The general rule is that a trustee or personal representative is not entitled to delegate its powers unless permitted to do so by the instrument that appointed it. So, while for instance it is provided by section 10(1) of the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 (PAA 1971) that a power of attorney in a general form under PAA 1971 shall operate to confer on the donee(s) of the power authority to do on behalf of the donor anything which it can lawfully do by an attorney, PAA 1971, s 10(2) expressly excludes the operation of that rule in respect of ‘functions

The construction industry scheme (CIS) applies to contractors and subcontractors providing or operating under a contract for the provision of construction operations. Broadly, construction operations are activities carried out

Loans to employees If a company proposes to make loans, or extend credit to its employees for any purpose, it will need to consider the impact of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974) and the consumer credit legislation under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. We refer you to Practice Note: Consumer credit—loans to employees and directors and employee share schemes which provides useful guidance on this topic. When determining whether the consumer credit regime applies, it is prudent to highlight that in the UK it has a very wide potential scope. Loans to employees may fall within the scope of the UK consumer credit regime if: • they fall within the definition of 'credit' under the CCA 1974, which may include cash loans and any other form of financial accommodation (see Article 60L of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI 2001/544 (RAO 2001) (RAO 2001, SI 2001/544, art 60L) for more detail), and

An application to vary a child arrangements order is made pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989). ChA 1989, s 1(1) will apply to make the child’s welfare the court’s paramount consideration. In addition, ChA 1989, s 1(4) provides that where the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge a section 8 order, and the making, variation or discharge of the order is opposed by any party to the proceedings the welfare checklist laid out in ChA 1989, s 1(3) is applicable. This provides that the court shall have regard in particular to: • the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of their age and understanding) • the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs • the likely effect on the child of any change in their circumstances • the child’s age, sex, background and any characteristics

This Q&A is relevant to civil cases which are governed by the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and associated Practice Directions. There are several CPR rules that are applicable to ensuring cases are dealt with in a timely manner as set out below. Overriding objective CPR 1.1 sets out the overriding objective of the CPR, which is to enable the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. In doing so, the court must, among other things, ensure that a case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly. The court must further the overriding objective by actively managing cases and active case management includes ‘deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and trial and accordingly disposing summarily of the others’. While the court needs to be aware of the above, there needs to be a balance to ensure that cases are also dealt with justly. This is highlighted in the overriding objective as CPR 1.1(2)(d) states ‘ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly’. While

This issue was considered by the High Court (Cox J) in Samara. In that case, the first defendant's application to set aside default judgment was dismissed by a master (in essence, for lack of promptness), whose decision was upheld by Silber J on appeal. No permission was sought to appeal the judgment upholding the master's decision. The first defendant then made a further application to set aside default judgment under CPR 13.3. One of the issues for the court was whether the court has jurisdiction to consider a second

This issue was considered by the High Court (Cox J) in Samara. In that case, the first defendant's application to set aside default judgment was dismissed by a master (in essence, for lack of promptness), whose decision was upheld by Silber J on appeal. No permission was sought to appeal the judgment upholding the master's decision. The first defendant then made a further application to set aside default judgment under CPR 13.3. One of the issues for the court was whether the court has jurisdiction to consider a second

Applications for interim maintenance orders are governed by the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 9.7, which requires an interim application to be made in accordance with FPR 2010, 2010/2955, Pt 18 procedure, see Practice Notes: • FPR 2010, Part 18—other applications in proceedings • FPR 2010, Part 18 applications—procedure FPR 2010, 2010/2955, 9.7(1) sets out the types of provision covered by the rule, including an order for maintenance pending suit and an order for interim periodical payments, ie the same procedure is adopted on an application for interim maintenance as in relation to an application for maintenance pending suit. See Practice

The Precedent: Standard order 2.1—financial remedy order derives from the suite of Precedent orders issued by the Financial Remedies Working Group (FRWG), led by Mr Justice Mostyn. Clause 61 of that Precedent replicates the wording of the order issued by the FRWG. For further background on the standard orders, see Practice Note: Standard orders—general principles. It was noted by the FRWG that the Precedent: Standard order 2.1—financial remedy order includes order clauses that historically have been dealt with by way of undertakings, and the explanation in the FRWG report dated 31 July 2014 (at para 84) is: 'A number of those responding to the consultation process queried whether, in relation to mortgage

In the specific scenario of this Q&A, the lump sum payment is being paid to the receiving party in exchange for them transferring their interest in a particular property to the paying party. A pre-emptive step that could be taken when drafting the final order is to provide that in the event the lump sum payment is not paid by a particular date, that this triggers an order for sale of the property and appropriate division of the net equity upon sale. Another incentive to ensure payment of the lump sum which can be dealt with in the drafting, is to provide that the transfer of the receiving party’s legal and beneficial interest in the property takes place simultaneously with payment of the lump sum. If the lump sum is not paid, then the receiving party retains their

In matters relating to a divorce which commenced after 1 March 2005 (the date when Brussels IIA bis came into effect), jurisdiction lies with the court in England and Wales only if it has jurisdiction under Article 3 of the Brussels II bis or, alternatively, if no court of a contracting Member State has jurisdiction under Article 3 of the Brussels II bis and either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in England and Wales on the date when proceedings commenced. Article 3 of the Brussels II bis provides that jurisdiction shall lie with the courts of the Member State: • in whose territory: ◦ the spouses are habitually resident ◦ the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there ◦ the

There are two issues to consider: • wasted costs • non party costs orders (NPCO) Wasted costs Most solicitors will be aware of the Courts’ powers in relation to wasted costs: where a legal representative has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently and this conduct has caused a party to incur costs, the Court has the power to order the legal representative to pay those wasted costs. See generally, Practice Note: Wasted costs orders. NPCOs against solicitors In principle, section 51 of Senior Court Act 1981 (SCA 1981) empowers the Court to order anyone—whether they are a party to a claim or not—to pay the costs of litigation. However, the authorities which deal with NPCOs repeatedly describe them as 'exceptional'. In practice, this power is used sparingly. The Privy Council Dymocks Franchise Systems