This week's edition of Restructuring and Insolvency weekly highlights includes: key announcements from the Spring Statement 2025 of relevance to restructuring and insolvency practitioners, an analysis of a decision that a former auditor deliver up its audit files to liquidators (Dale v BDO LLP), the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) opinion on the proposal for a directive harmonising certain aspects of insolvency law, plus a round-up of other news and cases for restructuring and insolvency professionals.

This week's edition of Restructuring and Insolvency weekly highlights includes: the launch of our Market Insights Trend Report on Part 26A restructuring plans, an analysis of the convening judgment in the restructuring plan for Madagascar Oil Ltd, the launch of the 13th edition of Doyle, Keay and Curl: Annotated Insolvency Legislation, plus a round-up of other news and cases for restructuring and insolvency professionals.

This week's edition of Restructuring and Insolvency weekly highlights includes: a look at the government’s consultation on proposed reforms to the mandatory notification regime under NSIA 2021, a decision that challenged statutory demands on jurisdictional grounds (Peretie v Eden Farm SRL), the Court of Appeal’s decision on costs in the Thames Water restructuring plan, plus a round-up of other news and cases for restructuring and insolvency professionals.

This week's edition of Restructuring and Insolvency weekly highlights includes: an analysis of the scope of the mental health crisis moratorium (Forbes v Interbay; Forbes v Seculink) providing much needed clarity for stakeholders on treatment of secured debt, an examination of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision on the legal status of dealer-arranged car finance and disclosure of commissions to customers (Hopcraft v Close Brothers Limited and other cases), the FCA’s plans to consult on a motor finance compensation scheme, plus a round-up of other news and cases for restructuring and insolvency professionals.

Formulating an informal restructuring plan Informal restructuring deals may use a combination of informal methods combined with more formal methods to bind dissenting parties, including: • schemes of arrangement • formal Part 26A restructuring plan (see Practice Note: Part 26A restructuring plans: history, rationale and scope) • pre-pack administrations • company voluntary arrangements (CVAs) • US Chapter 11 proceedings Informal restructuring rationale Once a valuation of the company or group has been obtained showing where value breaks (see Practice Note: Where the value breaks and negotiating strength), you will see who has a seat at the restructuring negotiating table and any dissenters will soon emerge, most likely challenging the basis of the valuation. If the dissenters are close to where value breaks and the creditors who are 'in the money' are unwilling to offer them a small piece of equity in the restructured vehicle or other incentive to obtain their consent to an informal restructuring, one of the more formal methods is often used. Part 26 Schemes of arrangement Schemes

This Practice Note explains Restructuring credit event as defined in the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions (the 2014 Definitions) published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and covers: (1) what a Restructuring credit event is and when it occurs, (2) exceptions, (3) Restructuring in the context of guarantees and (4) physical settlement following a Restructuring credit event and the four options that can be specified in a swap confirmation (No Restructuring, Old or full Restructuring (Old R), Modified Restructuring (Mod R) and Modified Modified Restructuring (Mod Mod R)). What are credit derivatives and what are credit events? What is a credit derivative? A credit derivative is a bilateral transaction which takes its underlying value from the credit risk of a third party (known as the reference entity)—a corporate, sovereign, municipality or other similar organisation. The credit derivative references specific underlying obligations (eg bonds or loans) of the reference entity (known as the reference obligations). The primary purpose of a credit derivative is for a party (known as the protection buyer) to buy credit protection to mitigate

An employer may propose the restructuring of a defined benefit pension scheme for a variety of reasons. These include: • the need to ensure that the pension scheme complies with and properly reflects recent statutory and case law developments • a desire to harmonise pension provision across the relevant corporate group, and • a desire to control or minimise future pension costs Types of scheme restructuring Common ways of restructuring defined benefit schemes include: • changing the scheme’s accrual rate for future service (eg from 1/60th of final salary for each year of pensionable service to 1/80th) • changing from final salary to career average accrual rates • pension scheme incentive exercises (eg an enhanced transfer exercise) • closing the scheme to new entrants • closing the scheme to future accrual (with or without retaining a link to final salary) • merging one or more schemes • buying out members' benefits For more information, see: • Pension scheme incentive exercises • Changing from final salary to career average accrual rates • Scheme closure—overview • Pension scheme mergers—considerations

Pensions analysis: The government is proposing to restructure the way in which financial guidance is delivered to the public. The current organisations, the Money Advice Service (MAS), the Pensions Advisory Service (TPAS) and Pension Wise will be replaced with a new delivery model. In March 2016, HM Treasury issued a consultation paper seeking views on how, within its proposed new framework, the proposed guidance services can best be delivered. Maralyn Thomas, director at Castle Pension Trustees, looks at the consultation paper.

There are many options for restructuring a company's debt. The most appropriate method depends upon the degree of the company's financial difficulties, the complexity of its funding arrangements and the existence of any dissenting creditors. Process The key stages are to: • stabilise the company (identify key parties and agree a standstill with creditors) • prepare for the restructuring (conduct due diligence, produce a business plan and obtain a valuation) • implement the restructuring The majority lenders of the company need to consent to the restructuring plan. A consensual restructuring is usually preferable in terms of cost and speed although formal processes (eg company voluntary arrangements (CVAs), restructuring plans, schemes of arrangement or pre-pack administrations) can be used to deal with dissenting creditors. See Practice Note: Restructuring process. Options Restructurings typically employ one or more of the following techniques: • covenant waiver–this is the least extreme form of restructuring (see Practice Note: Amending a facility agreement) • debt rescheduling (see Practice Note: Debt waivers and extending maturity/debt rescheduling) • debt for equity swap (see Practice

The restructuring plan under CA 2006, Part 26A The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA 2020) made a number of significant changes to insolvency law as it relates to limited liability partnerships (LLPs), including introducing the restructuring plan as a new procedure. The framework for the restructuring plan is found in Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006)—Arrangements and Reconstructions for Companies in Financial Difficulty. It is supported by the Explanatory Notes, which are admissible to aid interpretation without needing to show that the legislation is ambiguous or unclear (per Snowden J in Re Virgin Atlantic Airways applying Re Flora v Wakom (Heathrow) Ltd). The legislation is also supported by the Practice Statement (Companies: Schemes of Arrangement under Part 26 and Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006) produced on 26 June 2020 (Practice Statement 2020). From 1 January 2026, a new Practice Statement comes into force (the New Practice Statement), which encourages early identification of jurisdictional and procedural issues, clearer

These restructuring plan/scheme FAQs were last updated by the Company on [insert date the Company last updated these FAQs]. Q1: Why have you contacted me? We are contacting everyone we think might be a creditor/shareholder of [insert name of Company proposing the restructuring plan/scheme] (the Company), which has also traded as [insert trading names], to inform them about a restructuring plan/scheme of arrangement we are proposing. Creditors are people to whom the Company owes money. You might be a creditor because: we had a business relationship with you; the Company rented premises from you; or you supplied other goods or services to the Company. [Shareholders are people holding [ordinary] shares in the Company.] Q2: What is a restructuring plan/scheme of arrangement and why are you proposing it? A restructuring plan/scheme of arrangement is a legal process which allows a company to enter into an agreement with particular creditors/shareholders. For the restructuring plan/scheme to go ahead, it must be approved by the requisite majorities of the company’s creditors/shareholders affected. If they do, everyone will be

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The Plan Companies needed to rely on the shareholding Super Senior Lenders class as the assenting class to trigger the cram-down of the only dissenting class because the Super Senior Lenders were the only class with a genuine economic interest in the relevant alternative. Mr Justice Hildyard noted that it was an ‘arresting; feature’ of the Plan (at [104]) that the Super Senior Lenders were both the only available ‘cramming down’ class and the persons left, in their capacity as Shareholders, with the equity and the substantial part of any ‘restructuring surplus’. Although the Senior Lenders and the Recovery Financing Lenders no longer maintained this or any objection at the sanction hearing, it was still appropriate for the court to have that objection in mind. Mr Justice Hildyard ultimately decided this did not give rise to any unfairness in the circumstances and exercised the court’s cross-class cram down power under section 901G(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), sanctioning the Plans. Written by Sophie Waples, senior associate at A&O Shearman.