This Q&A has assumed that the lease is a 'new tenancy' under section 1 of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995. When dealing with an application for consent to assign, a landlord's obligations are governed partly by any relevant contractual provisions in the lease and partly by statute. If a lease contains provisions restricting assignment without the consent of the landlord, then in most circumstances the consent of the landlord must not be unreasonably withheld (section 19(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 (LTA 1927)). The burden of proof is on the landlord to show that they are acting reasonably in withholding consent. However, (unless the lease is a residential lease - ie a lease by which a building or part of a building is let wholly or mainly as a single private residence) the landlord and tenant may agree in the

A third party can object to the making of the final charging order, under CPR 73.10 or, as the case may be, CPR 73.10A of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (as amended) (CPR). Section 2 of the Charging Orders Act 1979 provides that a charging order may be imposed by a charging order only on an interest held by the debtor beneficially. If the beneficial interest was validly disposed of by the debtor before the interim charging order was made, then it would follow that the debtor had no beneficial

The court can make a declaration as to the beneficial ownership of property under section 17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 (MWPA 1882) or section 66 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004). MWPA 1882, s 17 allows either party in a dispute between husband and wife regarding the title to or possession of property to apply to the court, which may make such order with respect to the property as it thinks fit. CPA 2004, s

The Q&A proceeds on the basis that an unsecured periodical payments order has been made, which is one of the types of order under section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), that may be varied, discharged or suspended. MCA 1973, s 31(2)(a), (b) draw a distinction between periodical payments and secured periodical payments as distinct types of order to which the section’s provisions apply. We have been unable to find any clear authority on this point. Given the clear distinction drawn between the two types of periodical payment order, it may be thought that the powers of variation do not extend to converting a periodical payments order into a secured one as this would go beyond mere variation. Conversely, it would appear strange on a variation

The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA 1996) is a wide-ranging and powerful statute which allows the court, on the application of a person legally or beneficially interested in land, to exercise the powers of the trustees of that land, ie to declare the beneficial ownership of the relevant property, and to make orders for sale. Absent any clear declaration (such as a deed of trust), which is conclusive of the beneficial ownership of property, (Goodman v Gallant), residential property will be considered according to constructive trust principles (Stack v Dowden

The court will in certain circumstances judicially intervene whether by the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court or the jurisdiction of parens patriae. The latter relates to protection that the court can adopt in respect of exploitative relationships. The former is intended to safeguard individual autonomy where they cannot be utilised without intervention. Parens patriae is used in respect of persons who are unable to protect their own interests, such as children and mentally incapable adults and is an ancient doctrine relating back to feudal times and includes the wardship powers of the Senior Courts. The inherent jurisdiction is a residual source of powers which the court may draw upon where just or equitable. Such powers are derived not from

The Energy Efficiency (Private Rented Property) (England and Wales) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/962 require by 1 April 2018, all eligible properties to have been improved to a specified minimum energy efficiency standard (EPC rating E) before being let to tenants, except where certain exemptions apply. These exemptions are set out in Practice Notes: Minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES) in the private rented sector—snapshot, Minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES)—domestic tenants’ energy efficiency improvements, Minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES)—prohibition on letting substandard domestic property, Minimum energy efficiency standards (MEES)—non-domestic property within the scope of MEES and Minimum energy efficiency

On assignment, the original tenant is released from its obligations under the lease but takes on new obligations under the authorised guarantee agreement (AGA). The original tenant’s guarantor is released from its guarantee under the lease, and only takes

See Lord Neuberger’s judgment in K/S Victoria Street (a Danish Partnership) v House of Fraser (Stores Management) Ltd: '[45] As already mentioned, in almost all cases (save relatively freely assignable long leases at low rents), leases are assignable only with landlord's consent, not to be unreasonably withheld. Where consent is not required, the lease is normally pretty freely assignable or wholly unassignable, so the 1995 Act is unlikely to present any problem. In the normal case, where landlord's consent (not to be unreasonably withheld) is required for an assignment, the landlord can, if it is reasonable to do so, require the

Prior to the completion of the administration of an estate, the beneficiaries of the Will or under the rules of intestacy have no proprietary rights in any asset which was owned by the deceased. Instead, the beneficiaries have a right to the due administration of the estate. Such a right is an asset itself, namely, a chose in action. Where there is a Will, the executors have authority to deal with the assets within the estate from the date of death, whereas, on an intestacy, the personal representatives (PRs) only have authority from the date of the issue of the letters of administration. The right to bring an action held by the deceased person was itself a chose in action which would be transmitted to the PRs. Therefore, the persons entitled to the estate on intestacy would not have any authority to use the deceased's

Practice Note: Intestacy—summary, the Entitlement on intestacy—flowchart and sections 46 and 47 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (AEA 1925) may be useful for your purposes. From AEA 1925, s 46(1)(v) it can be seen that where

Under section 14(2) of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (LRHUDA 1993), if a participating tenant assigns their lease to another person, then, provided that a binding contract for the collective acquisition has not been entered into (LRHUDA 1993, s 14(11)), the assignee has 14 days from the date of the assignment to notify the nominee purchaser of the assignment and to state whether or not they wish to participate in the proposed acquisition. Under LRHUDA 1993, s 14(4), where the assignee notifies the nominee