Dispute Resolution analysis: This was an application by Ameyaw, a litigant-in-person, for the judge to recuse herself on the basis of either: (i) the judge’s professional relationship with McGoldrick’s counsel; or (ii) the judge’s conduct at a previous hearing. Taking those grounds separately and in the round, the judge held that the threshold for recusal (being actual or apparent bias, applying the well-established test) was not made out. Ameyaw’s application was accordingly refused. The judge confirmed that she could continue to preside over the matter, notwithstanding either the fact that McGoldrick’s counsel was the judge’s former pupil or the events of a previous hearing. Written by Matthew McGhee, barrister, at Twenty Essex.

The mutual respect which judges have for each other's opinions.

Judicial deference is also known as the principle that ‘respect is a central concept in judicial review’. It is not limited to cases involving human rights. In cases involving human rights, however, it concerns the weight that the courts will give to the views of Parliament and/or the Executive when assessing whether a particular decision or piece of legislation constitutes a proportionate interference with one or more rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. Though similar to deference in several respects, the margin of appreciation is a distinct doctrine that is employed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It expresses the idea that member states are in principle better placed to evaluate local needs and conditions than an international court and should therefore be accorded a certain amount of leeway as to the manner in which they implement human rights standards. Judicial deference In some circumstances, it will be appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgement within

Judicial ethics refers to the standards of conduct, integrity and independence expected of judges and, in many contexts, of magistrates and tribunal members. It covers impartiality, avoidance of bias and conflicts of interest, propriety in and out of court, confidentiality, and limits on political or public commentary that could undermine confidence in the administration of justice.In the UK and Ireland, “judicial ethics” is a descriptive term rather than a single statutory definition. The core principles are set out in non‑statutory judicial codes and guidance, supplemented by constitutional provisions, case law on apparent bias and recusal, and rules on judicial discipline.In England and Wales and in Scotland, key sources include the Guide to Judicial Conduct and relevant judicial discipline regulations. In Northern Ireland, similar principles are reflected in local guidance and constitutional arrangements. In Ireland, the Judicial Council Act 2019 and associated guidelines play a central role.For legal practitioners, judicial ethics is most relevant when advising on recusal applications, apparent bias, fair hearing rights, complaints about judicial conduct, and the separation of powers, as well as when serving part‑time in judicial or quasi‑judicial roles.

This Practice Note considers the judicial expenses and taxation system in general civil litigation in Scotland. For guidance on: • funding civil claims in Scotland, see Practice Note: Funding Scottish civil litigation • the closest equivalent procedure in England and Wales, see, for example: Principles of costs recovery—overview, Costs budgeting and costs management—overview, Fixed costs—overview, Costs orders—overview, Security for costs—overview, Summary assessment—overview, Detailed assessment—overview and Discontinuance and costs—overview which, in turn, link through to more detailed guidance on various aspects of civil litigation costs in England and Wales Note: this Practice Note does not deal with expenses in the Supreme Court which are subject to Supreme Court Rules. For further guidance, see Practice Note: Supreme Court—costs, fees and funding—on or after 2 December 2024. Key: • CL(EGP)(S)A 2018—Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) Act 2018 (sometimes referred to as the ‘Civil Litigation, etc Act 2018’) • CR(S)A 2014—Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 • OCR—Sheriff Court Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 • RCS—Rules of the Court of Session 1994 • SACR—Sheriff

A court appointed person who manages disputed property or the property of someone who is unable to do so, where the property is in Scotland.

A procedure of the court appointing someone to look after or gather and distribute property belonging to a third party

As in any litigation, the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is strongly encouraged in proceedings in the employment tribunal, and can in certain circumstances be obligatory. There is usually an inherent incentive for represented parties in the employment tribunal to seek to settle claims, since the default position is that each party bears their own costs regardless of which party is ultimately successfully in the litigation. Settlement of claims limits costs whilst also avoiding litigation risk. This Practice Note explains the process of judicial mediation, which is one of the forms of ADR offered by the employment tribunal to facilitate the resolution of disputes by agreement. Judicial mediation (unlike some of the other forms of ADR offered by the employment tribunal) is a voluntary process, and requires the consent of both parties. The Practice Note is split broadly into two halves (although there is inevitably a degree of overlap between the two): • the first locates judicial mediation in the broader context of how ADR is used in the employment tribunal,

Local Government analysis: The R (ECPAT UK) v Kent CC litigation provides a case study in the use of suspended quashing orders and the role of the court in monitoring compliance with its orders. The litigation has resulted in four reported judgments. The second explained why suspended quashing orders and ongoing judicial monitoring were appropriate in this litigation and was the subject of a prior article. The present article provides a potted history of the litigation and considers the fourth judgement, which demonstrates the limits of the court’s ongoing monitoring role. Written by Dr Alice Irving, barrister at Doughty Street Chambers.

The doctrine of judicial notice provides that a court may take cognisance of facts which are generally known, without requiring them to be proved.

Family analysis: The Court of Appeal allowed appeals brought by a mother and father against findings made by a judge in care proceedings that their son had sustained serious intracranial injuries attributable to a lack of reasonable parental care. At the heart of the appeal was the concern that the judge had over-relied on her own assessment of the extensive medical literature, rather than balancing it with the totality of the evidence before her and falling into error in her consideration of the same. Further, that she made findings which were not addressed by the parties in oral evidence or submissions. In determining the appeals, the appeal court warned of the dangers in a judge elevating their own independent analysis of the medical evidence to a status above other evidence. Teertha Gupta KC and Susannah Burley of 4PB consider the issues.

The means by which a party procures a statement from a witness is outside the scope of judicial proceedings immunity. Therefore an employee may bring a claim for a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence based on the allegation that his employer has used improper means and applied undue pressure to procure such a statement. Accordingly, if an employer, to the knowledge of an employee, is prepared to use underhand and improper means to defeat a claim of discrimination brought against it by the employee, that is destructive of the requisite trust and confidence (whether or not the employer succeeds in defeating the discrimination claim). Court of Appeal: Singh v (1) Governing Body of Moorlands Primary School (2) Reading Borough Council.