The adoption of a child severs all the child’s legal ties with their birth family and establishes a new legal relationship with the child’s adoptive family. The law does allow for applications to revoke an adoption order, but examples of such applications being successful are few and far between. An order to revoke an adoption order can only be made by the High Court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction. In Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to set aside), a 35 year old man (B) discovered that his birth father was of Muslim origin, although B had been adopted by a Jewish family and brought up as Jewish. The natural mother, who was English, had consented to the adoption, but indicated that she would have had serious misgivings had she been aware that the adoptive family was Jewish. B experienced difficulties when trying to settle and work in Israel. B applied to the High Court for the adoption order to be set aside

The domicile status of the deceased who has died intestate may be a relevant factor in applying the intestacy rules set out in the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (AEA 1925), but AEA 1925 does

We have understood this question to be regarding whether an adult child, who has been adopted, can make a claim against the estate of their natural parents. Under the Adoption Act 1976, s 39(2), an adopted child is treated as a child of the adoptor following adoption. The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (I(PFD)A 1975) fails to define the category of applicants referred to above (I(PFD)A 1975, s 25(1)). Schedule 2 of the Inheritance and Trustees' Powers Act 2014 (ITPA 2014), which came into force on 1 October 2014, amended I(PFD)A 1975, s 1(1)(d), so as to include someone treated as a ‘child of the family’ by the deceased. So, to be eligible, the child would need

In CPR 19.1 states that ‘[a]ny number of claimants or defendants may be joined as parties to the claim’. Parties who do not consent to be joined as claimants are usually joined as defendants; and the court’s permission may be required to join them, depending on the stage of the proceedings reached' (see CPR 19.4). Where a child under 18 is one of the persons proposed to be added as a party, they are required to act through a litigation friend under CPR 21.2(2), unless the court makes an order to waive this requirement (CPR 21.2(3)). The court will usually appoint a litigation friend unless the child already has one. If the child does not have one, a person can act as the litigation friend of a child in relation to a claim if they (a) ‘can fairly and competently conduct proceedings

A Deferred Payment Agreement (DPA) is an agreement whereby the local authority (LA) meets the cost of a person’s care home placement when they would otherwise have to meet that cost themselves. The sums paid by the LA accrue as a debt which is secured against a suitable asset (usually the person’s former home). The debt is repayable after the person dies or, if sooner, when the property or other security

This is a complex question and much depends on the specific facts of the case. In general terms, it is unlawful for any person to be involved in the laundering of criminal property—Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002). This includes acquiring, using, or possessing funds derived from criminal conduct (POCA 2002, s 329). For the offence to be committed, the person involved must know or reasonably have suspected that the proceeds were derived from criminal sources. For the purpose of this Q&A it will be assumed that such knowledge or suspicion exists. Funds derived from unlawful working may represent criminal property and, if so, money laundering will occur where an advisor is paid a professional fee from these funds. There are four defences available to the solicitor in these circumstances:

By section 1(2) of the Commissioners for Oaths Act 1889 a commissioner for oaths may administer any oath or take any affidavit for the purposes of any court or matter in England. CPR PD 32 makes provision for affidavits and states at paragraph 5.2 that an affidavit must have a jurat which is signed by all deponents and completed and signed by the person ‘before whom the affidavit was sworn’. There is no further guidance in either the Act or the CPR (or various other statutory provisions where the same is repeated) as to what is meant by being signed ‘before’ the person administering the oath. The Law Commission

Under regulation 3(1) of the Agency Workers Regulations 2010 (AWR 2010), SI 2010/93, an agency worker is an individual: • supplied by a temporary work agency • to work temporarily for and under the supervision and direction of a hirer • who has a contract with the temporary work agency which is: ◦ a contract of employment with the agency, or ◦ any other contract with the agency to perform work or services personally However, an individual is not an agency worker if: • the contract the individual has with the agency has the effect that the agency's status is that of a client or customer of a profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual, or • there is a contract under which the individual is available to work

The relevant provisions are set out separately in the Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTR 1998), SI 1998/1833 and the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996). The first question is whether a particular agency worker has rights under WTR 1998 as: • a ‘worker’ as defined in WTR 1998, reg 2(1), or • an agency worker brought within the scope of WTR 1998 by WTR 1998, reg 36(1) Under WTR 1998, a worker is someone who has entered into or works (or worked) under: • a contract of employment, or • any other contract (which may be express or implied and, if it is express, may be oral or in writing) under which the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of the individual’s profession or business undertaking This means that, in order

In answering this Q&A, it has been assumed it is referring to an agency relationship between two corporate entities operating in England and Wales and that the agent’s authority has not been extended beyond that set out in the agency agreement, either verbally or by conduct. We also assume that entering into a collateral warranty is not in the ordinary course of business of the principal and the authority to enter into contracts is set out in the agency agreement and not under a separate power of attorney. As noted in Practice Note: Scope and authority of the agent, an agent’s authority is conferred by its principal. Authority in business matters is usually to introduce, conclude, or otherwise deal with contracts between the principal and

Section 32(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002) states that: ‘A notice is an entry in the register in respect of the burden of an interest affecting a registered estate or charge.’ LRA 2002, s 132(3)(b) provides that for the purposes of LRA 2002: ‘References to an interest affecting an estate or charge are to an adverse right affecting the title to the estate or charge.’ LRA 2002, s 34(1) states that: ‘A person who claims to be entitled to the benefit of an interest affecting a registered estate or charge may, if the interest is not excluded by section 33, apply to the registrar for the entry in

What is the doctrine of frustration? If the contract does not include a force majeure clause or it does but the applicable force majeure event is not included, it may be possible for the parties to rely on the common law doctrine of frustration. A contract will be discharged by frustration if after formation, an event occurs which renders further performance of the contract impossible, illegal or something different from what was contemplated by the parties when entering into the contract. Frustration is not a straightforward doctrine to rely on, however, as it is dependent on interpreting the true construction of the terms of a contract in the context of the nature of that contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances when it was made. If there is a radical difference between the original contractual obligation and the performance that is possible due to a change in circumstances, the doctrine of frustration may apply. Successful reliance on the doctrine of frustration is dependent on the parties having not made provision