In Shore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from an individual who brought claims for damages in 2005 against his adviser for negligent advice regarding the transfer of his benefits from a defined benefit scheme to an income drawdown scheme. The Court of Appeal found that the negligence occurred at the time the transfer of his benefits was made from the defined benefit scheme to the drawdown scheme in April 1997 and his claims were therefore out of time.

Limitation periods refer to the time during which a claim must be brought. The law on limitation periods is set out in the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980) which makes provisions in respect of different causes of action. In an insolvency context, claims are generally divided into the following three categories: • actions based on a ‘speciality’ have a limitation period of 12 years. Speciality claims include those arising from a statutory cause of action and generally refer to claims to recover property (which would include setting aside a transaction in an insolvency context where the recovery is not simply for money) • claims to recover a sum of money under statute, which have a limitation period of six years, and • claims which have no limitation period A limitation period generally begins running from the date on which the cause of action accrued. This will be the case where the claim derives from the debtor’s cause of action. For example, where an office-holder seeks to recover unlawful dividends on behalf

When advising whether to commence arbitration proceedings, it is important to ensure that limitation issues have been considered and that the claim or cause of action is not time-barred. As with commencing domestic court proceedings, starting an arbitration under the law of England and Wales is subject to various statutory provisions. In addition, it is also important to consider any contractual agreement between the parties on the issue of limitation. In order for time to stop running, an arbitration must be ‘commenced’. The date of commencement will be determined by the legislation and/or arbitration rules under which the arbitration is conducted. Failure to commence the arbitration correctly could lead to a claim becoming time-barred, whether by statutory limitation or contractual time-bar. The procedure for commencing arbitration tends to be less onerous than for commencing court proceedings. In arbitration, a short notice may be sufficient to stop time running for limitation purposes and the claimant’s full pleading may not be required to be served until a later date. Applicable arbitration

The Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980) (as amended by the Latent Damage Act 1986 (LDA 1986)) governs the time limits for bringing different types of legal claims. If a claim is brought outside of the relevant limitation period, the defendant will be able to plead in defence that the remedy sought by the claimant is time-barred. The most relevant limitation periods for the construction industry are those for contractual and tortious (negligence) claims, although the LA 1980 also specifies time periods for actions relating to personal injury, defective products and defamation. Further, there are specific time limits which apply to claims under relevant statutes, including the Defective Premises Act 1972, the Building Act 1984, and the Building Safety Act 2022. Limitation can be particularly relevant in relation to claims arising out of defective works, as the cause of action may have arisen some years before the problem manifests itself. An example is where the contractor installs faulty foundations which result in cracking to walls and subsidence, but the problem only becomes evident some years later. In

What are limitation periods? Broadly, a limitation period specifies a time limit within which: • legal proceedings of a particular kind must be brought, or • notice of a claim or dispute must be given to another party Limitations of actions are essentially a matter of statute. The principal enactment is the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980). Legal proceedings are brought for these purposes when a claimant’s request for issue of a claim form (with the requisite fee) is delivered to the court office. Three basic issues arise when considering limitation periods: • when does time start to run? • how long is the limitation period? • what happens when time expires? The first two questions depend on which cause of action is being brought—for further information, see Relevant limitation periods for typical pension claims below. As to the third question, the general rule is that if the time period has expired, no action may be brought in respect of the claim. Limitation is a complete defence, but it

Public Law analysis: In Oracle Security Services Ltd v Barts Health NHS Trust and others, the High Court considered various aspects of the limitation period arising under regulation 92(2) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (the PCR 2015). The judgment concerns an application by the defendants for summary disposal of Oracle's claim, which challenged the direct award of a contract by the First Defendant (the Trust). The key issue for consideration under the application was whether Oracle’s Claim had been brought within the 30-day limitation period prescribed by PCR 2015, reg 92(2). While refusing the defendants' application, the court confirmed that the date on which a claimant first gains actual or constructive knowledge of the breach is included within the 30-day limitation period under PCR 2015, reg 92(2). Written by Ruby Zahra, associate at Trowers & Hamlins LLP.

Dispute Resolution analysis: The High Court considered whether claimants in the Ford diesel emissions litigation could amend their pleadings to introduce new claims arising from an alleged sulphur oxide (SOx) defect after the expiry of the primary limitation period for most claimants subject to an arguable case of deliberate concealment under section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 and a significant minority of claimants whose claims were said not to be time-barred. The judge held that the proposed claims did not arise out of the same or substantially the same facts as the existing prohibited defeat device allegations and therefore could not satisfy CPR 17.4. However, the court concluded that it had power to permit the amendments on the ‘Mastercard’ basis, treating the new claims as brought on the date of the amendment application rather than relating back to the commencement of the proceedings. The decision provides important guidance on the scope of that jurisdiction and the factors relevant to its exercise in large-scale group litigation, while confirming that the jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously and that defendants’ limitation defences must be preserved.

The High Court has held that section 38 of the Limitation Act 1980 (the Act) is to be construed such that if a minor, under the applicable tests also has another disability ie a mental health issue, then on reaching 18 the limitation period will still not start to run, the second disability effectively taking the place of the first. The court also departed from the existing position by finding that the applicable test to apply, when determining whether a claimant had a mental health issue which was a disability under s 38, was the test in the statute in place at the time the cause of action accrued and not at the time the claim form was issued. The court also reiterated the fact that there are two forms of constructive trust for the purposes of s 21 and it is only Type I, ie the true form of constructive trust, that would fall within s 21(1) so as to delay the start of the limitation period. This is important when dealing with claims for breach of trust/fiduciary duty.

The Chancery Division has held that a claim brought under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 was time barred after six years, as it fell within both section 2 and section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980 (the Act). This is important as previously it was not clear what the limitation period for this type of claim should be. Separately the court also considered whether the cause of action accrued at exchange of contracts or on completion of a property transaction and concluded that it should be at exchange. This was on the basis that the very entry into a flawed transaction should be seen to give rise to damage, even if that transaction is capable of remedy.

This Practice Note provides specific guidance on exclusions and limits of liability relevant to consultant appointments. It should be read alongside Practice Note: Limiting liability in construction contracts, which provides more detailed information. Why consultants seek to limit their liability Professional consultants who carry out design and/or other professional services for construction projects will usually have their own professional indemnity (PI) insurance policies in place in order to protect them if they get sued for a breach of a professional duty. It is usually a requirement of all professional appointments that consultants are required to take out and maintain PI insurance. PI insurance not only protects the consultant, but also protects the relevant employer, as it knows that there is a certain amount of money available, albeit from insurers, to cover any claim against the consultant. For more information on PI insurance, please refer to Practice Note: Professional indemnity insurance in construction projects. PI insurance is, however, expensive, and the level of cover taken out by most consultants is unlikely to cover all potential claims,

This Practice Note details limitations on enforcement to be taken into account when seeking to enforce an order made in family proceedings, including time limits, interest, specific requirements as to periodical payments orders (including where arrears are more than twelve months old) and the transfer of proceedings. Time limits The rules of limitation that prevent a fresh action being taken on a judgment once six years have elapsed since it became enforceable do not affect the right to take enforcement proceedings, including the appointment of a receiver, save for bankruptcy proceedings which are considered to be a fresh action. Section 24(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980) restricts the time within which to bring an action to six years. Enforcement for breach of a financial order on divorce or civil partnership dissolution falls outside this provision and applications to enforce lump sum payments are proceedings by way of execution rather than a fresh action and are not statute-barred. It is prudent, however, to take action as soon as possible, as the court may not be sympathetic to a creditor

Dispute Resolution analysis: In the County Court, the claimant (Habib) had succeeded in their claim for damages for breach of an agreement that they would be entitled to an equal shareholding with the defendant (Aziz) in a company set up to provide education services. In this unsuccessful appeal by Aziz, the High Court considered arguments on limitation and specifically addressed issues related to the timing of the breach and therefore when the cause of action could be said to have accrued in this case. Written by Charles Joseph, barrister at Tanfield Chambers.