An application for re-registration from private to unlimited will be made on a Companies House form RR05.

An application for re-registration from public to private will be made on a Companies House form RR02.

An application for re-registration from public to unlimited will be made on a Companies House form RR07.

An application for re-registration from unlimited to limited will be made on a Companies House form RR06.

This Practice Note provides guidance on applying to register a trade mark at the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO). It deals with issues relating to conducting searches before making an application, the three-phase application process, making the application for registration, application fees, filing dates, claiming priority, classification of goods and services, search and examination, eligibility of the mark, absolute and relative grounds of refusal, examiner's objections, and publication of the application. It covers relevant provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (TMA 1994). The registration of a trade mark gives the owner the exclusive right to prevent others from using that mark without their consent. It is important that any individual or company wishing to use a name or brand in respect of particular goods or services applies to register that mark to benefit from maximum protection. For more information about infringement of trade mark registrations, see Practice Note: Trade mark infringement—UK. Seeking protection through the common law tort of passing off for unregistered marks is dealt with in Practice Note: Introduction

This Practice Note explains the procedure to apply for the retention of property seized following a search under section 59(5) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPA 2001) and the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025 (CrimPR 2025), SI 2025/909 and the basis on which an application may be made. It also explains how such an application may be resisted. For information on the ways in which property may be lawfully seized under warrant, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984) and CJPA 2001, or with the consent of the owner and the process to apply for such a warrant, see Practice Notes: Seizure and retention of property and Obtaining and executing a search warrant under PACE 1984. For information on search and seizure warrants under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002), see Practice Note: Search and seizure warrants under section 352 of POCA 2002. When can an application to retain seized property be made? An application for an order authorising the retention of property which has been seized, in purported

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: This was an application to set aside default judgments entered for different amounts against the first, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants. The judgments related to claims based on the fraudulent evasion of VAT and Pay As You Earn/National Insurance Contribution (PAYE/NIC) by a company during the period 2017 to 2023. The VAT assessments which the claim was based on could not be challenged as the company had not filed any VAT returns. Applying FXF v English Karate Federation Ltd, an application to set aside a default judgment under CPR 13.3 is an application for relief from sanction to which CPR 3.9 also applies. Therefore, the right approach to deciding these applications is to apply Denton and others v TH White Ltd and another once the two specific matters in CPR 13.3 have been considered. Accordingly, the court held that the applicants had no real prospect of defending the claim and dismissed the application. Written by Andrew Mace, barrister, Tanfield Chambers.

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: This was an application to set aside a statutory demand. The demand was based on sums said to be due under a loan agreement, as well as various agreements executed thereafter. The applicant argued that, due to a provision in a 2016 deed, any dispute relating to the demand had to be referred to arbitration. Further, she said the 2016 deed did not impose liability on her personally. She also relied on duress, undue influence, and/or fraudulent misrepresentation. It was held that the subsequent agreements had superseded the 2016 arbitration clause. The applicant was found to be liable in her personal capacity. It was found that there was no duress, nor evidence of undue influence or misrepresentation. Therefore, the application was dismissed. Written by Nora Wannagat, barrister at 9 Stone Buildings.

Restructuring and Insolvency analysis: The court allowed part of an appeal but, on different grounds to the lower court, dismissed the application to stay the bankruptcy proceedings in respect of possession and sale of the home. The appeal court reviewed the jurisdiction to stay bankruptcy proceedings and helpfully set out the relevant principles, contrasting it to other provisions, and applying it to this unusual case (not pending an appeal of the bankruptcy order). The court had been initially minded (in its draft judgment) to allow the stay application in limited form, but on hearing new evidence, dismissed it. This case is a good illustration of the key factors which point in favour of and against exercising this power. The court also summarised when it is appropriate to revisit conclusions in a draft judgment. Written by Morwenna Macro, barrister at Five Paper.

Dispute Resolution analysis: In an application to stay an order to file a second acknowledgement of service, the court accepted that to require the filing of that acknowledgement of service could incur wasted costs and acceded to the application. In an application to stay an order for discharge of a freezing injunction, the court held that notwithstanding the fact that permission to appeal had been refused on the basis that it did not have a reasonable chance of success, that did not mean that an appeal would necessarily be frivolous and that the balance of injustice will often require the freezing order to be maintained so as to not render any intended appeal nugatory. Written by Sandip Patel QC, partner, at Scarmans Solicitors.

Test for delay The granting of a stay is an exceptional remedy, or, a remedy of last resort. Proceedings can only be stayed if the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that, by reason of delay, a fair trial would not be possible. There are two bases on which a stay in this kind of context may be granted: • the defendant can no longer have a fair trial, or • it is not fair for the defendant to be tried at all Considerations for determining whether the delay would deprive the defendant of a fair trial include: • the length of delay • the prosecution's reasons to justify the delay • the defendant’s efforts to assert his rights, and • the prejudice caused to the defendant The court may stay proceedings on some counts of the indictment for abuse of process but only if satisfied, on the balance of probabilities that,

Dispute Resolution analysis: The fourth defendant, Lancashire County Council, applied for an order pursuant to CPR 11(1)(b) and CPR 11(6))b) to set aside service of the claim form against it. Alternatively, the fourth defendant sought an order striking out the claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) (‘Application’). The Application was made on the basis that the court should decline its jurisdiction to entertain the claim because, the fourth defendant contended, it had been brought in breach of a contractual requirement that all disputes be first determined by adjudication. The court recognised that adjudication was a mandatory requirement under the contract but exercised its discretion and declined the Application. In refusing either to strike out or stay the claim, the court considered that it would be disproportionate to strike out the claim and that, due to the multi-party nature of the dispute, a stay would not resolve all the issues in the claim. The court considered that, if the claim against the fourth defendant was stayed, the claim against the other three parties would proceed in the meantime, and this could give rise to procedural complications. Written by Anna Gilbert, counsel, Hausfeld & Co LLP.