Dispute Resolution analysis: The High Court has addressed an apparently undecided question—when does time begin to run where a claimant is induced by fraudulent misrepresentation to enter into a purely personal, unsecured guarantee? Applying Law Society v Sephton and principles developed primarily in professional-negligence cases, the court held that the assumption of the contingent liability on the facts did not, without more, constitute damage. The claimant’s proposed cause of action in deceit accrued only when the demand was made under the guarantee. The claim was therefore within the six-year time limit under section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980). As the defendants had no reasonably arguable limitation defence, CPR 17.4 did not apply and the amendment could be permitted under CPR 17.1(2). This decision indicates that, absent additional measurable loss, execution of a purely personal, unsecured guarantee alone will not start time running.