Corporate Crime analysis: In this case, the Supreme Court considered the double criminality rule in section 137 of the Extradition Act 2003 (EA 2003) and its impact on whether a requested person’s alleged conduct constitutes an extradition offence. In doing so, the court considered and rejected obiter dicta of Lord Hope in Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas, [2005] UKHL 67. The court held that subsections 137(3) and 137(4) of EA 2003 are mutually exclusive; contrary to obiter dicta in Cando Armas, EA 2003, s 137 is only concerned with the physical location of alleged conduct rather than where the conduct’s consequences are felt; Mr El-Khouri’s conduct took place outside of the requesting state’s territory and therefore EA 2003, s 137(4) applied; and in hypothetical corresponding circumstances (as required by EA 2003, s 137(4)(b)), the test of double criminality was not satisfied because Mr El-Khouri’s actions did not meet the conditions of an extra-territorial insider dealing offence under sections 52(1) and 62(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (the CJA 1993). The court also rejected an argument that Mr El-Khouri’s actions constituted an extra-territorial money laundering offence. Written by Ben Brandon, partner, and Arna Mathiesen, trainee solicitor, at Mishcon de Reya LLP.

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: This case involved an application by trustees in bankruptcy to recover sums from the sale of a property formerly jointly owned by the bankrupt and his ex-wife during their marriage. The ex-wife argued that she was entitled to retain the full proceeds based on the equity of exoneration, claiming the secured loans discharged from the sale were taken solely for the bankrupt’s benefit. The court examined the principles governing equity of exoneration and held that as the ex-wife was a director and shareholder of the debtor company and had actively participated in the transactions she had derived a direct benefit from the loans. As such, she was treated as a joint principal debtor, and her claim to be indemnified from the bankrupt’s share failed, save for one small exception. The decision underscores the limited scope of equity of exoneration where both parties have meaningful involvement in a borrowing entity, largely setting aside the old-fashioned principles of married women's property rights from which the equity of exoneration derives. Written by Stephen Alexander, partner at Mourant and Roxanna Lackschewitz-Martin, associate at Mourant.

Dispute Resolution analysis: In this significant case concerning legal professional privilege and litigation conduct, the High Court addressed the limits of investigating alleged fraud through covert means. The claimants, pursuing a substantial stock-lending fraud claim, employed investigators who secretly recorded meetings with the defendants’ litigation solicitor under false pretences. While the court acknowledged a strong prima facie fraud case against the defendants, it held that the claimants’ entrapment tactics constituted an abuse of process. Rather than striking out the entire claim, the court adopted a balanced approach by striking out only the summary judgment application while allowing the substantive fraud claim to proceed. The case provides important guidance on the boundaries between legitimate fraud investigation and improper interference with legal professional privilege, emphasising that entrapment of an opponent’s legal representative crosses a fundamental line in civil litigation. Practical implications written by Lauren Godfrey of Gatehouse Chambers.

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: This groundbreaking case concerned the first scheme of arrangement of the mis-selling liabilities of a solvent, high cost lender, Instant Cash Loans (ICL). It was also the first scheme by a regulated entity to proceed without the formal non-objection of the FCA. However, the case has attracted most attention for the court’s ruling on the scheme’s attempt to force ICL’s landlords to accept an early surrender of their leases: at the sanction hearing, Zacaroli J held that this was outside the jurisdiction of Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). The judge did, though, permit the scheme to be modified in order to remove the surrender provisions and he sanctioned the scheme in its modified form. Written by Dan Butler, senior associate, at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP.

This Practice Note sets out certain key cases and associated relevant content on the liquidation stay and the factors the court will take into account when deciding whether to lift a liquidation stay. The cases are divided by topic area and include: • the liquidation stay • factors the court will take into account when deciding whether to lift a liquidation stay For further reading on this topic, see Practice Note: Factors the court will take into account when deciding whether to lift or impose a liquidation stay. The liquidation stay Names of parties Judgment date Case summary Relevant content Waypark Commercial Mortgage 1 Ltd v Vanguard Number 1 Ltd (in liquidation) [2025] EWHC 1786 (Ch) 14 July 2025 The liquidation stay imposed by section 130(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) does not apply to the sale of property by a secured creditor pursuant to a power of sale contained in a fixed legal charge/mortgage, as such a sale is not an ‘action or proceeding’ against the company or its property. Re

STOP PRESS: From 6 April 2017, the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 were revoked and replaced by the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (IR 2016), SI 2016/1024. The content in this Q&A may have been affected by this change. Under section 176ZA of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), except where provided otherwise, a liquidator’s expenses rank in priority of payment over any distribution to a floating charge holder from floating charge realisations, therefore reversing the House of Lord’s decision in Buchler v Talbot; sub nom Re Leyland Daf Ltd. Where, however, any of the expenses are ‘legal proceedings' (as defined in rule 4.218A(1)(d) of the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 (IR 1986)), the floating charge holder(s) must give specific approval beforehand if such expenses exceed or are

Section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) permits a person to apply to the local planning authority (LPA) for a certificate (often referred to as a CLOPUD) confirming whether any proposed use of buildings or other land or any operations proposed to be carried out in, on, over or under land would be lawful. TCPA 1990, s 192(2) places the burden of proof firmly on the applicant to provide sufficient information satisfying the LPA that the use or operations described in the application would be lawful. It is common for legal opinions

Public Law analysis: Supply Chain Coordination Ltd (SCCL), the state-owned entity managing the NHS Supply Chain, applied to lift the automatic suspension following challenges by unsuccessful tenderers (Unipart Group Ltd (Unipart) and D.H.L. Supply Chain Ltd (DHL)) in relation to a logistics services procurement governed by the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR 2015), SI 2015/102. The Honourable Mr Justice Constable in the High Court granted SCCL’s applications to lift the automatic suspension. The courts have been called upon to consider dozens of applications to lift automatic suspensions pursuant to PCR 2015, SI 2015/102, reg 96, with the majority resulting in the suspension being lifted. Consistent with that trend, the court in this case lifted the suspension—reinforcing the pattern of decisions favouring contracting authorities where public interest and service continuity arguments carry weight. Furthermore, the case discusses the requirements for when a tenderer is considered ‘definitively excluded’ (PCR 2015, SI 2015/102, reg 86(7)(b) and 86(8)). Written by Tom Ward, associate, and Andrew Dean, partner, at Bird & Bird.

Competition analysis: The Court of Justice’s judgment addresses two questions referred to by the District Court of Amsterdam on the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU. The first question is whether wide and narrow parity clauses constitute an ancillary restraint in the context of the application of Article 101(1) TFEU and the second question is how the relevant market should be defined when transactions are mediated by an Online Travel Agency (OTA)? With its judgment, the Court of Justice declared that both wide and narrow parity clauses do not qualify as ancillary restraints. Thus, they do not fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. At the same time, the Court of Justice stated that the fact that narrow price parity tends to combat possible free-riding phenomena and are indispensable in guaranteeing efficiency gains or in ensuring the commercial success of the main operation can be taken into account under the individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. With regard to the definition of the relevant market, the Court of Justice is rather reserved and only provides more general statements and only gave very few indications. Written by Anara Karagulova-Glantz, senior associate, Dominika Wojewska, senior associate, and Maren Tamke, partner at Dentons Europe.

This will happen either after the registrar of Companies House has had reasonable cause to believe that it has ceased carrying on business (under section 1000 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006)), following it having been wound up (under either Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) or by act of the registrar under CA 2006, s 1001) or on the application of the company itself (under CA 2006, s 1003). In the case of insolvency, most leases will make provision for the landlord to forfeit the lease. Once a winding-up order has been made, however, the landlord may not commence proceedings to forfeit the lease without the permission of the court (IA 1986, s 130). When a company is dissolved, all property and rights whatsoever (other than property which it holds on trust for another) is deemed to

One of the first things to be reviewed is whether the existing tenants were members of the dissolved management company. If so, they will need to consider whether or not they satisfy the criteria in order to restore the management company to the register at Companies House, effectively to revive the management company. If the criteria could be satisfied and this route adopted, the effect would be to reinstate the management company and it would be obliged to perform the management functions in the leases. The remainder of this Q&A assumes that the tenants were not members of

In this scenario, the occupying spouse has registered their home rights by way of a charge under either the Land Registration Act 2002 or the Land Charges Act 1972 as appropriate. This charge does not give the occupying spouse a legal or beneficial interest in the property that would enable them to bring civil proceedings to exclude the stepson. The occupying spouse could apply for an occupation order under section 33 of the Family Law Act 1996 (FLA 1996). An application may be brought under this section if (per FLA 1996, s 33(1)): • the applicant is