It is assumed that the beneficiary survived the testator and that their interest under the testator’s Will (in the absence of a survivorship clause) actually vested in them at the date of death. As they subsequently died that interest was then held by their personal representatives to deal with in accordance with the provisions of their Will or

Many Wills will contain provisions that require the recipient of a bequest to have survived for a specified period of time following the death of the testator. Such clauses will often provide that, for example, any beneficiary who does not survive the testator for more than 30 days will be treated as if they had pre-deceased the testator, or that the legacy is contingent upon survival for more than a specified period. The reason that such clauses are often included is to protect assets from being subject to inheritance tax twice in quick succession, or to ensure that, for example, the children of a spouse who dies shortly after her husband do not benefit if this would have been

Where a person is made bankrupt, their assets will be applied by their trustee in bankruptcy towards their liabilities. A beneficiary of a will who is bankrupt therefore may not be able to benefit from the funds due to them from the estate, and the executors must be careful before paying a legacy to a bankrupt beneficiary. Once a bankruptcy has been registered, the official trustee will be appointed as trustee in bankruptcy pending further appointment of a further trustee, and the estate of the bankrupt will vest in the trustee (section 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986)). The duty of the trustee in bankruptcy is to collect in and sell as necessary the assets of the bankrupt in order to satisfy

The Practice Note: Payment of legacies states that where a legatee of either a general legacy or a share in residue is a debtor to the estate, the debt must be brought into account. This principle was established in Cherry v Boultbee (1839) 4 My & Cr 442 (not reported by LexisNexis®) and further affirmed in Re Akerman, Akerman v Akerman. The general principle is explained in Williams on Wills as follows: 'A legatee is not entitled to receive out of the testator's estate any benefit without bringing into account money owing by him to the testator. This is in the nature of a right of set-off, and, as prima facie only money can be set off against money, the principle applies only to money legacies, ie general legacies and not to specific legacies, unless the latter happen to be specific legacies

The doctrine of satisfaction (or ademption by satisfaction, as it is also known) applies in some circumstances where gifts are made by (in most cases) a parent to a child during their lifetimes, with the intention that that gift should count towards a legacy made in a Will. The doctrine is a creature of equity and operates to give effect to the presumed intentions of parents when advancing a portion of their estate to a child. It usually operates alongside what is known as the presumption against double portions: the presumption that the parents would not want a child to be favoured over others by receiving a ‘double portion’—ie a gift inter vivos as well as a legacy, where other children have not received such a gift. Where the presumption arises, the doctrine of ademption

A gift by a Will to a beneficiary is not rendered invalid by the fact that the beneficiary attests a codicil to the Will, even though the codicil confirms the Will unless he also receives a benefit under the codicil. There is a benefit under the codicil when a contingent benefit is made absolute, but not when by revoking

When does the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims apply As of 1 October 2017, the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims (the Protocol) applies to claims by businesses against individuals (including sole traders) for the payment of a debt. As such, the Protocol would apply in the circumstances you described, assuming that the claimant company is seeking to recover payment of a debt from an individual. Note that the Protocol only concerns claims for the payment of a debt, and it does not apply to business-to-business debts, unless the debtor is a sole trader. Prior to 1 October 2017, such claims were governed by the Practice Direction Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols (the Practice Direction). Debt claims which fall outside the ambit of the Protocol will continue to be governed by the Practice Direction. For more information on the Practice Direction Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols,

This Q&A is limited to cover changes to the governance documents of an unincorporated charity. Every charity must have purposes that are exclusively charitable in law. The purposes of a charity will usually be defined by what its governing document says about what it is set up to do and how its funds are to be used if it is wound up. Section 275 of the Charities Act 2011 (CA 2011) allows trustees to change some or all of the purposes of their charity by resolution. Not only does it allow trustees to change

We have assumed for the purposes of this Q&A that there are no provisions in the lease stipulating where payments of monies under the lease should be made and we have focused on relevant information for a representative of the tenant. An option to determine a lease is a contractual arrangement. How it is effected will depend on its own terms. However, we assume that the point is ambiguous. In the case of Blewett v Blewett, a notice was held to be invalid as it was not served on all joint tenants. Logically, notices and payments should be made to all persons/entities who constitute

A notice, once served, cannot be unilaterally withdrawn, nor can the right to enforce it be unilaterally waived either expressly, or by implication (see Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen). However, a notice can be withdrawn or the right to enforce it waived with the consent of the party to whom the notice is given (see Davies v Bristow, Penrhos College v Butler). If both parties agree to the withdrawal, the effect in law will be to create a new lease that takes effect from the expiry of the notice. The withdrawal by consent operates as evidence of an agreement

This question raises the requirement to comply with the terms of a break clause if a tenant is to bring a tenancy to an end. The courts are quite strict when it comes to determining when it has to be exercised. Time is of the essence as is compliance with the terms of the clause. As Lord Diplock in the House of Lords decision in United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council giving the majority judgment put it: ‘…the exercise of this option by the tenant will have the effect of depriving the landlord of the existing source of income from his property and the evident purpose of the stipulation as to notice is to leave him free thereafter to enter into a contract with a new tenant for a tenancy commencing at the date of surrender provided

An option to determine a lease may be subject to one or more conditions; if so, as a general rule, such condition(s) must be strictly complied with by the person seeking to exercise the option. Ultimately, the meaning of any particular condition depends upon the true intention of the parties, which must be determined on the true construction of the lease as a whole. Key dates in break clauses are the date of service of the break notice and the break date (ie the date on which a valid exercise of the break option terminates the lease). Ideally, the break clause should clearly specify whether any condition must be satisfied on either of these dates, or both. In