The usual covenant to yield up imposes two obligations; one being to deliver up vacant possession of the demised premises to the landlord at the end of the term. This obligation includes the duty upon the tenant to remove all chattels brought onto the premises by him or his subtenants or licensees during the tenancy. Clearly, where a tenant has right to hold over on the expiry of the fixed term (eg under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954)), the tenant has a right to continue in occupation of the demised premises after the expiry date and use the premises for all lawful purposes which are consistent with the lease and the relevant statutory scheme which protects his occupation. Such a right includes the right to bring chattels into the land (as being consistent with his lawful

A number of statutory provisions (including section 33 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 (LG(MP)A 1982)) except public bodies from the general principles governing the enforceability of restrictive covenants and so enable them to enforce covenants despite not owning adjacent land. Under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925), a person with an interest in freehold and certain leasehold land can apply to the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal (previously the Lands Tribunal) for the modification or discharge of a restrictive covenant. LPA 1925, s 84(1) provides: ‘The Upper Tribunal shall (without prejudice to any concurrent jurisdiction

We assume that the query relates to a restrictive covenant. Covenants restricting the use of land imposed by a seller may be divided into three classes: • covenants imposed for the seller’s own benefit • covenants imposed as owner of other land, of which the land sold formed a part, and intended to protect or benefit the unsold land • covenants on a sale of land to various buyers who, with their respective successors-in-title, are intended mutually to enjoy the benefit of, and be bound by, the covenants The first category of covenants is personal to the seller and only enforceable by them, unless expressly assigned. The second category ‘runs’ with the land and these covenants are enforceable without express assignment

We refer you to the following Practice Notes: • Consumer credit agreements—pre-contract requirements • Responsible lending requirements—CONC 5 • FSMA 2000—private rights of action for breach of statutory duty • Consumer Redress Schemes The rules in chapters 4 and 5 of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)’s Consumer Credit Sourcebook (CONC 4 and 5) replaced the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)’s Irresponsible Lending Guidelines (ILG) that were in place before regulation of consumer credit became the responsibility of the FCA. You will note from Practice Note: FSMA

As a general rule, there is nothing to prevent a creditor imposing whatever preconditions to supply they deem appropriate subject to statutory exceptions (generally in relation to consumer credit, public policy and illegality). Whether or not the preconditions are accepted by a third party (in your question an individual or another company) is a matter of commercial negotiation. See: Guide to dealing with a distressed business—overview and Practice Note: A creditor's guide to dealing with a company in financial difficulty. In this example, if the third party is a connected person, ie a shareholder or a director of the company in liquidation, and is dependent on the continuation of supply to continue its trade in a new venture, the creditor is more likely to succeed

As set out in the Q&A: ‘Can a creditor take out letters of administration if the family of the deceased are refusing to do so?’, a grant may be made to a creditor of the deceased even if the debt is statute barred. See Commentary: Grant to a creditor: Tristram and Coote’s Probate Practice [6.351] and Coombs v Coombs, which held that the creditor of an intestate is entitled to a grant of administration, although their right of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations: ‘The question then arises whether a man who claims to be in possession of a right of this description [a debt that is statute barred] is a creditor in such a sense that this Court is justified in handing over to him the intestate’s effects, and thus putting it in his power to pay

Section 285(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) provides that after the making of a bankruptcy order no person who is a creditor of the bankrupt in respect of a debt provable in the bankruptcy shall either have any remedy against the property or person of the bankrupt or commence any proceedings against him without leave of the court prior to his discharge. On discharge he will be released from those debts. The restriction in IA 1986, s 285(3) only applies to debts provable in the bankruptcy. There is no restriction on a creditor whose debt was incurred after the making of the bankruptcy order (and so is not provable) making a claim against the bankrupt. Care

Bankruptcy Immediately upon a bankruptcy order being made against an individual, that individual is described as an ‘undischarged’ bankrupt. They will retain that status until they are discharged from their bankruptcy, which will automatically occur on the first anniversary of the bankruptcy order being made, unless any order is made suspending a bankrupt’s discharge pursuant to section 279 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986). See Practice Note: The immediate effects of a bankruptcy order on the bankrupt. The role of the bankrupt’s trustee in bankruptcy (trustee) is to realise the assets forming the bankruptcy estate and, after payment of the costs and expenses of the bankruptcy process, to distribute any surplus to the bankrupt’s unsecured creditors. See Practice Note: What assets vest in the trustee in bankruptcy and what steps does the official receiver or trustee in bankruptcy need to take? Only those creditors who are owed ‘provable’ debts can participate

STOP PRESS: From 6 April 2017, the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 were revoked and replaced by the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (IR 2016), SI 2016/1024. The content in this Q&A may have been affected by this change. Costs involved in a winding-up petition The costs or expenses that may be paid from the estate of a company in liquidation are set out in the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 (IR 1986). It will be appreciated that there are frequently only limited funds in an insolvent estate and the priority of payment of the different expenses is accordingly also set out in the IR 1986, SI 1986/1925. IR 1986, SI 1986/1925, r 4.218(3) sets out the expenses that may be paid from the estate of a company in liquidation, and the order of

A guarantee is an agreement between one person/entity (the guarantor) and another person/entity (the creditor), whereby the guarantor will meet the current or future debts owed by the principal debtor to the creditor to the extent the principal debtor fails to do so. Because guarantees tend to be called on when the debtor is either insolvent, or is in a distressed position, they tend to be seen in insolvency processes frequently and as such there is a vast amount of case law concerning their application and use. As a matter of general

Paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA 2020) (as amended) provides that no statutory demand served between 1 March 2020 and 30 June 2021 can provide the basis of a winding up petition presented against either a registered or unregistered company on or after 27 April 2020. There is nothing in CIGA 2020 to prevent a statutory demand being served, but it cannot be used to found a winding up petition. However, an unsatisfied statutory demand does not provide the only gateway to the presentation of a winding up petition—a creditor can petition to wind up a company if the creditor can show that the debtor company is insolvent on either a cash-flow or balance sheet basis (Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), ss 123(1)(e) and 123(2) respectively),

Can a creditor enforce a charging order over an interest in property—does this mean enforcing an interim or final charging order over such property? A creditor ‘enforces’ a final charging order, by seeking an order for sale based on a final charging order. An order for sale cannot be obtained in respect of an interim charging order. As set out in our Practice Note: Charging orders, a charging order is an indirect method of enforcement, ie it is a means of obtaining security in respect of a judgment debt—the charging order itself does not satisfy the judgment debt (it is a precursor to satisfying it). It is a two stage process whereby an interim order is first sought. An interim charging order gives notice that the judgment creditor has charged the debtor’s property to secure the judgment