The question of liability for causing psychiatric illness is a wide topic. Each case will be heavily fact dependent. This Q&A will only set out the broad parameters of the question. The fact that a claimant is in a contractual relationship or is a contractor of the party (such as a public authority) whose negligence may factually be causative of his psychiatric injury does not disapply the rules which apply specially into claims for compensation for adverse psychiatric effects. Claimants in stress cases have usually been the subject of a continuous causative process and are normally considered to be primary victims. Most cases of occupational stress are concerned with an employer's liability to an employee. In this question, it appears that the individual is not employed by the public authority but is in a 'commercial' relationship. The difference is important as all employers have a duty to take reasonable

In answering the above, we have taken into consideration whether there are any legal duties arising from the commissioning of services by a local authority (LA) for a third party remains with the LA. The obligations placed upon a local authority as the commissioner of services on behalf of a third party depends will depend upon the basis that the services are commissioned, ie are they commissioned by the LA in furtherance of a statutory duty to provide that service or as a matter of expediency to facilitate a required outcome. Commissioning of services by a third party in exercise of statutory

Section 278 agreements An agreement pursuant to section 278 of the Highways Act 1980 (HIA 1980) allows a local highways authority to enter into a legal agreement with a developer for the developer to either pay for or make alterations or improvements to the public highway, to facilitate development. A developer will ordinarily carry out works under an agreement made under HIA 1980, s 278; see Lexis®PSL Property Practice Note: Negotiating a section 278 agreement between National Highways and a developer and Precedent: Precedent s 278 agreement. The procedure for entering into an agreement under HIA 1980, s 278 is the same as for entering into an agreement

If the application cannot be validated, the local planning authority must notify and return the planning application fee to the applicant, as required by the Town and Country Planning (Fees for Applications,

This Q&A assumes that the interest in the main property is a lease. Where the main property is a house The tenant of a house which is held under a long lease has the right to acquire an extended lease of the house and premises under section 1(1) of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 (LRA 1967). The definition of ‘house’ in LRA 1967, s 2 therefore serves two purposes. First, it identifies those tenants who are entitled to claim an extended lease. Secondly, in conjunction with ‘premises’, it identifies the extent of the property that they can claim. Where a right to acquire an extended lease can be established, by LRA 1967, s 2(3), the house and premises includes any ‘garage…which at the relevant time [is] let…with the house’

Article 23(2) of Directive 2001/83/EC (consolidated version 26.07.2019), the Pharmaceutical Code requires the marketing authorisation holder (MAH) to report to the competent authorities ‘any other new information which might influence the evaluation of the benefits and risks of the medicinal product concerned’, including ‘data on the use of the medicinal product where such use is outside the terms of the marketing authorisation’ (ie off-label

Merger of a leasehold interest and its reversionary estate occurs where the ownership of each is by the same person in the same capacity, together with a clear intention to merge. There must not be any intervening estate between the two estates that have united in the same person (Burton v Barclay ), and that unity must be in the same capacity, so that merger does not occur if, for example, one of the estates is held personally but the other as a trustee or personal representative

There will be an automatic determination of a subtenancy at common law on the termination of a head tenancy pursuant to a notice to quit or a break option, in respect of which see Pennell v Payne and PW & Co v Milton Gate Investments Ltd. We have been unable to find direct authority as to whether or not determination of the head tenancy in those circumstances will also automatically end incumbrances such as mortgages. However, Land Registry Practice Guide 31 provides that: ‘...if a lease is determined by notice, forfeiture or frustration, all incumbrances will normally end automatically with the determination

This Q&A discusses the circumstances where a security holder with security over land may become a mortgagee in possession upon exercising its rights of enforcement. It also outlines in broad terms why most security holders will want to avoid that result. For general information on taking security over land, see Practice Note: Taking security over land and for a discussion of enforcing security over land, see Practice Note: Enforcement—security over land. Summary There are a number of remedies available to a creditor with security over land and not all of them involve becoming a mortgagee in possession. In fact, the exercise of the most common remedies being the power of sale and the appointment of a receiver will not, without more, make the security holder a mortgagee in possession. Being a mortgagee in possession gives rise to a number or potentially onerous duties or liabilities and most security holders will want to avoid becoming a mortgagee in possession for that reason if they

Where a liquidator has disclaimed a lease under section 178 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), the rights of a mortgagee of the disclaimed interest continue notwithstanding the disclaimer (IA 1986, s 178(4), and SCMLLA Properties Ltd v Gesso Properties (BVI) Ltd). The mortgagee will therefore retain the rights granted to it under the charge over the underlease, including the right to require repayment of the debt to release the charge by way of a DS1. Any person who has an interest in the disclaimed land, or any person who is under any liability in respect of the disclaimed

Mortgagee's power of sale A legal mortgagee has a right to sell the property, free from the mortgagor's interest. However, this statutory power can be limited by contract, although most modern mortgages often include an express power which modifies and extends the statutory power. In the absence of the statutory or an express power a court order is needed for sale. However, sale is normally effected without a court order by exercising the mortgagee's statutory power. The statutory power of sale becomes exercisable when the mortgage sum has become payable,

Sale by mortgagee Under section 104(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925), a sale by a mortgagee exercising its power of sale will override all rights over which the charge has priority. LPA 1925, s 104(1) provides: ‘A mortgagee exercising the power of sale conferred by this Act shall have power, by deed, to convey the property sold, for such estate and interest therein as he is by this Act authorised to sell or convey or may be the subject of the mortgage, freed from all estates, interests, and rights to which the mortgage has priority, but subject to all estates,