The defence of set-off can be used when two parties have monetary debts against each other. This may rise in circumstances whereby a claimant brings a claim against a defendant, for example, and the defendant states that the claimant also owes money to the which ought to be balanced against the amount being claimed. For example, if one party owed £100,000 to another who brought a claim, but the other owed £50,000 back, they could use that as a defence to say only £50,000 should be paid due to set off. There are a number of different types of set-off. These include contractual set-off, whereby two parties have a contractual business relationship, banking set-off, insolvency

Who can apply to set aside? It appears that a party has obtained a judgment in accordance with the provisions of CPR 12. It is not clear if you are acting for the claimant or the defendant. It is equally not clear as to whether an acknowledgement of service was filed by the defendant, though whether the default judgment was entered under CPR 12.3(1) or CPR 12.3(2) matters little. The timing of the payment which satisfied the debt amount is important. The setting aside of a judgment is governed by CPR 13. In accordance with CPR 13.2(c), the court must set aside judgment if the whole of the claim was paid before judgment was entered (our emphasis in bold). If the amount claimed was paid prior to the date of the judgment, either the claimant or defendant can request that the

Duty of care Duties to patients in contract: Butterworths Personal Injury Litigation Service [211] states: ‘Where a health professional undertakes private practice, a contractual relationship is likely to arise between the patient and the health professional. In the absence of an express term to the contrary, a term will be implied into that contract that the service will be performed with reasonable care and skill. In the case of private hospital treatment, most doctors undertake such services as independent contractors. Thus, for example, there may be separate contractual relationships in respect of the provision of nursing care, resident medical officers and laboratory services.’ Duties to patients in tort: Butterworths Personal Injury Litigation

We have been unable to find any authority that the oral confirmation waives the written requirement set out in CPR 6.7(1). The 'in writing' requirement was confirmed as a mandatory requirement by the Court of Appeal in Nanglegan

RTA Protocol The Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents (RTA Protocol) applies to claims where the claimant values the claim at no more than the 'Protocol upper limit' which is: • £25,000 where the accident occurred on or after 31 July 2013, or • £10,000 where the accident occurred on or after 30 April 2010 and before 31 July 2013 The RTA Protocol applies only where the claim includes damages in respect of personal injury and if proceedings were started the small claims track would not be the normal track for that claim. The RTA Protocol does not apply to a claim: • where there has been a breach of duty owed to a road user by a person who is not a road user • made

The court has the power to stay the whole or part of any proceedings or judgment either generally or until a specified date or event under CPR 3.1(2)(f) and CPR 1.1(2)(b). This power should be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. Pursuant to the decision in Hosking v Apax Partners LLP, the following principles are considered to be applicable when determining an application for a stay: • the burden lies on the applicant to demonstrate by 'cogent evidence' that there are 'sound reasons for the stay' • although it is usually the defendant—being concerned with the cost and difficulties of dealing concurrently with two sets of overlapping proceedings—who applies for the stay, the application can, as in Hosking, be made by the claimant. However, where the application is made by a claimant who

Pre-action obligations Before commencing legal proceedings, it is generally expected of a claimant that they will send a letter of claim to the proposed defendant. Even in cases which are not covered by a specific pre-action protocol, the Civil Procedure Rules’ (CPR) Practice Direction Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols states that the parties should engage in correspondence which, for the claimant, will involve sending a letter to the defendant which: ‘…should include the basis on which the claim is made, a summary of the facts, what the claimant wants from the defendant, and if money, how the amount is calculated.’ The defendant is then expected to send a reply which: ‘…should include confirmation as to whether the claim is accepted and, if it is not accepted, the reasons why, together with an explanation as to which facts and parts of the claim are disputed and whether

A conditional fee arrangement (CFA) is first and foremost a contract. To a great extent therefore, what the parties’ rights and duties are will depend on the precise terms of the agreement between them. Many CFAs follow the template of the most recent Law Society Standard (issued in 2014), but this has not been updated in the light of case law since then and currently the Law Society does not have a version available on their website. Any breach of contract, including a repudiatory breach, will give the innocent party (here the client) the right to claim for damages. The type and amount of damages recoverable will depend upon the value of performance not performed since the primary purpose of damages for breach of contract is

It is important to note that the provisions of the Will deal with the rights of the beneficiary vis a vis the trustees of the Will trust. The answer to the question posed requires consideration to be given not only to the terms of the Will, but also to the terms of the trust of land. In other words, there are two trusts to be considered—the trust of land (under which the trustees of the Will are entitled to a beneficial half share for the beneficiaries of the estate) and the trust under the Will. Sometimes, the two sets of trustees may be, or include, the same people, so that the two separate roles can become

The determination of the issue will always depend on the exact terms of the dispute resolution clause utilised in the contract. It has been assumed that a standard multi-tier clause has been used. The distinction here is between the right to terminate and a disputed termination. If a party to the contract (Party A) considers that there has been a material breach of that contract by the other party (Party B), then, assuming that the contract allows for termination for material breach, Party A will consider

Section 25(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) provides that ‘an advance decision is not valid if P…has under a lasting power of attorney created after the advance decision was made, conferred authority on the donee (or if more than one, any of them) to give or refuse consent to the treatment to which the advance decision relates’. It is important to note that, under MCA 2005, s 9(2)(b), a lasting power of attorney (LPA) is not created unless it has been registered in accordance with MCA 2005, Sch 1. Given that the donor has selected option A, the attorneys’ authority will include the power to give or refuse consent to life-sustaining treatment on behalf of

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002) creates the three main money laundering offences, with penalties of up to 14 years imprisonment. They are: • POCA 2002, s 327—concealing, disguising, converting or transferring criminal property or removing it from the jurisdiction • POCA 2002, s 328—entering into or becoming concerned in an arrangement to facilitate the acquisition, retention or control by, or on behalf of another person of criminal property knowing or suspecting that the property is criminal property, and • POCA 2002, s 329—acquiring, using or having possession of criminal property In each case, commission of the offence depends on the notion of ‘criminal property’. This is defined in POCA 2002, s 340 as: • a person's