PI & Clinical Negligence analysis: The Court of Appeal has reaffirmed the orthodox limits on local authority liability for third-party acts, holding that Tower Hamlets owed no duty of care to a pedestrian injured by market stall poles left on the footway by an unidentified trader. The authority’s statutory licensing powers, licence conditions and operating procedures did not amount to an assumption of responsibility or the special control required to found liability for an omission. Nor had the authority created, authorised, adopted or continued any nuisance. The decision is significant for practitioners because it underscores the difficulty of converting regulatory powers or internal procedures into actionable duties, particularly where causation depends on proving that an inspection regime would have prevented harm caused by a third party. Produced in partnership with David Juckes of Hailsham Chambers.

Pensions analysis: The Deputy Pensions Ombudsman has partially upheld a complaint about a pension sharing order. Martin Scott of gunnercooke LLP looks at the decision.

Law360: The government has said that there is no straightforward way to fix a quirk of privacy rules that discourages pension providers from sending emails to retirement savers.

Where a tribunal gives oral reasons for its decision at the end of the hearing, and then subsequently delivers written reasons to the parties, it will sometimes be the case that the reasoning expressed in support of the conclusion in writing differs in substance from the oral reasoning given earlier. In such circumstances, the written reasons constitute the sole authoritative statement of the tribunal’s reasons and the oral reasons are superseded. Such a departure from the reasoning initially expressed orally does not involve any error of law, and will never constitute a valid ground of appeal. By contrast, the tribunal's actual decision in the orally delivered judgment (as opposed to the reasoning by which it reaches that decision) may not be changed in the written reasons. A change in the decision itself can only be achieved by use of the review mechanism. EAT: Partners of Haxby Practice v Collen.

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: ICC Judge Greenwood refused Mrs McFadzean’s application for leave to bring a claim under section 304 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) against her former trustees in bankruptcy, Mr Cacho and Mr Waghorn (the Trustees), in relation to the sale of a French property (the Property). The judge held that the Trustees had acted reasonably and within the broad discretion afforded to insolvency office-holders when realising estate assets under time pressure and in challenging circumstances. Despite Mrs McFadzean’s allegations that the Property was negligently sold at an undervalue, the court found that the Trustees had relied on professional advice, pursued the highest available unconditional offer after a higher offer was withdrawn for reasons outside their control, and made rational decisions in the face of short deadlines and lack of liquid funds. Crucially, Mrs McFadzean failed to adduce any expert evidence on French planning law, valuation of the Property, or the prospects of alternative sales, which the judge found to be fatal to her application. The judgment reinforces the robust ‘filtering’ function of the leave requirement under IA 1986, s 304, confirming that applicants must show a reasonably meritorious cause of action likely to benefit the estate, supported by solid evidence. The decision is significant for practitioners as it highlights both the evidential threshold for misfeasance claims against trustees in bankruptcy and the wide latitude given to office-holders exercising commercial judgment. Written by Brian Rostron, Associate at Addleshaw Goddard LLP.

For firm offers announced before 5 July 2021, the Code allowed an offeror to make a statement that an offer will not be extended beyond a specified date unless it is unconditional as to acceptances. Under Rule 31.5(b), if a no extension statement is made by or on behalf of an offeror, its directors, officials or advisers, and not withdrawn immediately if incorrect, the offeror will not be permitted subsequently to extend its offer beyond the stated date except: (1) where the right to do so in certain circumstances is specifically reserved at the time the no extension statement is made and those circumstances subsequently arise; or (2) in wholly exceptional circumstances.

Commercial analysis: In a demerger transaction between shareholders in a family-run company, the defendant shareholder did not owe any fiduciary duties to the claimant shareholder. The transaction involved a commercial negotiation in which the parties had intrinsically opposed interests, and the recognition of fiduciary obligations was inconsistent with the nature of that transaction. The claimant’s claim for equitable compensation representing the alleged undervalue at which they had sold their shares in the company, or an account of profits, was dismissed. The court considered what was required for fiduciary obligations to arise between shareholders. In particular, it considered and rejected the claimant’s argument that fiduciary duties were appropriate because the company was in the nature of a quasi-partnership. Alternative claims in duress and unjust enrichment, and against the company’s accountants and solicitors (not raising a point of principle or considered in this note), also failed. Written by Seb Oram, barrister, at 3PB Barristers.

The House of Lords Library has published a research briefing which explores what announcements the government could make in the King’s Speech on 13 May 2026 about welfare and pensions.

Dispute Resolution analysis: An application for security for costs was made in circumstances where the claimant tried to enforce arbitration awards and an interim charging order in relation to money it obtained in a London bank account. Mr Justice Waksman dismissed an application for security for costs brought by a joining third party, DP World Djibouti Fzco (DPW), who objected to a final charging order being made in the case. DPW made its application specifically pursuant to CPR 25.26(1), rather than seeking an alternative order through the court’s inherent jurisdiction. CPR 25.26(1) allows a defendant to any claim to apply for security for their costs of the proceedings. Pursuant to CPR 25.26(3), where the court makes an order for security for costs, it must determine the amount and direct the manner and time within which the security must be given. Written by James Miller, 18 St John Street Chambers.

Consultant warranty 1 The Consultant warrants and undertakes to the Beneficiary that the Consultant has observed and performed and will continue to observe and perform each and all of the obligations of the Consultant under the Appointment, provided always

’No greater liability’ clauses are a common feature of collateral warranties and third party rights memoranda. Their purpose is to ensure that the warrantor/promisor does not have greater exposure under the third party rights granted than it has under the original contract. However, the drafting of these clauses has been subject to debate and can sometimes result in unintended consequences for the parties. Collateral warranties—general principles It is a generally accepted commercial principle, among users of collateral warranties, that, if a party enters into a warranty which is collateral to an underlying contract, it should not be under any obligations or duties under that warranty that are greater or of a longer duration than those under the original contract. In fact, professional indemnity insurance policies commonly exclude cover for claims under a collateral warranty that result from obligations that are more onerous than those under the original or underlying contract. In British Overseas Bank v Stewart Milne the court recognised that the underlying commercial purpose of collateral warranties

No greater liability Contractor 1 The Contractor's duties under this Memorandum shall be no greater and of no longer duration than the duties which it owes to the Employer under the Building Contract and the Contractor shall be entitled in any action or proceedings to rely on any limitation in the Building Contract and to raise the equivalent rights in defence of liability as it would have against the Employer