practice Note sets out the alternative ways that applicants can meet this requirement. Applicants must demonstrate English language ability at a specified level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). These are generally either CEFR Level B1 (Intermediate/demonstrating the ability to communicate in everyday situations) or B2 (Upper Intermediate/showing stronger communication and understanding of complex topics). The specified level, and which ‘components’ of ability are required (listening, speaking, writing, reading), will depend on the route applied for, and are stated in the Immigration Rules for the relevant route. The ways that the applicant can show that they meet this level, in the relevant components, are set out in the Immigration Rules,