IP analysis: Mr Justice Fancourt discharged a £20m freezing order, and related imaging order which the claimants had obtained on an ex-parte basis. He found that there had been failures of full disclosure and fair presentation when the freezing order had initially been granted on an ex-parte basis. This emphasizes the importance of full and frank disclosure and fair presentation when seeking ex-parte orders. Written by Amanda McDowall, partner, and Saher Amin, trainee solicitor at Lee & Thomspon LLP.

Family analysis: His Honour Judge Booth (sitting as a High Court judge) has confirmed in the clearest terms that the duty of full and frank disclosure in financial remedy arbitrations endures until the court order reflecting the award is made. Although the wife in the case succeeded in her non-disclosure argument regarding the husband’s business, the result for her was ultimately Pyrrhic in light of the extent of her incurred costs and the way she had pursued other matters which were held not to be capable of producing a material difference on the outcome. Both parties’ approaches to the issues received judicial criticism. David Wilkinson, solicitor at Slater Heelis, examines the issues

Under English law, there is no requirement that parties negotiate in good faith and provisions relating to good faith are, generally, unenforceable. A drafter should be aware that several European jurisdictions automatically require all parties to adopt a stance of good faith. Under English law in certain circumstances, however, an undertaking to negotiate in good faith may be enforceable.

Commercial analysis: The court found that Essex County Council (the Authority) were entitled to terminate a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract where the contractor was unable to pass acceptance tests. In particular, the judgment considered a number of issues with general commercial relevance, including relational contracts and the implied duty of good faith, whether there was an implied time limit for exercising termination rights and the independence, impartiality and objectivity of expert witnesses. Written by Antony Smith, partner, and Emily Hunt, trainee solicitor, at Beale & Company Solicitors LLP.

Commercial analysis: In Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Saeed Bin Shakhboot Al Nehayan v Ioannis Kent , Leggatt J held that Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Saeed Bin Shakhboot Al Nehayan (Sheikh Tahnoon) owed Ioannis Kent (Kent) an implied duty of good faith. This duty arose out of an oral contract between the parties whereby they entered into a joint venture as equal shareholders. Detailing what Leggatt J describes as a ‘story […] all too familiar’, the case recounts the story of two friends entering into business together, the subsequent breakdown of their friendship, threats of personal violence, and the disintegration of a multi-million euro business. Importantly, in practice, the case serves as a warning to commercial entities that the English courts may imply a duty of good faith into certain commercial agreements. Written by Oliver E. Browne, partner at Latham & Watkins LLP, London.

This Practice Note explores the boundaries of the duty of trustees not to fetter their discretion. It should be read in conjunction with the Practice Note: Discretionary decisions—what must pension trustees do? which explores the manner in which trustees ought to exercise their discretions more broadly. What does the duty mean and what are its consequences? A fetter means to restrict, restrain or keep someone within limits. If it often used in the pensions context in relation to express or statutory limitations placed by the setlors/parliament on the exercise of a power, eg as to the conditions required for the valid exercise of a power of amendment. We are not concerned with that here (for further information, see Tolley’s Pensions Law Service, para F1.9). This Practice Note instead deals with fetters placed on the exercise of powers by trustees themselves. The general rule is that when exercising a fiduciary power, a trustee must form a judgment according to the circumstances as they then exist. It means that trustees cannot

Arbitration analysis: The case concerns an appeal before the Supreme Court of India against the decision of the Calcutta High Court entertaining a challenge against an arbitral award. The Supreme Court partly allowed the challenge as the Calcutta High Court had wrongly interfered with an arbitral award on the basis that the arbitral tribunal and district/lower court had failed to establish/hold any discussion on questions it felt should have been considered/answered. The Supreme Court also allowed the appeal as the Calcutta High Court had erroneously observed that the contract prohibited grant of pre-reference interest. The Supreme Court, while partly dismissing the appeal, also emphasized on the need for the arbitral tribunal and court alike to examine the contract, as it is the foundation of the legal relationship. The decision signifies the careful consideration of multiple issues within an arbitral award and the scope of interference available to a court to interfere with an award. The fundamental duty of the court and the arbitral tribunal is to examine the contractual provisions, and these provisions cannot be ignored or simply dismissed with standard reasoning. Written by Muizz Drabu, associate at Stewarts.

This Practice Note sets out certain key cases and associated relevant content on the duty to co-operate with an office-holder under section 235 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986). The cases are divided by topic area and include: • scope of the duty • use of information obtained • enforcement For further reading on this topic, see Practice Notes: • Basic principles—the delivery-up of information and property to the insolvency office-holder • Duty to co-operate with office-holder under section 235 of the Insolvency Act 1986 Scope of the duty Names of parties Judgment date Case summary Relevant content Webb (as joint liquidators of Eversholt Rail (365) Ltd (in liquidation)) v Eversholt Rail Ltd [2026] EWHC 101 (Ch) 22 January 2026 Liquidators must establish a reasonable requirement for documents or information under IA 1986, ss 235 and 236. Merely seeking to reconstitute the company’s knowledge is not, by itself and without more in any individual case, a sufficient reason to seek ‘everything forever’ relating

This Practice Note considers section 235 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) which provides an informal procedure to allow office-holders to obtain information concerning the company and its promotion, formation, business, dealings, affairs or property. For key cases and associated relevant content, see Practice Note: Duty to co-operate with office-holder under section 235 of the Insolvency Act 1986—key cases. If necessary, after seeking to obtain information under IA 1986, s 235, an office-holder may apply to court for an order for the provision of information and/or documents under IA 1986, s 236. For further information, see Practice Notes: • Basic principles—the delivery-up of information and property to the insolvency office-holder • Inquiry into a company's dealings (including by way of private examination) under section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 • Inquiry into a company's dealings under section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986—key cases Scope of the duty The duty under IA 1986, s 235 is to: • give the office-holder such information concerning the

ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. The duty to cooperate was revoked with effect from 25 March 2026 by the changes to plan-making introduced by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 (LURA 2023). As the duty to cooperate no longer applies to plan-making, this Practice Note has been archived. It is not maintained and is available for background information only. For more information on the abolition of the duty to cooperate and what replaced it, see Practice Note: Plan-making in England under the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023—principles and key steps—Abolition of duty to co-operate. Note that provisions in LURA 2023, not yet in force, abolish the duty to cooperate and regulations are expected to give effect to this abolition in 2026. For further detail, see: Abolition of the duty to cooperate in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. What is the duty to cooperate? The duty to cooperate was created by the Localism Act 2011. It places a legal duty on local planning authorities (LPAs), county councils and public bodies in

This Practice Note reflects the procedural code for sentencing offenders in England and Wales and should be read in conjunction with Practice Note: Sentencing Code. Duty to follow sentencing guidelines Every court when sentencing an offender is under a duty to follow any sentencing guidelines that are relevant to the offender's case, unless the court considers that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. In R v Malik, the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to emphasise that: ‘…these duties exist, not for the sake of it but because they serve the interests of justice. They help to promote certainty and consistency as between different judges. They also help all concerned including the public to understand why courts have reached the decisions that they have. This in turn helps to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. Thirdly, they assist this Court to understand why and how a sentencing decision was reached.’ The Sentencing Council (SC) has published offence

The concept whereby an employer is required to make reasonable adjustments for a disabled person in the work environment.