Dispute Resolution analysis: The Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) has successfully resisted an attempt to enforce twelve US judgments obtained against it, on the grounds of state immunity. In a wide-ranging decision, the High Court held that Iran had not submitted to the High Court’s jurisdiction by steps taken in the enforcement proceedings to date. It also concluded it had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the US court for the purposes of recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (CJJA 1982). This decision provides useful guidance regarding the requirements for enforcing foreign judgments against States in the English courts. It also clarifies the application of section 5 of the State Immunity Act 1978 (SIA 1978) (the ‘personal injury’ exception) in the context of the wider ‘terrorism’ exception under the equivalent US legislation. Written by Harriet Campbell, PSL, with Sue Millar, partner and Stephen Ashley, of counsel, at Stephenson Harwood LLP.

Note: the cases referred to below are not reported by LexisNexis®. Introduction Interim measures, which contain remedies such as freezing orders or injunctions, are important in any dispute as they intend to prevent irreparable harm and hollow outcomes. In Indonesia, interim measures are also really important and can be very helpful, but are rarely applied. This is not because this remedy lacks theoretical legal support. In fact, there is supporting legal framework in this area. However, the reality is that practice remains rare and, to some, opaque. There is a promising interesting development in recent years, which hopefully shapes this practice in the future. This practice note seeks to provide an insight into Indonesian legal theory and practice in respect of interim arbitration awards and measures. Indonesian legal framework for interim awards and measures–in courts Interim measures are traditionally found and practiced by the courts. Indonesian courts have a specified, narrow range of interim remedies, which focuses mainly on preserving assets or the status quo rather than

Introduction This Practice Note sets out the legal regime governing enforcement of international arbitral awards in Egypt. This regime is embodied in the Egyptian Arbitration Law (hereinafter ‘the EAL’), which is derived from the UNCITRAL Model Law (hereinafter ‘the Model Law’) and the New York Convention for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter ‘the NY Convention’) to which Egypt is a signatory. Egypt ratified the NY Convention on 9 March 1959 and the convention entered into force by its adoption by the parliament and its publication in the official Gazette on 14 February 1959. The EAL applies to the enforcement of all international arbitral awards whether rendered inside or outside Egypt so long as they are classified as international awards. Pursuant to EAL Article 3 an international award is one which is rendered in an international arbitration, the latter being defined in reference to more than one test, and, hence, the starting point must be defining what is considered an international arbitration. Definition of international v domestic

Note: the Luxembourg cases referred to below are not all reported by LexisNexis®. Luxembourg has a favourable setting for arbitration generally, and has a known record of accomplishment in the enforcement of arbitral awards. Luxembourg is a forum that is particularly respectful of the hierarchy of norms, and gives considerable importance to international treaties. Indeed, before listing the grounds for refusing the exequatur, Article 1246 of the New Code of Civil Procedure (the ‘NCCP’) provides that the Court of Appeal may refuse to enforce the arbitral award only ‘subject to the provisions of international conventions’. As evidence for this, Luxembourg is a party to a number of international treaties, agreements and conventions that allow for greater effectiveness in the enforcement of arbitral awards. In particular, the Grand-Duchy is a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award of 1958 (the ‘New York Convention’), which is applicable for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral

This Practice Note considers the provisions in Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, Brussels I (recast) dealing with the enforcement of foreign judgments between EU Member States. It considers what judgments can be enforced, as well as what happens when conflicting judgments are encountered. The general rules in enforcement are set out together with the documents required, including any translations. Also considered is the application process for the enforcement of a judgment of the courts of an EU Member State, any appeal as well as the grounds on which enforcement of a judgment may be refused. For guidance on the recognition of judgments under Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, Brussels I (recast), see Practice Note: Recognition of judgments under Brussels I (recast) which sets out general provisions and then looks in some detail at the grounds on which recognition might be refused followed by how to make an application requesting that the court refuses to recognise the judgment. For guidance on enforcement under Regulation (EC) 44/2001, Brussels I, see Practice Note: E&W Brussels I—enforcement of judgments [Archived]. Application

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: In Bluestone Mortgages Ltd v Stoute, the High Court heard an appeal concerning the enforcement of a possession order by a mortgage lender where part of the secured debt was subject to a mental health crisis moratorium under the Debt Respite Scheme Regulations 2020. The core issue was whether, where a judgment or order relates to both a moratorium debt and non-moratorium debt, the creditor requires the court’s permission to enforce the non-moratorium part of the debt during a moratorium period. Mr Justice Mellor upheld the lower court’s interpretation of regulation 7 of the Debt Respite Scheme (Breathing Space Moratorium and Mental Health Crisis Moratorium) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020 (the Regulations), SI 2020/1311 such that it prohibits enforcement without court permission if any part of the debt is protected. The judgment reinforces that mixed security triggers moratorium protections. Practitioners advising secured lenders must take note: enforcement action, even when largely related to non-moratorium debt, may require the court’s permission if the moratorium debt is also secured. The decision prioritises debtor protection, particularly during mental health crises, and limits automatic enforcement by requiring court permission, even where a secured creditor holds a valid possession order. Written by Justin Perring, barrister at New Square Chambers.

The orders of the Court of Protection do not always require enforcement—for example, a declaration regarding P’s capacity or lack of capacity, or an order declaring that a particular course of action is lawful or unlawful. However, there are many circumstances where it will be necessary to enforce orders of the court, such as where there has been financial abuse of P’s property and financial affairs or where personal contact with P needs to be controlled. The Court of Protection (CoP) has wide ranging powers to enforce its orders under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) and the Court of Protection Rules 2017 (COPR 2017), SI 2017/1035. MCA 2005, s 47(1) confers on the CoP the same extensive powers of enforcement as the High Court. As with the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR 1998), the COPR 2017 have the overriding objective of enabling the CoP to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost, and they provide that the CoP must further the overriding objective by actively managing cases at all times

This Practice Note sets out the methods of enforcement available to enforce an order made under section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA 1996). It details the steps to be taken following an order for sale where one party fails to execute a conveyance together with the procedure to be followed and explains the procedure to be followed on an application to commit for contempt of court. TOLATA 1996, s 14 enables the court to make a declaration as to the nature and extent of a person’s interest in a property subject to a trust of land and/or for an order for sale of the property. Any trustee or beneficiary of the property is entitled to bring such a claim. See Practice Note: Eligibility to apply under TOLATA 1996. Order for sale TOLATA 1996, s 14 confers a discretion upon the court to make an order relating to the exercise by the trustees of any of their functions as it thinks fit. When determining an application

If, for any reason, a developer fails to meet its obligations in an agreement entered into or binding on it under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) (referred to as a planning obligation/section 106 agreement), the relevant local planning authority (LPA) can take action to enforce the performance of the obligations in the section 106 agreement. As soon as a developer realises that it is unable to meet obligations in a section 106 agreement it should liaise with the LPA and seek to discharge or modify the obligation. For example, it could seek to reduce or otherwise modify a required contribution or negotiate a later trigger date for payment/delivery/compliance. See Practice Note: Renegotiating planning obligations/section 106 agreements. Where this is not possible, and the developer fails to comply with an obligation in a section 106 agreement, the LPA has discretion in deciding whether, and how, to enforce a planning obligation. There is a general willingness of the courts to enforce section 106 agreements. As was noted in J A Pye (Oxford)

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The court held that on a proper construction of the terms of a settlement agreement, a liquidator was entitled to direct a counterparty to transfer a property to the company or a third-party nominee, and the liquidator was entitled to a declaration to that effect notwithstanding that she had not yet given the requisite direction. Written by Simon Passfield, barrister at Guildhall Chambers and deputy Insolvency and Companies Court Judge.

ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. This Practice Note provides guidance on the regulation of sex establishments as provided for by Schedule 3 to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 (LG(MP)A 1982) as amended by the Policing and Crime Act 2009 (PCA 2009). It outlines the criminal offences arising from a breach and the penalties which may be imposed on conviction. What is a sex establishment? LG(MP)A 1982, Sch 3, as amended by PCA 2009, s 27, introduced a new category of sex establishment called a ‘sexual entertainment venue’, in addition to the existing categories of ‘sex shop’ and ‘sex cinema’. Sex establishments are defined by LG(MP)A 1982, Sch 2. There are four categories of sex establishments: • sex shops • sex cinemas • sexual entertainment venues • hostess bars LG(MP)A 1982, Sch 3 empowers a council to licence these premises. The licence application requirements are set out in LG(MP)A 1982, Sch 3, para 10. When considering applications in relation to a licence for a sex

Practitioners should note that the Law Commission announced it would be reviewing the product liability regime established under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (CPA 1987) on 31 July 2025. The purpose is to assess whether the current legal framework remains effective in addressing harm caused by defective products, particularly in light of technological advancements over the past 40 years. The review aims to examine the regime’s adequacy in managing risks associated with emerging digital technologies and consider potential reforms to ensure it continues to protect consumers while supporting innovation and industry. For further information, see: LNB News 01/08/2025 53. Powers exercised by the Secretary of State/enforcement authorities under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 Prohibition notices Under CPA 1987, s 13(1)(a), the Secretary of State may serve a notice on any person prohibiting them from supplying, offering to supply, exposing for supply, or possessing for supply, any relevant goods which are considered unsafe, except with the consent of the Secretary of State and in accordance with the conditions (if any) on which consent is given. Contravention