Rights to light can cause developers extensive delays and additional cost if not fully considered prior to works commencing. Indeed, an injunction can be obtained in some circumstances even after the development has been completed. Taking matters back to basics, a right to light is an easement, which can arise in a number of ways, for example, by express grant, implied grant, through prescription, or by statute. In order for an easement to arise, it must accord with the principles established in Re Ellenborough Park: • there must be a ‘dominant’ and ‘servient’ tenement • the right must ‘accommodate and serve’ the dominant tenement • the dominant and servient tenements must have different owners, and • the easement must be capable

Can the information held by a principal be imputed to an agent? Further information would be required to consider the purpose for which knowledge is to be imputed. For example, is a third party bringing a claim against the principal for a statement made by an agent that does not reflect the principal’s position/knowledge? The following may assist in considering this question: • in appointing an agent, it is the principal that is bound by the actions of the agent and not vice versa. As such, the acts of the principal cannot be deemed the acts of the agent • in the absence of an express contractual provision requiring the principal to share all relevant information with the agent, there is no obligation for full disclosure by the principal to the agent at common law. However, if the agent is a commercial agent under Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (CA(CD) Regs 1993), SI

When a buyer is interested in acquiring a business, there are two options: either the buyer acquires the entire issued share capital of the company which owns that business (known as a 'share purchase'), or the buyer acquires the collection of assets that comprise the business, which may include, eg machinery or equipment, property, intellectual property rights, employees and contracts (known as an 'asset purchase'). On a share purchase, the buyer acquires the company 'warts and all'. The company remains the employer of its employees and there is no effect on contracts of employment. With certain limited exceptions, whatever rights, obligations, powers and liabilities the company has towards past, present and future employees will be unaffected by the change in ownership. If the company has a subsidiary, the same considerations will apply to that subsidiary's

As of 1 October 2015 and the coming into force of Deregulation Act 2015, ss 33–41 (DA 2015), and the Assured Shorthold Tenancy Notices and Prescribed Requirements (England) Regulations, 2015 SI 2015/1646, the regime in respect of s 21 notices and related requirements has changed in respect of English tenancies. A s 21 notice only needs to expire on the last day of a period where s 21(4)(a) is being used in respect of tenancies which are covered by the transitional provisions. The obligation in respect of tenancies which are subject to the amends arising from the DA 2015 has been removed. The notice does not need

Consequences of disapplication If the option to tax is disapplied, it makes the transaction exempt from VAT, which means that the seller/landlord cannot recover VAT related to the property (eg VAT paid on the purchase price or VAT paid in connection with works). The impact can be particularly serious for property developers, who may find themselves unable to recover any input tax paid in respect of the construction/refurbishment of the building. As there does not need to be any VAT avoidance motive to trigger the disapplication, it can therefore be disapplied in normal commercial transactions, eg a sale or letting. Circumstances in which a VAT option to tax might be disapplied The issue of disapplication must be considered: • in any property transaction where it is assumed the option to tax will apply, but • any occupier is or will be someone that cannot recover VAT in full Transactions include: • a sale of a freehold interest in the property • the

Is the judgment a High Court or County Court judgment? The Companies Court is within the Chancery Division and is therefore within the High Court. Accordingly, it would appear that the judgment you are seeking to enforce is a High Court judgment. Usual rule—apply to the same court for your charging order as the court which gave judgment The usual rule in respect of applying for charging orders is that you must make your application for a charging order to the same court where the judgment you are seeking to secure was given. See our Practice Note: Pre-6 April 2016—procedure for obtaining interim and final charging orders. However, as this Practice Note indicates, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule, including where the proceedings have been transferred to another court. These exceptions are set out at CPR 73.3(2). When you can seek a charging order from the County Court in respect of a High Court judgment CPR 73.3(2) provides

Section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) states that: ‘[187B Injunctions restraining breaches of planning control] [(1) Where a local planning authority consider it necessary or expedient for any actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by injunction, they may apply to the court for an injunction, whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise any of their other powers under this Part. (2) On an application under subsection (1) the court may grant such an injunction as the court thinks appropriate for the purpose of restraining

STOP PRESS: From 6 April 2017, the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 were revoked and replaced by the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (IR 2016), SI 2016/1024. The content in this Q&A may have been affected by this change. The general position on jurisdiction For corporate insolvency, section 251 if the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) defines the 'court' as 'a court having jurisdiction to wind up the company'. This definition is expanded on in IA 1986, s 117. IA 1986, s 117 says that the High Court has jurisdiction to wind up any company registered in England and Wales. It also says that subject to the company's share capital (being paid up or credited with being paid up) not exceeding £120,000, then the county court of the district in which the company's registered office is situated also has jurisdiction. Which court then? There are two options, depending on the amount

The High Court has jurisdiction to wind up any company registered in England and Wales. Where in the case of a company registered in England and Wales the amount of its paid up share capital does not exceed

Criminal Finances Act 2017 The Criminal Finances Act 2017 (CFA 2017) received Royal Assent on 27 April 2017 and its purposes, as stated in the title, are to ‘amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, make provision in connection with terrorist property, create corporate offences for where a person associated with a body corporate or partnership facilitates the commission by another person of a tax evasion offence, and for other purposes’. CFA 2017 is divided into three substantive parts: • Part 1—Proceeds of Crime • Part 2—Terrorist Property • Part 3—Corporate offences of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion CFA 2017 Anti-tax evasion facilitation The question is concerned with CFA 2017, Pt 3 and the two new offences established: • failure to prevent facilitation of UK tax evasion offences. This applies to all businesses

On the death of the last surviving trustee, the power to appoint new trustees would vest in that trustee's personal representatives, as set out in section 18(2) Trustee Act 1925. See also section 1 of the Administration

Position of receiver A receiver generally acts as agent of the company (ie the mortgagor) in exercising its powers under the security document such as collecting income from and disposing of the assets in respect of which the receiver has been appointed. This agency relationship will be terminated upon the company being wound-up—see Thomas v Todd. In such a situation, the receiver does not automatically become the agent of the mortgagee (see Gosling v Gaskell) and if the receiver continues to act, he will do so as principal (rather than as agent of the mortgagor). For the avoidance of doubt, termination of the agency relationship between the receiver and company will not in itself terminate the receiver’s appointment. We