Construction analysis: The case concerned an application for an interim injunction which was being sought before any legal proceedings had been commenced. Monty & Payter LLP (‘M&P’) had instructed a building contractor, MWA Projects Ltd (‘MWA’) to undertake building works at a site in West London. Until May 2023, MWA had allowed the building contractor from M&P (a Mr Tim Jackson) to access the site whenever he wished, including outside working hours. In May 2023, MWA informed Mr Jackson that he would only be allowed to access the site during working hours or otherwise if accompanied by someone from MWA. Mr Jackson applied to the High Court for an injunction preventing MWA from changing the rules on access to the site in the way that it had done. The High Court refused the application for an injunction, finding that the test for an interim injunction was not satisfied. Written by Alexander Campbell, barrister at Cornerstone barristers.

This Practice Note should be read in conjunction with Practice Notes: Privacy law—misuse of private information and Privacy law—remedies. Brexit This Practice Note makes several references to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998). Brexit has had no automatic impact on either HRA 1998 or the incorporation of the ECHR provided for by HRA 1998. The ECHR is an international treaty that protects the human rights of people in countries that belong to the Council of Europe, which is an entirely separate body from the EU. The UK continues to be a member of the Council of Europe. Note that the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement provides that the deal does not alter the UK’s obligations under the ECHR and that the deal can be terminated in the event of either side denouncing the ECHR. For more information, see: • Q&A: What does Brexit mean for the Human Rights Act 1998? • LNB News 07/01/2021 77: Comment—EU-UK Trade and Cooperation

Correct jurisdiction and parties The court's jurisdiction Section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986) states: 'Where a person is subject to a disqualification order made by a court having jurisdiction to wind up companies, any application for permission for the purposes of section 1(1)(a) shall be made to that court.' See also new Practice Direction: Directors Disqualification Proceedings [2014] para 17. Where: • a person is subject to a disqualification order made under CDDA 1986, s 2 by a court other than a court having jurisdiction to wind up companies or • a person is subject to a disqualification order made under CDDA 1986, s 5 any application for permission for the purposes of CDDA 1986, s 1(1)(a) shall be made to any court which, when the order was made, had jurisdiction to wind up the company (or, if there is more than one such company, any of the companies) to which the

Applications for leave to act as a director, and the possible conditions attached to leave Once a director is disqualified under CDDA 1986, he may apply to the court for permission to act as a director of a specific company or companies. Whether leave is granted is entirely within the discretion of the court. The court will look to the Secretary of State (SoS) for guidance, but ultimately the decision rests with the court. Of paramount consideration when agreeing to grant leave, is the need to protect the public to prevent misconduct from occurring in the future. The court must consider the risk to the public, and balance this against the need for the director to remain as a director of a particular company or companies. For a full discussion on what factors the court will consider when applying its discretion, see Practice Note: Applications for leave to act as a director, under section 17 of the Company

This practice note discusses the ability for a disqualified director to apply for permission to act as a director despite disqualification, using s 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986). It looks at some general background to the law in this area, and then specifically what factors may be taken into account by the court when deciding whether to allow leave or not. For details on the procedure to apply for leave, see Practice Note: Applications for leave to act as a director under section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986—jurisdiction, parties and the application procedure. For details on the conditions that the court might impose in allowing leave, see Practice Note: Applications for leave to act as a director under section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986—possible conditions attached to leave. A director can be disqualified under a number of different statutory provisions. For the purposes of these notes

When a grant of letters of administration with Will annexed will be made A grant of letters of administration with Will annexed is made where a Will is proved by any person other than an executor. Clearly this requires the testator to have left a valid Will and to not have died fully intestate. There are specific circumstances in which a grant of letters of administration with Will annexed will be made, including where: • no executor has been appointed in the Will • all or the sole appointed executor has died in the lifetime of the testator or has survived the testator but has died without proving the Will—often seen in circumstances where spouses appoint each other and make no provision for a substitute executor • all or the sole appointed executor has renounced probate or has been cited to accept or refuse probate but has not appeared to the citation • the executor appointment is void for uncertainty • where the court exercises its discretion under section 116 of the Senior

Where an executor is not able to take out a grant of probate to the testator’s Will, there is a strict order of priority of others who can do this by way of a grant of letters of administration (with Will annexed). See Practice Note: Applications for letters of administration with Will annexed. After an executor, the next persons in the order of priority under NCPR 1987, r 20 would be those who have an interest in the residuary estate. Determining whether a gift of residue has been left is sometimes unclear, particularly where the Will is not professionally drawn. It is therefore necessary to examine what constitutes a gift of residue. Is there a residuary gift? In general a specific disposition of the residue is usually seen in a Will. There are some obvious clues in the wording that may be used and it is generally accepted that there are many words that are capable of denoting the whole or residue of the real and personal property of the testator,

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The court dismissed an application made by the claimant under section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986) for permission to act as a director of 15 companies (the companies) and an application under section 216 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986). The claimant had given an undertaking of ten-and-a-half years in respect of his conduct as a director of four companies. The admitted grounds of unfitness related to the claimant causing the companies to obtain government-backed bounce back loans contrary to the scheme. The court initially granted interim permission with conditions, including that the claimant would procure timely payment of the companies’ tax liabilities. This condition was breached prior to the final hearing. In refusing relief, the court closely scrutinised the companies’ tax positions, noting that the structure of the companies as a group potentially left HMRC extremely exposed. Significant factors considered by the court include the breach of the interim order and the claimant’s conduct in the proceedings, which involved providing affidavits which contained material inaccuracies and deliberately concealing the companies’ history of non-payment and late payment of taxes. Written by Lisa Feng, barrister at Exchange Chambers.

This flowchart sets out applications for permission (leave) to appeal in family proceedings. To access detailed practical guidance on the steps in the flowchart including relevant overviews, Practice Notes, precedents, procedural guides, client guides, legislation, forms and further reading links, see: Appeals and judicial review—overview

This Practice Note sets out the circumstances in which there is a requirement for permission (leave) to appeal an order made in family proceedings together with guidance on appeal notices, documents required, filing and service. The key provisions are set out in Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, Pt 30, together with Practice Directions FPR 2010, PD 30A and FPR 2010, PD 30B. See also Practice Note: Appeals—general principles, practice and procedure including as to Forms and fees. Permission Permission is required to appeal any judgment or order made by the Family Court except: • a committal order • a secure accommodation order • a refusal to grant habeas corpus for release in relation to a minor With effect from 2 March 2026, permission to appeal is required in relation to a decision of a bench of lay magistrates, a single lay justice or a justices’ legal adviser and permission to appeal cannot be sought from the lower court, but must be sought from the appeal court in an

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The case concerned an application by Mr Armstrong as trustee in bankruptcy (the trustee) for a possession and disposal order (the application) of Mrs Vanessa Temblett’s property in London, which was jointly owned with her husband (the London property). The court held that the trustee was entitled to possession and sale of the London property under section 335A of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) as no exceptional circumstances were shown to displace the statutory presumption that the interests of creditors outweigh all other considerations. The judgment notes the importance for practitioners to act within statutory time frames and demonstrates the court’s support of trustees fulfilling their duties in circumstances where the bankrupt is uncooperative and/or obstructive. The case also highlights that the court will not be dissuaded from making an order in circumstances where the increased costs of a drawn-out process can deplete an estate, absorbing the proceeds of realisations. Written by Amy Halliday, associate and Luke Bergin, trainee solicitor at Addleshaw Goddard LLP.

Dispute Resolution analysis: The Managing Judges of the large GLO NOx emissions litigation have dismissed applications seeking the protection of documents used in open Court from use for collateral purposes and for information about the funding arrangements which the claimants have in place in contemplation of a security for costs application. Written by Phillip Patterson, barrister, Gatehouse Chambers.