Arbitration analysis: The arbitration agreements relevant to this application required arbitration in London. The central question was who was entitled to act on behalf of the claimant in those proceedings. The dispute lay between the 9th–10th defendants on the one hand and the 4th–8th defendants on the other, as to who ultimately controlled the claimant and, therefore, who was entitled to nominate an arbitrator in its name. The issue of control over the claimant had already been addressed in a US arbitration (the JAMS arbitration) and in the US courts. The High Court held that the 9th–10th defendants could not rely on the JAMS award because it had not been recognised, could not be recognised, and did not give rise to an issue estoppel. Moreover, recognition was suspended by the competent US court pending determination of the fraud challenge in the arbitration. Written by Elina Mereminskaya, arbitrator at Arbitra International.

Arbitration analysis: On 8 January 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal, sitting through the conseiller de la mise en état, held that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the admissibility of a plea seeking annulment of an exequatur order on the basis of an alleged excess of power of the first-instance judge. According to the court, such a plea concerns the appeal itself and therefore falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal sitting as a full bench, rather than that of the conseiller de la mise en état acting alone. The order was made in proceedings concerning the exequatur in France of a partial award rendered in São Paulo under the auspices of the Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado (CAM), in a shareholder dispute between minority shareholders of Petrobras and the Federative Republic of Brazil (the União). Although the ruling addresses a strictly procedural issue, it usefully clarifies the allocation of functions between the pre-trial judge (conseiller de la mise en état) and the appellate bench in proceedings brought against exequatur orders under article 1527 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. It confirms that a procedural argument seeking to invalidate the appeal (fin de non-recevoir), where that argument is in fact tied to the substance of the appeal itself, must be decided by the full bench and cannot be filtered out by a single judge at the pre-trial stage. The ruling therefore has practical implications for how parties should frame and time their procedural arguments in exequatur-related appeals. Written by Marie-Laure Cartier and Alexandre Meyniel, partners at Cartier Meyniel AARPI with Sami Kabbara, trainee lawyer at the Paris Bar Centre and intern at Cartier Meyniel AARPI.

Arbitration analysis: The court held that, contrary to the tribunal’s decision, an arbitral tribunal which decides it lacks substantive jurisdiction has power to make an award allocating the costs of the challenge between the parties. It is important that the successful party does seek costs from the tribunal, because the court also held that the court does not have jurisdiction under section 63(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) to determine which party should bear the costs of a successful jurisdiction challenge before an arbitrator. The claimant failed to obtain any redress against the tribunal’s decision that he did not have jurisdiction to award costs because its applications under AA 1996, ss 68 and 69 were unsuccessful. Written by Jennifer Haywood, arbitrator, mediator and barrister at Serle Court.

Tax analysis: In Procurement International Ltd, the First-tier Tax Tribunal (FTT) decided that the Appellant was entitled to zero rate supplies of goods that had been exported because it found that the Appellant was the exporter.

This table considers the parties that are likely to receive a collateral warranty under design and build, traditional, construction management and management contracting procurement routes. It lists the likely beneficiaries across the top of the table (funders, purchasers, tenants, the employer and other parties) and considers whether contractors, consultants and sub-contractors will

The following Practice Notes may be useful: • LPAs—the attorney's duties and powers • Personal representatives—powers, duties and remuneration The personal representatives must collect and get in the deceased’s estate and administer it according to the law with due diligence (section 25 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925). The personal representatives owe a duty of care to the beneficiaries

We assume in this scenario that the property is registered at HM Land Registry and A and B are the registered proprietors. We also assume that, since A and B hold the beneficial interest on trust for themselves as tenants in common, there is a Form A restriction on the title. Two trustees will therefore be required for the transfer of the property in order to overreach the beneficial interests in the property and comply with the restriction. On the death of A, legal title to the property vests in B. As the property was held as tenants in common, A’s beneficial share vests in A’s personal

The owners of the land on either side of the river are responsible for the maintenance of the watercourse itself and the flow within it, as where the river runs along the boundary of the property, the landowner is likely to be the riparian

Generally, the personal representatives step into the shoes of the deceased, as they are appointed under a valid Will or the intestacy rules to administer the estate. Under section 25 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, the personal representatives of a deceased person are under a duty to collect and get in the estate of the deceased and administer it according to the law, ie the personal representatives collect in the estate and distribute it to the beneficiaries under a valid Will or the intestacy

This Q&A assumes for the purpose of this query that you are referring to private law children proceedings rather than care proceedings. Section 10(5) of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) lists the people who are entitled to apply for a child arrangements order with respect to

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In the context of data protection, the term 'data subject' is used frequently. For the purposes of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998), 'data subject' is defined as: 'an individual who is the subject of personal data'. The term 'Personal data' is defined as follows: 'data which relate to a living individual who can be identified— (a)     from those data, or (b)     from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely