For the purposes of this Q&A, we have assumed that no grant was made to the sole executor who has lost capacity. It is further assumed that the Q&A refers to an attorney acting under a registered enduring or lasting power of attorney (LPA) who wishes to renounce administration for the use and benefit of the sole executor, as referred to in Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 (NCPR 1987), SI 1987/2024, r 35(2)(c). NCPR 1987, SI 1987/2024, r 35(1) provides: ‘Unless a registrar otherwise directs, no grant shall be made under this rule unless all persons entitled in the same degree as the incapable person referred to in paragraph (2) below have been cleared off.’ NCPR 1987, SI 1987/2024, r 35(2) provides: ‘Where a district judge or registrar is satisfied that a person entitled

The Bradford Factor is usually used by employers to highlight persistent, short-term absence which is either due to sickness or is unauthorised. It applies an extra weighting to the number of absences (as opposed to the length of any particular period of absence), and is usually used as a tracking tool, or to trigger steps under a sickness and absence policy. For further information about the Bradford Factor, or Bradford Index, see: • Practice Note: Dealing with persistent, intermittent, short-term absences—Initial considerations, under the heading ‘Setting triggers’, and • Q&A: Is there any case law (Employment Tribunal or otherwise) or authoritative guidance to support the use of the Bradford Factor as a ground for dismissal? There is, accordingly, a distinction to be made between a score generated

It is assumed for the purposes of this Q&A that the ‘application’ referred to is an Interlocutory Application, made pursuant to CPR Part 23 (for example, an Application for Specific Disclosure or for an Interim Payment made during the course of proceedings). Withdrawal of Interlocutory Applications arises relatively frequently in practice. As to Interlocutory Applications, the operation of Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting (QOCS) is somewhat of a red herring. QOCS has no impact on the rules or the practice of the Court in making Costs Orders against a Claimant (whether following an unsuccessful Interlocutory Application or following the dismissal of proceedings at Trial). Costs awards are made in the identical

This Q&A covers the procedure to get a detailed assessment of costs without having to start a Part 7 claim. The requirements for using the costs-only procedure are set out in CPR 46.14(1). Note, if the costs are payable pursuant

A Part 8 claim is begun by the claimant filing: • Form N208—Claim Form (CPR Part 8)—Commercial Court • the fee payable (where no money is claimed)—£528 in the High Court and £308 in the County Court • evidence For

We refer you to our Lexis+® UK Dispute Resolution Practice Note: Court fees in civil proceedings which provides information on the court fees payable for all aspects of civil proceedings. In Court Fees Schedule from 18 April 2016 (changes included), Fee 1.5 states that on starting proceedings for any remedy, other than for recovery of a sum of money or recovery of land (as set out in Fees 1.1–1.4),

In order to establish what court fee is payable, see Court Fees Schedule from 6 March 2017. Specifically, the amount of fess payable will depend on whether the claim is a claim to recover money, a claim to recover lands or goods or is a claim for any other remedy. Where the claim is for a sum of money (and the claim is not being brought in the County Court Business Centre (CCBC) or using Money Claim Online), the fee payable will depend on the amount of the sum claimed as follows: If the amount claimed: • does not exceed £300,

We refer you to Practice Note: Court fees in civil proceedings. As set out under main heading: ‘Current court fees’, ‘Issuing a non-money claim’, subsection: ‘Other claims’: The

Any settlement, compromise or payment arising from a claim on behalf of, or against, a child is not binding unless it has been approved by the court (CPR 21.10(1)). A compromise involving a child needs to be approved: • first, because the court needs to be satisfied that the compromise is fair: it protects children from any mistakes by their legal advisors or from pressure to settle a case quickly for less than it is worth • secondly, because a court-approved compromise protects the defendant as it ensures that they are properly discharged from the claim • finally, because the court ensures that the money is protected and properly looked after by being invested on behalf of the child until they reach adulthood Where settlement is reached before proceedings have begun and the sole purpose of the proceedings is to obtain the approval of the court, the

There is limited case law on the issue of life-shortening illness and its impact on financial awards. Such cases often fall within the court’s consideration of section 25(2)(e) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) as to any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage. The judgment in M v M, where the wife had a life-limiting illness, is considered in the News Analysis: Non-discrimination on the basis of disability. The decision in M v M (property adjustment: impaired life expectancy), was considered in M v M, in which the wife had been diagnosed as having a brain tumour, and this had led to a reduction in her life expectancy. The court at first instance found that the circumstances of the wife's health meant that a clean break could not be achieved,

Pursuant to regulation 95 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 2015/102 (PCR 2015) (PCR 2015, SI 2015/102, reg 95), the award of a public contract is automatically suspended from the time a public contract award is challenged if that contract has not yet been entered into. PCR 2015, SI 2015/102, reg 96 allows the courts to make an order ‘lifting’ the automatic suspension on contract execution before the substantive hearing takes place. There have been several cases in recent years in which the UK courts have considered the appropriate test for determining whether interim relief should be granted. Beginning with Indigo Services (UK) Limited v The Colchester Institute Corporation (unreported) and Exel Europe v University Hospitals Coventry & Warwickshire NHS Trust, the courts have consistently held that the appropriate test is based on the traditional interim injunctive relief principles established by the American Cyanamid case, namely: • is there a serious issue to

If the donor lacks the capacity to revoke the Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA), then the Court of Protection can revoke it on the donor’s behalf in the following circumstances: • if fraud or undue pressure was used to make the donor create the LPA, or • if the attorney, in his capacity as attorney or in any other capacity, is behaving, or proposing to behave, in a way that would contravene their authority or would not be in the donor’s best interests The circumstances in which the Court of Protection may consider revoking an LPA are considered in the following cases: • Re EL (Public Guardian v CS and PL)) • Re Harcourt (the Public Guardian v A) • Re J • Re MC (Public Guardian v SR)