It is assumed for the purposes of this answer that the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) in their amended form after 6 April 2022 apply. The normal method of enforcing an order of the type referred to would be by means of a contempt application under FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, Pt 37. However, it would appear that the original order has only been served on the solicitors then acting for the party in default by e-mail. Normally, such service would suffice (FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 26.1 subject to FPR 2010, PD 6A, paras 4.2–4.6). This facility to serve by e-mail without the court's permission is overridden by the requirements of a contempt application contained in FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955,

For the purpose of this Q&A we have assumed that the agreed Tomlin order will settle the litigation between the parties in its entirety. Legally represented parties can agree a Tomlin order without court approval. Provided the requirements as to form set out in CPR 40.6(7) are satisfied, a court officer may enter and seal such agreed orders. Where one of the parties to the Tomlin order is a litigant in person (or the requirements of CPR 40.6(2) are not met for some other reason), court approval is required (CPR 40.6(5)). For further guidance, including on the court application required when approval is required, see Practice Note: Consent orders and judgments, in particular

Statute limits a landlord’s right to forfeit (this includes service of a s 146 notice) a long residential lease for non-payment of: • rent • service charge, or • administrative charge See Practice Note: Statutory limitations on the landlord’s right to forfeit a long residential lease which deals with forfeiture for non-payment of rent, service charge or administrative charge and other breaches. In respect of other breaches a section 146 notice must be served. The fact that a breach is remediable does not preclude service of a section 146 notice. However,

In de Keyser v Wilson, the EAT gave guidelines on the steps to be taken if a party wishes to rely on expert evidence: • a party should check that the employment tribunal will hear expert evidence in the proceedings • the joint instruction of an expert is preferable, unless one side has already obtained expert evidence • if the parties are to have a joint expert, they should agree who is to pay the expert's fees and expenses, or whether they are willing to let the tribunal decide that point • a

Issue against deceased debtor CPR 19.8 states where a defendant against whom a claim could have been brought has died and a grant of probate or administration has been made, the claim must be brought against the personal representatives of the deceased (CPR 19.8(2)(a)). Where a grant of probate or administration has not been made, the claim must be brought against ‘the estate of’ the deceased (CPR 19.8(2)(b)). A claim shall be treated as having been brought against ‘the estate of’ the deceased for the purpose of CPR 19.8(2)(b)(i) where the claim is brought against the personal representatives of the deceased but a grant of probate or administration has not been made, or where the person against whom the claim was brought was

The Family Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2016, SI 2016/901 inserted a new regulation 9.9A under the Family Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955 (FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 9.9A) with effect from 3 October 2016 providing for applications to set aside a financial remedy order. The most common circumstances forming the subject of an application under FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 9.9A are: • fraud • material non-disclosure • certain limited types of mistake • a subsequent event, unforeseen and unforeseeable

In this Q&A we refer to a final charging order and have limited our research to that effect. We have also assumed that the purpose in making payment into court is in order to seek discharge of the charging order. Effects of charging order A charging order secures the value of a judgment debt. To satisfy the debt, a creditor can obtain an order for the sale of the debtor’s property which is subject to the charging order by issuing a claim for an order for sale under CPR 73.10C. To stop this from happening, the debtor can pay the debt in full which allows them to release the charging order. Discharging a charging order To discharge a charging order, it should be shown that there has been a material change of circumstance since the date the order was made, unless facts emerge suggesting the order should never have been made. CPR PD 73, para 3A provides

We refer you to Practice Note: Variation of Will or intestacy after death—Q&As and the Q&As contained in it, particularly Will a deed of variation be valid where the beneficiaries of the Will (both current and proposed) are minors?, which states: HMRC’s guidance, in their Inheritance Tax Manual (IHTM35045) suggests that a deed of variation which adversely affects the interests of minor or unborn beneficiaries can achieve total validity only by obtaining the approval of the court (on an application under the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 (VTA 1958), or under the court’s inherent jurisdiction). There may be other circumstances where the deed of variation is partially effective on execution for general law and IHT purposes. For examples,

To make an application to the magistrates’ court for a disposal order under section 149 of the Highways Act 1980 (HiA 1980), the highway authority must first determine that an item has been deposited on a highway in a manner that constitutes a nuisance. The form of notice must comply with the requirements of HiA 1980, ss 320–323. See: Atkin's Court Forms: 30 Complaint by highway authority for order to remove nuisances. Note, HiA 1980,

A person who has served notice (Form 1 below) on a highway authority requesting them to secure the removal of an obstruction from any footpath, bridleway or restricted byway (other than a building, or works for the construction of a building, or any other structure designed for human habitation, such as a tent or if a person constitutes the obstruction) and who is not satisfied that it has been removed, may apply to a magistrates’ court for an order for it to be removed having first given notice to the highway authority of their intention to do so (sections 130A and 130B of the Highways Act 1980 (HiA 1980)). The requisite notices are those specified Removal of Obstructions from Highways (Notices etc) (England) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/370, reg 2 as set out in the Schedule as follows: • Form 1 gives notice under HiA 1980, s 130A(1)

There is no clear statutory definition of a highway and highways can be classified as various categories according to section 48(4) of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. The process for removing highway rights from an area of land is known as ‘stopping up the highway’. Section 116 of the Highways Act 1980 (HiA 1980) allows highway authorities to make an application to the magistrates’ court to stop up any type of highway, apart from a trunk road or a special road, on the grounds that it is ‘unnecessary’. The stopping-up or diversion of trunk roads and special roads is dealt with under separate provisions of HiA 1980 and is outside the scope of this Q&A. Whether or not a highway is ‘unnecessary’ is a question of fact. Evidence of lack of current public use and the existence of an alternative route are material considerations, for further information,

Purpose of CPR 19.12(2)(b) CPR 19.12(2) provides as follows: '(2) Where a defendant against whom a claim could have been brought has died and— (a) a grant of probate or administration has been made, the claim must be brought against the persons who are the personal representatives of the deceased; (b) a grant of probate or administration has not been made— (i) the claim must be brought against “the estate of” the deceased; and (ii) the claimant must apply to the court for