This Practice Note discusses freezing injunctions granted after a claimant has obtained judgment against the defendant. For discussion of the principles that apply in pre-judgment applications for freezing injunctions, see Practice Note: Freezing injunctions—guiding principles. This guidance focuses on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the CPR. Depending on the court in which your matter is proceeding, you may also need to be mindful of additional provisions—see further below in the main section titled: Court specific guidance. 6 April 2025 changes The CPR provisions relevant to interim injunctive relief, including freezing orders, were amended with effect from 6 April 2025. In particular, CPR 25 was revised extensively and the example draft freezing order included in Annex A of Practice Direction 25A was revoked. In its place, a new model order for a freezing injunction came into force on 6 April 2025. The changes were not intended to materially alter the substantive law or practice. However, the numbering and location of many of the provisions have changed, and case law and guidance which pre-date 6 April

The requirement of real risk An applicant for a freezing injunction must satisfy a number of requirements before the court will grant the relief sought. Those requirements are discussed in detail in Practice Note: Freezing injunctions—guiding principles, but in summary the applicant must show: • a ‘good arguable case’ • the existence of assets against which a freezing injunction could bite • a real risk that those assets will be dissipated so as to defeat a judgment entered against the defendant, and • that it is just and convenient to grant a freezing injunction This Practice Note provides guidance on the requirement of a real risk of dissipation of assets. Real risk—meaning and scope If the court has found that it has jurisdiction over the substantive cause of action and there is a good and arguable case against the defendant, it will go on to consider whether there is a ‘real risk’ that a judgment obtained by the claimant will not be satisfied. There are two aspects to this issue: • what

NOTE: On 1 October 2026, a newly formed Business and Property Division replaces the Chancery Division—see News Analysis: The new Business and Property Division of the High Court. This Practice Note contains references to, and information derived from, the Chancery Guide. It is understood that a Business and Property Division Guide is being drafted and it is assumed this will replace the Chancery Guide. Existing links to the Chancery Guide will remain in content until a replacement is released. This Practice Note provides guidance on making an application for a freezing injunction (also known as a Mareva injunction or freezing order). It discusses the procedure to be followed when making an application for any form of freezing injunction, whether it is a domestic freezing injunction, a worldwide freezing injunction (WFO) or a notification injunction. In this regard, it is important to stress that a freezing injunction is a type of interim injunction and therefore you should have an understanding of the basic procedure that applies to all interim injunctions, whether made on notice or without notice.

NOTE: On 1 October 2026, a newly formed Business and Property Division replaces the Chancery Division—see News Analysis: The new Business and Property Division of the High Court. This Practice Note contains references to, and information derived from, the Chancery Guide. It is understood that a Business and Property Division Guide is being drafted and it is assumed this will replace the Chancery Guide. Existing links to the Chancery Guide will remain in content until a replacement is released. This Practice Note provides guidance on drafting a freezing injunction (also known as a Mareva injunction or freezing order). It considers the model order for a freezing injunction and explains why particular terms and undertakings need to be included in a freezing injunction. For additional provisions you might need to be mindful of, depending on the court in which your matter is proceeding, see: Court specific guidance. For details on the application process and the test the court will apply, see the following Practice Notes: • Freezing injunctions—guiding principles • Freezing injunctions—post-judgment • Freezing injunctions against third

This Practice Note discusses the variation or discharge of freezing injunctions and appeals in connection with such orders. For details on the variation, discharge and/or appeals related to interim injunctions generally, see Practice Note: Interim injunctions—variation, discharge and appeals. For practical guidance on applying for a freezing injunction and the applicable principles, see Practice Note: Freezing injunctions—guiding principles together with the following: • Applying for a freezing injunction—checklist • Responding to a freezing injunction—checklist The content in this Practice Note focuses on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the CPR. Depending on the court in which your matter is proceeding, you may also need to be mindful of additional provisions—see the section below: Court specific guidance. April 2025 changes The CPR provisions relevant to interim injunctive relief, including freezing orders, were amended with effect from 6 April 2025. In particular, CPR 25 was revised extensively and the example draft freezing order included in Annex A of Practice Direction 25A was revoked. In its place, a new model order for a freezing

The Pensions Regulator can issue a freezing order when it is considering winding up a defined benefit scheme. It must be satisfied that it is necessary for member protection and that there is an immediate risk to the interests of the members or the assets of the scheme. The effect of a freezing order is that benefits cease to accrue and the scheme cannot be wound up (except by order of the Pensions Regulator).

Arbitration analysis: On the return date of a worldwide freezing order (‘WWFO’) granted without notice, the High Court considered the consequences of the fact that the time for service of the arbitration claim form had expired by the time the WWFO was made. The court held that the claimant had failed to take all reasonable steps to serve the claim form within the one-month time limit. This meant that it did not meet the criteria for a retrospective extension of time for service. In addition, the claimant had failed to disclose the fact that claim form had expired when applying without notice for the WWFO, and had failed to draw the court’s attention to the criteria for extending time when it applied (also without notice) to extend time for service. The court thus set aside the claim form and the order purporting to extend time for serving it, and discharged the WWFO. Written by Natasha Peter, barrister at Cornerstone Barristers and partner at Trinity International.

A freezing order (formerly termed a Mareva injunction or order) is an interim injunction restraining a party from disposing or dealing with assets under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court or the Family Court (by section 31E of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 and section 37(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (SCA 1981)) under SCA 1981, s 37 and Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 20.2(1)(f). This power is in addition to that conferred by section 37(2)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). See Practice Note: Applications to restrain future dealing—MCA 1973, s 37. Great care should be taken when dealing with an application to preserve assets. An ill-conceived, badly prepared application or one that does not carefully follow procedure may result in an adverse order for costs (including wasted costs), as emphasised by Mostyn J in UL v BK (Freezing Orders: Safeguards: Standard Examples). Consideration should also be given to proportionality, as in J v H, where the monies removed by the wife were described

Freezing orders were formerly known as Mareva injunctions, named after the claimant in one of the first cases in which such an injunction was granted. A freezing order is an injunction that prevents a defendant from removing any assets from the jurisdiction (ie England and Wales) and/or from dealing with their assets, whether within the jurisdiction or (in suitable cases) elsewhere. The purpose in granting such a freezing injunction is to ensure that the defendant's assets are preserved so that in the event the claimant obtains judgment against the defendant, the defendant's assets are available to enable the claimant to recover damages and costs. A freezing order may therefore be appropriate in a case where there is credible evidence that a defendant is likely to dissipate their assets to defeat a damages claim against him. In an employee competition scenario, it is unlikely that such an order would be sought unless there is an allegation of fraud against one or more of the defendants—the freezing order aims only to prevent the defendant dissipating

A party applying for a freezing order owes the court ‘a duty of candour’ which includes drawing to the court’s attention any defences that might be advanced. It is also necessary for the applicant to show ‘solid’ evidence of a risk of dissipation of assets (not just the defendant’s possible impecuniousness). The danger otherwise is that the option of a freezing order is misused. In this case the application was only saved by the financial non-compliance of the defendant.

CASE HUB (appeals lodged at General Court in Case T- 270/12 (Panalpina), Case T- 267/12 (Deutsche Bahn), Case T- 265/12 (Schenker), Case T- 264/12 (UTi), Case T- 254/12 (Kuehna+Nagel and Case T- 251/12 (EGL)–see Cases T- 251/12 EGL and Others v Commission, et al) ARCHIVED–this archived case hub reflects the position at the date of the decision of 28 March 2012; it is no longer maintained. See further, timeline. Case facts Outline European Commission Article 101 TFEU investigation into price-fixing cartels for international air freight forwarding services (COMP/39.462) Latest developments On 28 March 2012, the Commission issued its infringement decision and imposed fines totalling €169m. Deutsche Post (including its subsidiaries DHL and Exel) received immunity from fines. Subsequently, appeals were lodged at General Court in Cases T- 25/12

Arbitration analysis: Arbitrators’ authority to order specific remedies is not precluded by the broad wording of a claim, as held in substance by the Paris Court of Appeal in its decision of 13 January 2026. Under French law, the scope of arbitrators’ powers is limited by the subject matter of the dispute, which is in turn defined by the parties’ claims. Accordingly, a ruling ultra petita exposes the award to annulment. In this case, the court dismissed the application for annulment and upheld an ICC partial award, holding that the arbitral tribunal had not exceeded its powers by translating a request for good-faith performance and cooperation, subject to a per diem penalty (astreinte), into a more detailed order to execute an agreement and complete the related formalities, since these measures were provided for in the contract and had been addressed in the claimant’s submissions. This decision therefore confirms the discretion that arbitrators have when specifying the modalities of performance needed to give effect to the relief granted, even where these are not expressly requested, provided they remain consistent with the contract and the claims made. Written by Sara Nadeau-Seguin, partner and Yassine Alaoui, associate at Teynier Pic.