This Practice Note gives an introduction to judicial separation proceedings that were issued prior to 6 April 2022. It explains the requirement to prove one of the five facts in section 1 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973: adultery, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, separation for two years with consent, and separation for five years. It sets out the effects of a decree of judicial separation. The Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 (DDSA 2020) came into force on 6 April 2022. Proceedings issued by the court on or after 6 April 2022 are subject to the provisions of DDSA 2020 and the changes to procedure under the amended Family Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955. For further information, see Practice Note: Introduction to the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020. Proceedings issued by the court on or before 5 April 2022 continue to progress under the pre-DDSA 2020 law. Such applications are not impacted by the coming into force of DDSA 2020, nor the consequential changes to procedure. This document covers the position for proceedings

The Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (C(IC)A 2003) is the UK’s main domestic legislation for mutual legal assistance (MLA) and provides the framework for making and giving effect to MLA requests. It prescribes the mechanisms by which UK law enforcement authorities can both obtain and provide evidence or assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings. For detailed guidance on the forms of assistance available under this and other related legislation, consult Practice Notes: Mutual legal assistance (MLA) and Mutual legal assistance—forms of assistance. Discretion to provide assistance to an overseas authority Where a request for MLA is received in the UK from an overseas authority, the Secretary of State may: • arrange for evidence to be obtained, subject to various conditions having been met • direct a search warrant is applied for • direct that an application be made for a production order (despite the absence of explicit wording in C(IC)A 2003, s 13(1)(b) to this effect) In practice, the UK Central Authority (UKCA) receives and considers incoming letters of request (LORs) and decides whether

When will the court allow an appeal against a finding of fact? The appeal court will only allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was: • wrong, or • unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court (CPR 52.21(3)) For more information, see Practice Note: Grounds for appealing and preliminary considerations. When it comes to appeals seeking to reverse a trial judge's findings of primary fact, the appeal court will intervene only very rarely. An appellate court will not interfere with a finding of fact by a first instance judge merely because it takes a different view of the matter (Stocker v Stocker). Appellate courts have repeatedly warned at the highest level not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them (see the Supreme Court decision in Re

This Practice Note gives guidance on introducing fresh evidence when appealing a court’s decision under CPR 52. It addresses when the appellate court will allow new evidence, the application of the Ladd v Marshall criteria when the court is considering whether to admit fresh evidence on an appeal and the court’s discretion under CPR 52.21(2), including whether the evidence could have been obtained at trial, would have had an important influence and is credible. A note on CPR 52.21 and older cases The rules governing the admission of fresh evidence on appeal are set out in CPR 52.21(1)–CPR 52.21(2). However, until October 2016 those rules were contained in old CPR rule 52.11. Note that some cases still refer to the old rule, but the principles are equally applicable to CPR 52.21 as the wording of the provisions is identical. For further information, see Practice Note: Amendments to Part 52 on 3 October 2016—table of destinations [Archived]. When will an appeal be allowed? The appeal court will only allow an appeal where the decision of

This Practice Note explains when an appellant may raise a new point or argument in a civil appeal. It sets out the general rule against raising new points that were not argued at first instance and provides guidance on the three-stage approach described in Singh v Dass. It describes the approach to new points in appeals against judgment following trial as well as where there has not been a trial on the merits; how the court will deal with concessions; and procedural considerations including seeking permission to raise new points on appeal and amendments to statements of case to enable new points to be taken. The general rule against advancing a new point on appeal The principles which the Court of Appeal will apply in deciding whether a new point may be advanced on appeal were summarised by the Court of Appeal in a much-cited passage in Singh v Dass: ‘First, an appellate court will be cautious about allowing a new point to be raised on appeal that was not raised before

Claim No: [insert claim number] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND & WALES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LIST (ChD) [ Patents Court OR Intellectual Property Enterprise Court ] Between: [insert name] Claimant/Part 20 Defendant and [insert name] First Defendant/Part 20 Claimant [insert name] Second Defendant/Part 20 Claimant _______________________________________ Grounds of invalidity _______________________________________ The following are the Grounds of Invalidity of [GB Patent OR European Patent (UK)][number] (the Patent) referred to in the Defence and Counterclaim served with these Grounds of Invalidity and upon which the Defendants/Part 20 Claimants will rely. 1 The alleged invention as claimed in each and every claim of the Patent is not a patentable invention in that the subject matter was not new having regard to the matter which formed part of the state of

The ground of challenge based on legitimate expectations is designed to hold a public authority to ‘an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue’ (the legitimate expectation), where to go back on that promise or change its practice would be an abuse of power. There are generally two elements to a legitimate expectations challenge: • Was there a legitimate expectation, and what was it an expectation of? • Has the public authority frustrated that expectation in a way that was so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power? A legitimate expectation can be either procedural or substantive. However, the law on legitimate expectations is still developing, and what constitutes a legitimate expectation and/or an unfair frustration of that expectation is not yet entirely settled. Development of legitimate expectations The concept of legitimate expectation was first developed by Lord Denning MR in Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs,

Overview of the illegality ground Illegality is the first of the grounds on judicial review set out by Lord Diplock in his classic exposition in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service: ‘one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”... By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.’ Judicial review on the illegality ground is a claim that a public law decision-maker has acted unlawfully by exceeding its legal powers, or misunderstanding or in some way abusing them. Lord Diplock’s label ‘illegality’ seems useful for referring to this ground of judicial review because a claim based on it essentially argues that a decision is unlawful because it has no proper legal basis, or an inadequate or defective legal basis, or is otherwise legally flawed. This contrasts with claims that:

Procedural impropriety as a ground of judicial review ‘Procedural impropriety’ is the last of the three grounds for judicial review identified by Lord Diplock in the seminal case Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (GCHQ). In this case, Lord Diplock characterised the ground as encompassing a ‘failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision’ or ‘failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice’. This Practice Note will address the central features of procedural impropriety as a ground of judicial review: • The development of procedural impropriety as a ground for judicial review including: ◦ the language of procedural propriety ◦ the boundaries of procedural impropriety as a ground for review ◦ the rationale for procedural propriety • Elements of procedural

This Practice Note outlines the ground of judicial review usually known as unreasonableness or irrationality. Unreasonableness as a Ground of Judicial Review ‘Irrationality’ is the second of the three grounds for judicial review identified by Lord Diplock in the seminal case Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (‘GCHQ’). In that case Lord Diplock characterised the ground as ‘a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it’. Today the courts often favour the language of ‘unreasonableness’ over ‘irrationality’, though the two terms continue to be used interchangeably. This Practice Note will address the central features of reasonableness as a ground of judicial review: • the development of reasonableness review, • the Wednesbury standard of reasonableness, • the two limbs of unreasonableness, ◦ unreasonable approach/route, ◦ unreasonable outcome/terminus, • adjustments to the Wednesbury standard of reasonableness, ◦ ‘super Wednesbury’, ◦ sub

The grounds set out in LTA 1954, s 30(1) upon which a landlord may seek to oppose the grant of a new business tenancy to a tenant.

A landlord can oppose the grant of a new lease under section 30(1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954) by specifying ground of opposition (a): '…where under the current tenancy the tenant has any obligations as respects the repair and maintenance of the holding, that the tenant ought not to be granted a new tenancy in view of the state of repair of the holding, being a state resulting from the tenant’s failure to comply with the said obligations'. To successfully oppose on ground (a), the landlord must show: • that the tenant has obligations to maintain and repair the holding (whether express, implied or statutory), and • the holding is in disrepair as a result of breaches of these obligations There is not strictly any requirement for the disrepair to be substantial. But the Court of Appeal in Gill v Lees News pointed out that ‘if the breaches are not substantial, that will have a very significant impact on the question whether the tenant 'ought not'