The obligations of parties pre-action are set out in the Practice Direction Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols (the Practice Direction) and the pre-action protocols. The protocol that relates most closely to the subject matter of the dispute should be followed. For details of all the pre-action protocols, see Practice Note: The pre-action protocols and when they apply. If there is no protocol for the type of dispute you are dealing with, you should refer to the Practice Direction, which sets out various general pre-action conduct requirements that apply to all claims, and is specifically stated to apply where no other specific protocol is relevant (paragraph 2 of the Practice Direction). For more information on the Practice Direction, see Practice Note: Pre-action

A repudiatory breach is a breach of contract that gives the innocent party the right to treat the contract as being disregarded and entitling the innocent party to refuse to be bound by its terms. Not all contract breaches are repudiatory. A repudiatory breach goes to the core of the contract and must substantially deprive the innocent party of the absolute benefit that the contract was intended to provide. What amounts to a repudiatory breach will vary with each contract and depends on the construction of the contract and the circumstances of the case. Anticipatory breach may constitute repudiatory breach. The test for whether an anticipatory breach is also repudiatory is the same as for an actual breach, ie breach of a condition, or breach of an innominate term which goes

There is no special form applicable to a claim which includes a claim for final injunctive relief. The usual considerations on choosing the appropriate type of claim form set out in CPR 8.1 apply. The key consideration is likely to be whether the court will need to resolve a substantial dispute of fact in order to determine the claim. Using the Part 8 procedure can be tempting as it seems simpler, but it often only leads to increased costs and delay where Part 7 is more appropriate. In all but the simplest cases there will be a lot of scope for factual disputes where a right of way is being interfered with, not least because the grant of

Form D50H—Application for alteration of maintenance agreement during parties' lifetime is seldom used in practice, as it relates solely to applications under section 35 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) that alter a maintenance agreement (within the meaning of MCA 1973, s 34(2)) during the lives of the parties. Such a maintenance agreement must be in writing and will usually be a maintenance agreement (whether made before or after divorce) or a separation agreement. When exercising its powers under MCA 1973, s 35, the court may alter the agreement,

Amendments were made to CPR PD 22 which were effective as of 6 April 2020. Those amendments altered the prescribed format for a statement of truth verifying documents to be used in civil litigation, though both prescribed formats include a statement by the signatory that they believe the 'contents' of the relevant documents (or the ‘facts stated’ in the relevant document, under the new prescribed format) to be true. The court only has the power to strike out statements of case, although in practice the court can make directions which have a materially identical effect (for example, ordering that a party is not permitted to rely upon a particular witness statement at

If the contract is not specific on this point, the case of Marks & Spencer plc v Paribas Security Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd shows the difficulty of arguing that there will be any implied term in these circumstances that the promisee will pay for such services. There the tenant exercised a break clause terminating the tenancy in the middle of a quarter but paid rent for the whole quarter. The court refused to imply a term that the rent should be apportioned. Although the court was strongly influenced by the fact that it was well-known, that rent paid in advance could not be apportioned under the Apportionment Act 1870 (AA 1870), the case reaffirmed the relatively strict approach the court takes to implying

An appeal of an arbitration award can only be brought under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996). Such an appeal is limited to an appeal on a point of law. The court will only grant leave to appeal in very rare circumstances. For more information on the procedure for appealing an award on a point of law, see Practice Notes: AA 1996—appealing the award—leave to appeal (s 69) and AA 1996—appealing the award—appealing on a point of law

Under an individual voluntary agreement (IVA), a debtor avoids bankruptcy by entering into a repayment plan with their creditors. If the former spouse is owed money pursuant to an order made within financial remedy proceedings, that former spouse is a creditor alongside all the other creditors. As such, the former spouse is entitled to vote at a meeting of creditors as to whether the proposed IVA should be approved, and may object to the IVA, but ultimately, they will be bound by the outcome of the vote. This may result in the former spouse being bound by an IVA that disadvantages them, despite their objections, and

In this Q&A it has been assumed that it is referring to a situation in which the legal aid certificate was issued after 01.04.2013, and have taken into consideration the issues raised in relation to the indemnity principle and the amount which lawyers who undertake legal aid work (legal aid lawyers) can be paid for that work. The indemnity principle The indemnity principle operates so as to prevent a receiving party recovering a greater amount in costs than it is liable to pay to its solicitors (see: Costs orders—overview). The receiving party must be liable to pay its solicitor no more than is claimed for every item which is claimed (see General of Berne Insurance Company v Jardine Reinsurance Management Ltd).

In answering this Q&A, it is assumed that the appellant has not yet applied for permission to appeal (different rules on permission to appeal apply to appellant’s notices issued before 3 October 2016), and the appeal would be a ‘first appeal’, ie it is the first appeal to the Court of Appeal, and the decision being appealed was not itself made on appeal from a lower court (in terms of CPR 52.6 and CPR 52.7, different rules apply in relation to permission for first and second appeals). In summary, the procedure involved in appealing a decision of the Technology and Construction Court (TCC) in the Court of Appeal is the same as applies to other appeals from the High Court to the Court of Appeal.

Background The purpose of Part 20 is to enable counterclaims and other additional claims to be managed in the most convenient and effective manner (CPR 20). Claim The procedure for the counterclaim will differ depending on whether the claim is Part 7 or Part 8. A probate claim must be commenced using the procedure in Part 7 (CPR 57.3(b)). Within Part 57, a ‘probate claim’ includes a claim for a decree pronouncing for or against the validity of an alleged will (CPR 57.1(2)(a)(iii)). Counterclaim A defendant who contends that he has any claim relating to the grant of probate of the Will of the deceased person must serve a counterclaim making that contention (CPR 57.8(1)). A

This Q&A considers the procedure which a party to an order must follow if it wishes to make an application to vary its terms. This response is restricted to the procedural point. While it is common for an order requiring a property to be sold for no less than a certain price to contain provision for either party to apply to vary that price in the light of subsequent events which indicate that the original value was too high (or too low), one would need to consider