An electronic communications network in which the network intelligence is centralised and separated from switching functions. These allow more flexibility than switched based systems, customers can be given access to their own database entries to carry out changes.

Arbitration analysis: Cynthia Tang, Gary Seib, Anthony Poon, Simon Hui, Philipp Hanusch and Andrew Chin of Baker & McKenzie Hong Kong discuss the January 2016 judgment of the Privy Council in Anzen v Hermes One which highlights the importance of clear drafting.

An intended beneficiary is a person or entity that the parties to a legal arrangement mean to benefit, even though that person may not be a direct party to the contract, trust, will or other instrument. In practice, the term is used descriptively rather than as a defined statutory concept, and its precise legal effect depends on the context and jurisdiction. In contract law in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, questions about intended beneficiaries commonly arise under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and analogous Northern Irish legislation, which confer enforceable rights on third parties where the contract expressly provides a benefit or purports to do so. In Ireland and Scotland, where the privity doctrine operates differently, the focus is on whether the parties’ intention to benefit a third party can be given effect through recognised mechanisms (for example, jus quaesitum tertio in Scots law or trust-style devices). In trust and succession law across all four jurisdictions, the test is generally whether the relevant instrument, properly construed, demonstrates an intention to confer a benefit on the person in question, which has consequences for enforceability of rights and standing to sue.

Intent to defraud means with intent to practise fraud.

A person directly intends those consequences which he desires to bring about by his acts, whether or not they will be likely to follow; a person obliquely intends those consequences which are virtually certain to result from his acts and which he knows are virtually certain so to result.

Usually the first announcement to the public by an issuer of its proposed IPO. Through the intention to float announcement, the issuer notifies the market about its proposed IPO and provides information about its business and strategy as well as information about the equity offering. Issuing an intention to float announcement is not a legal requirement but has become well-established market practice in the UK. In certain Main Market equity IPOs where a registration document is published pursuant to the rules on disseminating research in the Conduct of Business Sourcebook, it has become market practice for issuers to issue an expectation of intention to float which is then followed by a confirmatory intention to float announcement.

What is an intention to float announcement? An intention to float announcement (ITF) is generally the first announcement to the public by an issuer of its proposed initial public offer (IPO). Issuing an ITF is not a legal requirement but has become well-established market practice in the UK. An ITF enables the issuer to notify the market about its proposed IPO and to provide information about the issuer’s business and strategy, as well as about the timing and rationale for the equity offering and listing, in advance of publication of the prospectus. Content of an ITF As an ITF is not a legal requirement, the level of detail which is included may vary. However, typically, an ITF includes the following: • summary information about the issuer and the offering • a quote from the chairperson, chief executive and/or other management • contact information for the issuer, the investment banks and public relations advisers • a description of the issuer and its strengths and strategies, as well

Local Government analysis: This appeal was based on unusual and highly specific facts regarding the intention to return to a property and whether that satisfies the tenant condition in relation to the Right to Buy (RTB). It was held that it does, in this particular circumstance. The relevant principles to determine occupation of a property while not living there are outlined in Islington LBC v Boyle, and it remains a question of fact and degree and the burden is on the tenant. This case simply adds some helpful detail to conditional or contingent intention to return. Written by Clive Adams, head of Housing Management at Birketts LLP.

This Practice Note explains the offence of causing intentional harassment, alarm or distress contrary to sections 4A and 4B of the Public Order Act 1986 (POA 1986), alongside the lesser offence of causing harassment, alarm or distress under POA 1986, s 5. It sets out the elements of the offences and explains what is needed to prove them. An offence under either POA 1986, s 4A or 5 is triable only summarily, while an offence under POA 1986, s 4B is triable either way. The elements of the offence under POA 1986, s 4A The prosecution must prove that the defendant: • used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour, or displayed any writing, sign or other visible representation which was threatening, abusive or insulting • with intent to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress, and • by that behaviour, caused that person or another person harassment, alarm or distress POA 1986, s 4B was inserted into POA 1986 by the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023 and

Local Government analysis: A Judicial Review which examines the duties under section 190 of the Housing Act 1996 (HA 1996) owed to applicants found intentionally homeless. The s 190 duty is the duty to secure accommodation for a limited period of time to enable an applicant who is not owed the main duty sufficient further opportunity to secure other accommodation. The exercise of the duty is often overlooked in practice and has received little judicial attention to date, but the judgment helps provides guidance on the process an authority should follow to meet the duty, the test of suitability with such accommodation and the mechanism by which the duty ends. Written by Kevin Long, solicitor at Hackney Community Law Centre.

A local housing authority (LHA) may in certain circumstances have a duty to provide accommodation for homeless applicants. One of the key criteria in determining the extent of the duty owed to the applicant is to establish whether the applicant’s homelessness is intentional. This Practice Note explains the relevant factors, including whether the homelessness was caused by a deliberate act or omission on the applicant’s part, that must be considered when making this assessment. The definition The concept of intentional homelessness is one of the statutory tests applicable in homelessness cases under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 (HA 1996) (and the Housing (Wales) Act 2014 (H(W)A 2014)) which will determine which duties might apply to a homeless applicant. It concerns deliberate acts or omissions on the part of an applicant which result in the loss of accommodation. It is focused on whether the operative act or omission can be said to be deliberate rather than whether the applicant deliberately made themselves homeless. In England, the main housing duty under HA 1996, s 193 will only apply if the LHA

Local Government analysis: In Munemo v The City of Wolverhampton Council, the Court of Appeal allowed the Council’s appeal and reinstated its decision that Ms Munemo was intentionally homeless under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996 (HA 1996). The central issue was whether a tenant who obtained a secure tenancy through deliberate misrepresentation can later claim that it was not reasonable to continue to occupy that accommodation once the landlord seeks possession for that deception. The Court of Appeal held that where a tenant did in fact lawfully enjoy a secure tenancy (until a possession order was executed), they cannot rely on their own fraud to argue that the accommodation was not reasonable for them to occupy. The judgment clarifies the limits of Chishimba v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC (Chishimba) and R v Exeter City Council ex p Gliddon (Gliddon), emphasising that their reasoning does not extend to secure tenants who were not inherently ineligible for housing assistance. The decision provides important guidance for homelessness officers and housing litigators in assessing intentionality where a tenancy is rescinded through ground 5 proceedings. Written by Clive Adams, partner at Birketts LLP.