The question posed relates to the prohibition on making an application for a financial provision order or a property adjustment order after remarriage contained in section 28(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). The question suggests three possible dates: • the date the application was dated by the applicant • the date the application was submitted by the applicant, or • the date the application was issued by the court The subsection uses the words 'shall not be entitled to apply' to reflect the prohibition. The answer to the question is to be found in the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 5.3, which provides that the proceedings are started when the court officer issues an application at the request of the applicant (FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 5.3(1)) and that an application

As outlined in the section, ‘Stamp duty exemption for low value transfers’ in Practice Note: Exemptions and reliefs from stamp duty, an instrument of transfer is exempt from stamp duty provided: • the consideration does not exceed £1,000 • it does not form part of a larger transaction or series of transactions in respect of which the consideration exceeds

In the context of dismissal, conduct is one of the potentially fair reasons for dismissing an employee. However, in order to dismiss fairly, employers must also follow a fair procedure which allows employees sufficient opportunity to improve. Ultimately it must be shown that dismissal is a fair sanction to impose. See Practice Notes: • Reason for dismissal—conduct • Reason for dismissal—general—Potentially fair reasons • Dismissing fairly for conduct reasons The Acas Code of Practice, which applies to disciplinary and grievance situations, sets out how disciplinary action, including dismissal for disciplinary purposes, should be taken, and creates responsibilities for both employers and employees in both of these processes. It accepts that it may not always be practicable for all employers to take all the steps set out in the ACAS Code, but in

Conduct is one of the potentially fair reasons for dismissing an employee under section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996). However, in order for the dismissal to be fair, it must also be shown that, in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking), the employer acted reasonably in treating the employee’s conduct as a sufficient reason for dismissal (ERA 1996, s 98(4)). For more information, see Practice Notes: Reason for dismissal—conduct and Dismissing fairly for conduct reasons. For information on managing conduct generally, see Practice Note: Managing conduct. For information on the significance of the Acas Code of Practice on disciplinary and grievance procedures (Acas Code), see Practice Notes: • Acas

Serious untoward incidents (SUIs) often involve interviewing staff and preparing witness statements, assessing all the documentation and the history and then preparing a chronology, a root cause analysis of how the error came to occur, and an action plan of changes to be made with a time frame. The main purpose of the SUI is to ascertain how the mistake has occurred, learn from it and prevent it from happening again. From a claimant solicitor's point of view, the SUI and report are an important stage of the investigation into a legal claim. All the documentation relating to the SUI, including preparatory documents and those associated with the

Employment analysis: An employment tribunal should not order a party to disclose documents to the other side’s representatives when it is disputed that they are privileged. That is not a proper exercise of the tribunal’s discretion. While an order may be made for the disputed documents to be disclosed to the tribunal, that should only be used as a last resort. In addition, if legal advice comes from someone who is not a qualified lawyer, that will only attract legal advice privilege (to protect the communication from disclosure) if the circumstances are such that the advice nevertheless falls to be treated as the advice of a lawyer, according to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT).

If a financial remedy order makes no specific order in relation to the costs of the divorce suit, and the only reference to costs in the financial remedy order is a provision that there would simply be 'no order as to costs', then such an order would not exclude a previous order relating to the divorce suit. Where the order for costs in the divorce suit has already been made, so there are no other 'claims' in respect of 'the divorce costs'

The provisions for service of a divorce application are found in the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, Pt 6. The methods of service are set out in FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 6.4. Most importantly, it must be noted that, after 6 April 2022, where the applicant serves the application, the divorce application must be served within the time limits specified by FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 6.6A, unless an extension of time is obtained under FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 6.6B. Where postal service has failed in that the respondent has failed to return the acknowledgment of service, email service may be attempted under FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 6.7A, if the applicant has an email address. Personal service under FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 6.7 (other than by the

The position with regard to costs in divorce proceedings commenced on or after 6 April 2022 is set out in the President's Guidance entitled Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020: Costs in Proceedings for Matrimonial and Civil Partnership Orders. This guidance does not provide a new cost regime but applies the existing cost rules to the post Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 (DDSA 2020) law. The guidance emphasises the court’s discretion to make a cost order against either party (see paras 2 and 6). Conduct will be a very relevant factor (see paras 4 and 5). However, under the post-DDSA 2020 process, obtaining a divorce order does not depend on any findings about the responsibility of either party

This Q&A has assumes for the purposes of this reply that the application for a matrimonial order was made on or after 6 April 2022 and that it has been made by a sole applicant. In relation to applications for a matrimonial order that were issued by the court on or after 6 April 2022, the court may not make a conditional order unless, in the case of an application that is to proceed as an application by one party to the marriage only, that party has confirmed to the court that they wish the application to continue and such confirmation cannot be given before the end of the period of 20 weeks from the start of proceedings (section 1(5)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 7.9(1) provides that an application may be made to the court for it to consider

This Q&A assumes that it relates to proceedings issued after the implementation of the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 (DDSA 2020) on 6 April 2022. Court’s power to shorten the applicable periods DDSA 2020 introduced a minimum period of 20 weeks from the start of the proceedings (when the court issues the application) to when the applicant(s) may apply for a conditional order (see section 1(5) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973)). A conditional order may not ordinarily be made final before the end of a further six-week period from the making of the conditional order (MCA 1973, s 1(4)(b)), mirroring the position before the implementation of DDSA 2020. Under

Section 1(2)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides that irretrievable breakdown of a marriage may be proved if the petitioner can satisfy the court that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married to