Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition and which affect trade between Member States.

The concept of ’single and continuous infringement‘ (SCI) enables the European Commission (Commission), and national competition authorities more generally, to treat a series of acts or continuous conduct as one infringement of Article 101 TFEU where the various instances of conduct form part of an overall plan pursuing an identical anti-competitive object. Rationale behind the SCI concept Where a complex cartel of a long duration is at issue, its scope, form and membership may change throughout time. This may pose the following problems, amongst others, for the Commission: • a higher evidentiary threshold, as the Commission would need to identify and prove: ◦ the existence of a series of distinct anti-competitive agreements and/or concerted practices, and ◦ the parties involved in each of them • a potential time-bar as regards the older of such distinct anti-competitive agreements and/or concerted practices To address such problems, the Commission has adopted the SCI concept which has been upheld by the EU Courts The SCI concept made its first appearance in Europe in the Polypropylene

A key proposition underpinning EU competition law is that competing companies should act independently on markets. In principle, rivalry and competition can be expected to ensure the greatest consumer welfare, the most efficient allocation of resources and, with respect to the EU single market project, help further overall market integration. The European Commission (the Commission) and other regulators, including national competition authorities, are therefore wary of any arrangements which might dampen competition or reduce commercial uncertainty that would otherwise exist between competitors. At the same time, there are often legitimate reasons why companies enter into agreements that contain provisions or obligations that risk restricting competition. In particular, this will be the case where arrangements are concluded in order to generate or promote beneficial effects (efficiencies) which, absent the restriction contained in the agreements, would not arise. EU competition law policy attempts to strike a balance between ensuring the maintenance of effective competition (in particular, by prohibiting illegitimate collusion) and the realisation of benefits derived and often only achievable through cooperation. Article 101 TFEU

Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position on a substantial part of the internal market which affect trade between Member States.

In the EU, unilateral or ‘dominant’ firm conduct is governed by Article 102 TFEU. In particular, Article 102 TFEU prohibits undertakings that (individually or collectively) hold a dominant position within the internal market, or a substantial part of it, from abusing their dominance (without objective justification) insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. This provision is mirrored in the national competition laws of EU Member States. Article 102 TFEU places a ‘special responsibility’ on dominant undertakings—aiming to ensure that powerful firms do not distort markets, act unfairly towards customers, or reduce the threat of competition by excluding rivals, in particular by: • directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions, • limiting production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of consumers, • applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage, or • making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature, or according to commercial

Introduction This Practice Note provides a concise guide to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (EHCR), the right to freedom of expression. Its main focus is to provide an overview of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on Article 10, but there are also references to UK cases on Article 10 where appropriate. This Practice Note looks at: • the structure and wording of Article 10 • the fundamental principles applicable to Article 10 cases • the scope of Article 10 • the different legal grounds for restricting the right • the penalties or other sanctions that may be imposed The structure of Article 10 Article 10 is a qualified right consisting of two parts. Article 10(1) establishes the scope of the right to freedom of expression. Article 10(2) sets out the circumstances in which a public authority may lawfully restrict the right. Article 10 is one of four qualified rights in the ECHR which all share a similar two-part structure: they

Introduction—Article 14 and the HRA Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), reads as follows: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’ Under HRA 1998, all public bodies, including courts, must always act compatibly with the ECHR, including Article 14. Failure to do so gives rise to liability under HRA 1998, s 6; decisions of public authorities can be quashed and secondary legislation can be struck down. Primary legislation can also be subject to a conforming interpretation under HRA 1998, s 3 (for an example in the context of Article 14, see Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza), otherwise courts can send a signal to Parliament that the legislation breaches Convention rights by way of issuing a declaration of incompatibility under

This Checklist identifies the practical and legal issues practitioners should consider when assessing whether Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is engaged in a coroner’s investigation and the implications this may have for the scope and conduct of a coroner’s inquest. This Checklist should be read in conjunction with Practice Notes: The scope of coroners’ inquests and How to make representations on the scope of an inquest. Requirements of an Article 2 investigation An Article 2-compliant investigation should, so far as possible, ensure that: • all facts are considered and brought to light • culpable and discreditable conduct is identified, brought to public attention and responsible parties are held accountable • unjustified suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing is dispelled • dangerous practices are identified and rectified • insights are gained to save lives in future The minimum standards that must be implemented in an Article 2 investigation are as follows: • have authorities acting of their own motion • be conducted by someone who is independent—ie the coroner • be effective and conducted

Regulation EC 593/2008, Rome I applies in respect of choice of law provisions in civil and commercial contracts. The root principle is that courts in EU countries will apply the law of choice to the contract as standard save where an exception to this principle exists, even if this means that the courts of the relevant country will be applying the law of a foreign jurisdiction. It applies to contracts entered into after 16 December 2009 (earlier contracts remain governed by the Rome Convention in this regard). A choice of law must have expressly been made within the contractual provisions or be clearly demonstrated by the circumstances of the case. Where a contract

An amendment to an EU directive is set to complicate lending into the EU for non-EU banks, including UK banks. The relevant amendment was inserted into the EU Capital Requirements Directive IV (2013/36/EU) (CRD) as Article 21c by Capital Requirements Directive VI (2024/1619/EU) (CRD VI). In summary, Article 21c CRD requires EU member states to pass domestic legislation preventing in scope third country undertakings from providing core banking services into an EU member state except through an authorised branch in that member state. This means that non-EU lenders may not now be able to lend to EU borrowers directly from the UK, where previously those lenders may have been able to do. Member States were required to transpose CRD VI into national law by 10 January 2026, with the measures to actually apply from 11 January 2027—see: Article 2 CRD VI. Contracts entered into prior to 11 July 2026 can be ‘grandfathered’ (see below). The provisions also apply to the three additional EEA states, Norway,

Ireland-Banking & Financial Services analysis: This article was written by David Molloy, partner (Debt Finance), Kevin Lynch, partner (Debt Finance), Darragh Geraghty, partner (Debt Finance), Imelda Shiels, partner (Debt Finance), Ruth Lillis, partner (Debt Finance), Ciara Buckley, partner (Debt Finance), Sarah Thompson, partner (Financial Regulation), Robert Cain, partner (Financial Regulation), Katherine Quirke, of counsel (Debt Finance) and Sinéad Cantillon, senior professional support lawyer (Debt Finance), of Arthur Cox LLP. It examines the impact of Article 21c of Directive (EU) 2024/1619 (the Capital Requirements Directive VI (CRD VI)). It covers the Irish transposition approach and key timing considerations, exemptions and alternative approaches including reverse solicitation, the circumstances in which banking services may be regarded as being provided 'in the State', grandfathering, and syndication and secondary market issues.

Ireland—Banking and Financial Services analysis: This article, written by Kevin Lynch, partner (Debt Finance), and Ben Rayner, Of Counsel (Debt Finance), of Arthur Cox LLP, examines the practical implications of Article 21c of Directive (EU) 2024/1619, the Capital Requirements Directive VI (CRD VI) for cross-border corporate lending from an Irish perspective. It considers the restrictions on non-EU banks providing core banking services to EU borrowers, the Loan Market Association's (LMA’s) guidance on grandfathering and available exemptions, the implications of Ireland's pending transposition of CRD VI and the key operational and structuring steps institutions should take ahead of the application of the new regime in January 2027.