This Q&A assumes that the document requiring interpretation is a simple contract to which the normal rules of contract construction and interpretation apply, and is not a document used in legal proceedings or other proceedings to which specific rules of interpretation might apply. The usual rules of contract interpretation will be considered by the courts when considering the definition of an 'agreement'. Whether a term needs to be implied depends on the wording of the particular contract and the surrounding circumstances. The rules of contract interpretation The courts will apply an objective test based on what a reasonable person, having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation they were in at the time of contracting, would have understood the contract to mean. The

We have assumed that: • there is no dispute over the existence of the easement • if the easement was granted by express grant, the answer below is limited by the fact we have not had sight of the relevant document(s) granting the easement • the servient owner is unwilling to repair/replace the septic tank himself • replacement (as opposed to repair) has been determined as the only option It has long been held (see Jones v Pritchard) that where an easement is granted, such ancillary rights as are reasonably necessary for the exercise or enjoyment of the easement are also granted. Where the use of a thing (eg a septic tank) is granted, everything is granted by which the grantee may have and enjoy such use. The

The Lasting Powers of Attorney, Enduring Powers of Attorney and Public Guardian Regulations 2007, SI 2007/1253, reg 21(1)(b) provides that a donor who revokes a lasting power of attorney (LPA)

We refer you to Practice Note: Business and commercial LPAs, which sets out the circumstances in which it might be appropriate for an individual to consider making a separate business lasting power of attorney (LPA) to deal with their business assets. The Practice Note discusses the

An application for a child arrangements order (CAO) may be made either by someone who does not require leave of the court or by someone who has obtained permission from the court to apply. Whether a grandmother requires leave will be dependent on the facts of the case. If the application is for a CAO that regulates who the child is to live with and when they live with them, and the child has lived with the grandmother for at least a year immediately preceding the application then a grandmother will not require permission to apply for a CAO (section 10(5B)-(5C) of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989)). Otherwise it is likely that as a first step she will need to apply for permission. An application for permission is made using the procedure under Part 18 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955 (FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, Pt 18). The

Section 23(1)(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) contains the principal power to make ‘school fees orders’ on divorce; the section provides that on granting a decree of divorce, or at any time thereafter, the court can make (inter alia) one or more of the following orders: ‘an order that a party to the marriage shall make to such person as may be specified in the order for the benefit of a child of the family, or to such a child, such periodical payments, for such term, as may be so specified’ The reference to make payments ‘to such

We assume that your question refers to a financial order in the context of family proceedings. We refer you to Practice Note: Implications of the death of a party in financial proceedings. In particular, a claim for a financial order is personal to the parties to the marriage and does not survive death. If either party dies before the application under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 or Civil Partnership Act 2004 for financial provision or property adjustment has been made, the court’s jurisdiction will lapse. If either party dies before financial proceedings are determined,

If a solicitor acts for both parties in filing a joint application for divorce, they would then be prevented from acting for either party in subsequent financial remedy proceedings because of a potential conflict of interest even if an agreement is achieved. The parties would require independent legal advice before such an agreement could be concluded. It is for this

It is assumed that the clause in the Will which contained the appointment of the executors actually appointed the partnership rather than specifying that the executors were to be the partners in the partnership at the date of death. It is also assumed that, prior to the death of the testator, the partners in the partnership transferred its business and assets to the

The GDPR became directly applicable and enforceable in the EU on 25 May 2018. It should be noted that although the text of the GDPR refers throughout to the ‘Union’, it is stated on page one of the regulation that it is a text ‘with EEA relevance’, meaning all provisions are intended to be applicable in respect of all EEA members, not just those that also have EU membership. Once the GDPR is incorporated into the EEA Agreement and in force, references to EU Member States in the GDPR can generally be read to also include EEA members. This Q&A is therefore drafted from the perspective of the position once the GDPR is incorporated into the EEA Agreement and refers throughout to the EEA for simplicity. For further information on progress with that incorporation, see the European

State Immunity Under section 1(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 (SIA 1978) ‘a State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom except as provided in the following provisions of this Part of this Act'. One of the exceptions to this is within SIA 1978, s 6, which states: ‘(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to— (a) any interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, immovable property in the United Kingdom; or (b) any obligation of the State arising out of its interest in, or its possession or use of, any such property.’ However,

It is important to note initially that there is no statutory requirement for a chargor to notify Companies House that it has either fully or partially satisfied a debt or had its security released. Subject to the terms of any deed of release or other document relating to the charge stating to the contrary, the release of the security