This Practice Note applies to issues relating to tort where the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred on or after 1 May 1996 and before 11 January 2009. This Practice Note sets out Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 and how it applies to tort claims. It only applies to tort events, which occurred prior to 11 January 2009. Where the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim fall outside that period, a different applicable law regime will apply. For guidance, see Practice Note: Applicable law—a guide for dispute resolution practitioners. Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (PIL(MP)A 1995) is found in PIL(MP)A 1995, ss 9–15B. It applies to the UK and deals with the choice of law in tort. The tort equivalent in Scotland is delict. The purpose of the provisions is set out in PIL(MP)A 1995, s 9: • PIL(MP)A 1995, s 9(4) provides that the applicable law, chosen in accordance

This Practice Note discusses selected court judgments which illustrate the application of Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (PIL(MP)A 1995) to tort claims. Judgment and citation Facts Decision Walter Hugh Merricks CBE v Mastercard Inc [2024] EWCA Civ 759 at para [146] The case concerned competition follow-on claims. The Court of Appeal considered that this was a rare case in which the rule in section 11 should be displaced by that in section 12.The court’s analysis was strongly influenced by the Commission decision and collective redress context. The rationale was that the applicable law, as determined under section 11, would result in the law of countries being applied under which restriction of competition occurred. However, in this case, the restriction of competition had already been decided by the European Commission and the issue before the court was a follow-on claim. It was considered that it was ‘substantially more appropriate’ for the issues in the follow-on proceedings to be determined under

This Practice Note explains what is meant by applicable law, also referred to in differing circumstances as governing law, proper law or the choice of law, ie the law used to determine the dispute between parties. The term does not include procedural law. The Practice Note sets out which applicable law regime applies in the courts of England and Wales (English courts). The relevant regime will vary depending on whether the dispute is contractual or non-contractual, and, if contractual, whether the parties agreed the applicable law through a choice of law clause (governing law clause), including whether any such agreement was later varied. Cross-border issues in disputes can arise very easily in a world where international travel, trade and communication is the norm. Contracts are concluded on a daily basis between parties operating in different countries and different continents. Goods and services are delivered across national borders and people have accidents in countries other than those in which they habitually live and work. Where there is a cross-border element to a claim, there are

This Practice Note considers when the common law of England and Wales is applied to determine the law applicable to contract claims. It sets out the process by which the courts of England and Wales will apply the common law to determine which law is applicable to the issues in dispute between the parties. For an overview of considerations when dealing with applicable law, see Practice Note: Applicable law—a guide for dispute resolution practitioners. For guidance on determining the applicable law of an arbitration agreement, see Practice Note: Law of the arbitration agreement (England and Wales). Why is the applicable law important? When determining a contractual dispute, it is important to know the substantive law of the country that is to be applied by the courts to determine that dispute. This is known as the applicable law, governing law or proper law. The rationale for disputes to be determined by application of the substantive law was explained in the dictum of Lord Diplock in Amin Rasheed v Kuwait Insurance as follows: ‘My Lords, contracts are incapable

This Practice Note considers the application of the common law when determining which country’s laws apply to deal with a tort dispute. It considers the general rule of double actionability as well as the flexible exception. The court will also apply the substance test. The common law only applies to torts before 1 May 1996 (or defamation claims before 2009). Terminology The choice of law for a tort claim being determined under the common law uses the following terminology: • lex fori—the law of the forum (in the High Court, the law of England and Wales) • lex loci delicti—the law of the place in which the tort was committed • double actionability—the claim must be actionable both under foreign law and English law • flexible exception—a rare exception allowing the law with the closest connection to apply Steps to determining the applicable law The following steps apply when determining the applicable law under the common law: • identify the date of harm—always check the date of harm first as this will determine

This Practice Note examines how to determine which system of law is applicable to a contract of employment or employment relationship. It takes account of the impact of Brexit and the end of the implementation period (IP) for the Withdrawal Agreement on IP completion day (11pm on 31 December 2020) and the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 (REUL(RR)A 2023) on this area of law (see: Brexit impact, below). The Practice Note: • provides an overview of the Rome Convention and Regulation (EC) 593/2008, Rome I (see: Overview of Rome Convention and Rome I, below) • examines the key employment-specific provisions in Assimilated Regulation (EC) 593/2008, UK Rome I, including the ‘habitual place of work’ test, the ‘closer connection’ test, non-derogable provisions, overriding mandatory provisions (see: Determining the applicable law, below) • considers public policy issues and who should apply the applicable law (see: Applicable law manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum and Who should

Planning analysis: In Davis v Isle of Wight Council, the High Court rejected a challenge to the grant of planning permission for a renewable energy park on the basis that the case officer had shared a draft committee report with the applicant and later incorporated some of its comments. The court held that the claimant had not been unfairly prejudiced by being deprived of the opportunity to comment on a draft of the report, the purposes for which the report was shared with the applicant were unobjectionable, the planning officer exercised her independent professional judgment on the comments received and the claimant had ample opportunity himself to influence how the application was presented to the committee, to which he availed himself fully.

This Practice Note explains who is automatically entitled to apply for a special guardianship order (SGO) for a child and who requires permission from the court to apply. It sets out the criteria that the court must have regard to when deciding whether to grant permission. It also sets out the procedure for making an application for permission including the form of the application, documents in support and service. Circumstances in which a special guardianship order may be made The court may make an SGO : • as the result of a free-standing application by an individual who is entitled as of right to apply, or, an individual who has obtained leave of the court to apply • in any family proceedings in which a question arises with respect to the welfare of the child if an application has been made by an applicant who is entitled to apply or one who has obtained leave • in any family proceedings of its own motion if it considers that an SGO should be made even though no such

Interim applications in civil proceedings are governed by the CPR provisions relevant to the specific type of application. Interim applications include those for extensions of time, summary judgment, security for costs, injunctions, amending a statement of case, etc.

This Agreement is made on [date] Parties 1 [Insert name of licensor], a company incorporated in [England and Wales] under number [insert registered number] whose registered office is at [insert address] (API Licensor); and 2 [Insert name of licensee], a company incorporated in [England and Wales] under number [insert registered number] whose registered office is at [insert address] (API Licensee), each of the API Licensor and the API Licensee are a party and together the API Licensor and the API Licensee are parties. Background (A) The API Licensor has developed the Platform and controls the API (as those terms are defined below). (B) The API Licensee has developed the Application (as defined below) and wishes to [insert as appropriate, eg build on the Platform, and integrate the API Licensee’s own services with those of the API Licensor and/or disclose data or information from the Platform to the Application [or vice versa]], and requires the API to do so. (C) This Agreement sets out the terms upon which the API Licensor grants the API Licensee rights to use the API to interface between the API

The following flowchart applies to losses arising prior to 1 April 2017 which are set off against profits arising in accounting periods beginning before 1 April 2017. It sets out at what point in the calculation of taxable total profits deductions can be made and the order in which the deductions must be made for: • trading losses • UK property

Private Client analysis: The case considers the factors to be considered on an application to be appointed a deputy for personal welfare (PWD) under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) and is of particular relevance to such applications in respect of an adult child. The applicants were the ‘loving and caring parents’ of HDEB who was 22 years old. HDEB was in a residential placement as his needs could not be met at home. It was clear that HDEB was unable to make decisions about his personal welfare due to his autism and other disorders. The judge carefully considered the statutory provisions and the principles set out in Lawson, Mottram and Hopton (appointment of personal welfare deputies) (Lawson) and concluded that it was not in HDEB’s best interests to appoint his parents as PWDs for him. Written by Lynne Counsell, barrister at Addington Chambers.