Possessory title is granted where the applicant claims to have acquired title to the land by adverse possession or where they cannot produce documentary evidence of title for some reason. It will be granted if the applicant is in actual possession of the land, or in receipt of the rents and profits of the land, and it cannot be registered with any other title. Registration with possessory title has the same effect as registration with absolute title, except that any adverse rights are excepted from the effect of registration and their priority is protected on the registration of a registrable disposition. Therefore, the title is not guaranteed before the date of first registration and the prior title should be examined by any purchaser as if the land were not registered. As

Under section 1 of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 (LRA 1967), a tenant of a long leasehold house and any associated premises (eg a garden, garage, yard etc) who has owned the property for at least two years has a statutory right to acquire the freehold (and any intermediate leasehold interests). Please see Practice Note: Guide to the right to enfranchisement and lease extensions of houses under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 (LRA 1967), for more information generally. Under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994, the seller will normally provide covenants for title, in standard form, by selling with full or limited title guarantee. The standard conditions provide for the seller to transfer the property with full title guarantee unless otherwise provided in the contract.

The General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/679, (the GDPR) represents the most significant development in data protection law for the last 20 years. The GDPR came into force on 24 May 2016, but due to a two-year implementation period, its provisions will only be directly applicable and fully enforceable across all Member States from 25 May 2018. For more information, see Practice Note: EU data protection reform—timeline [Archived]. Once applicable, the GDPR will repeal the Data Protection Directive, Directive 95/46/EC, and replace the Data Protection

A power of attorney is a document which enables a person (the donee) to take steps as if those steps were taken by another person (the donor). It is often used where a person is acting as an agent, or where a person is unable to be physically present to execute documents. It should be distinguished from an Enduring or a Lasting Power of Attorney which are put in place to enable a person to act for the donor if the latter loses capacity. Powers of Attorney are governed by the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 (PAA 1971), which includes, at PAA 1971, Sch

This Q&A assumes the parties are commercial entities agreeing terms on a business-to-business basis. The courts’ approach to interpretation General principles and rules of contract interpretation have been developed by a considerable body of case law. There is no simple set of rules to follow in respect of how terms may be construed and interpreted (as much will depend on the individual facts of the case), but five principles of interpretation have been used by the courts, as formulated by Lord Hoffmann in 1998 in the leading case of Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society: • it is an objective test as to what a reasonable person, having all the background knowledge reasonably available, would have understood the contract to mean at the time of contracting • account can be taken of background knowledge and matrix of fact, where such is relevant • previous negotiations and subjective intent are excluded (with a few exceptions—eg rectification cases) • the meaning of

Following IP completion day (11 pm on 31 December 2020), Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, Brussels I (recast) will not be applied by the UK courts in respect of jurisdiction clauses in favour of EU Member State courts, nor by courts in EU Member States in respect of UK jurisdiction clauses where proceedings are commenced after IP completion day. For proceedings commenced on or after 1 January 2021, the courts of England and Wales will determine jurisdiction by applying the existing common law, save where a relevant international convention or agreement applies. This

Section 23(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) gives the court the ability to order a single lump sum or a series of lump sums in one order. In general, the court may only make capital orders on one occasion. An order for a single lump sum, or series of individual lump sums, is not variable under MCA 1973, s 31 save in limited circumstances in relation to timing. However, where an order provides for a lump sum to be payable in instalments (rather than just one single payment of a lump sum, or several individual lump sum payments), the court does have the power to vary that order under MCA 1973,

Section 42 of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (LRHUDA 1993) sets out the requirements for a tenant who wishes to exercise the right to acquire a new lease of their flat. LRHUDA 1993, s 42(2) provides that the notice must be given to: • the landlord, and • any third party to the tenant’s lease LRHUDA 1993, s 42(3) sets out what information the notice must contain. The ‘landlord’ for the purposes of section 42 and the right to a new lease generally is the competent landlord ie a person who, for the time being, fulfils the following

Commentary: Conditions or restrictions imposed by the donor: Cretney & Lush on Lasting and Enduring Powers of Attorney [13.55]–[13.64] explains that under section 9(4)(b) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005), the authority conferred by a lasting power of attorney (LPA) is subject to any conditions or restrictions contained within the instrument. The donor may, within section 7 of the LPA

This depends upon whether all blocks and the houses on the estate can be considered as one building as per Long Acre Securities Ltd v Karet. If so, then only one set of notices would need to be served in relation to the disposal and hence the shared communal areas would be included in those notices. If,

Personal Injury analysis: In Mohmed v Barnes and another, Turner J found that a driver had not been negligent when he drove into the claimant. Tony McLoughlin, partner at Horwich Farrelly Solicitors, who instructed the barrister for the defendant, comments on the case and its implications.

PI & Clinical Negligence analysis: A farm worker suffered serious injuries when he was struck by a car when crossing the road. The claimant had been travelling back from the field to his lodgings on a company bus and had left the bus to tell employees on the other side of the road to get on. The judge dismissed the claim against the car driver, but the worker succeeded against his employer. The judge held that he had been engaged in activities incidental to his employment. The judge made a Sanderson order against the employer. It was ordered to pay both the driver’s costs and the costs the claimant had incurred against the driver in turn. Written by David Juckes, barrister at Hailsham Chambers.