Arbitration analysis: On 22 October 2024, the Court of Appeal issued an important judgment in relation to the enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards, in the combined appeals of Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.À.R.L. v Kingdom of Spain and Border Timbers Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe. The Court of Appeal has confirmed that foreign states cannot rely on the principle of state immunity under section 1(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 (SIA 1978) to set aside the registration of ICSID awards. This important decision brings the position under English law in line with the courts of other contracting states to the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the Convention), including Australia, New Zealand, the US, France and Malaysia. Written by Tatiana Minaeva, partner, and Ana Margetts, associate, at RPC.

The Court of Appeal has made it clear that where a successful claimant exaggerates his claim this will not automatically result in the court making an adjustment to the costs that the claimant can recover from the defendant. The issue for the court to consider when exercising its discretion under CPR 36.14 is at what stage did it become clear to the claimant that the defendant was aware that the claim had been exaggerated and was a settlement offer accepted soon after. Lord Justice Jackson also provides a useful roundup of guidelines which apply in determining the appropriate costs order both in relation to Part 36 and Calderbank offers.

By a majority of 2-1 the Court of Appeal dismissed Appellant’s appeal and confirmed the decision of Macduff J that the 2nd Defendant, The Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust, could be vicariously liable for the alleged torts of a parish priest in the diocese.

The Court of Appeal, in upholding a judge's decision to strike out the claimant's claim, sought to balance the rights of all parties to a fair trial. The strike out had been ordered on the basis of a failure to comply with CPR provisions but the judge had identified the lack of merits of the case as a factor he had taken into account. The Court of Appeal held that whilst claimant's counsel had 'ingeniously advanced' arguments as to the strength of the merits the need for such arguments was directly attributable to the very procedural failures that had been the basis of the judge's decision to strike out. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal refused to order that the redacted names of employees of the defendant bank be provided as part of a party's standard disclosure obligations. In doing so it confirmed that caution should be exercised in applying pre-CPR cases to CPR issues. However, the requirement in pre CPR case Taylor that parties should not be disadvantaged in litigation applied although the original test in that case, taken from Peruvian Guano, no longer apply. Instead the correct test to apply was whether the applicant seeking disclosure had complied with the strict requirements in CPR 31.6.

The Court of Appeal has held that when determining whether a solicitor has a lien over a client account the question to be considered is whether the monies were held for a particular purpose which was incompatible with there being a lien.

Dispute Resolution analysis: the Court of Appeal held it could not make an award for costs incurred by the respondent in an appeal dealing with whether a matter should be transferred from the small claims track to the fast claims track. The rationale being that there was a provision in the CPR which expressly precludes a costs order for small claims proceedings and there was no provision which gave the Court of Appeal the power to override an express provision on costs.

The Court of Appeal has recently given judgment in two credit hire appeal’s concerning two issues that are commonly in dispute between motor insurers and credit car hire companies. The appeals concerned the entitlement to recovery of interest on damages and the proper method of calculating the rate for the hire of the replacement vehicle. In both cases the claimants were the innocent victims of an RTA caused solely by the defendants negligence and they both hired a replacement car on credit terms even though they could have afforded to hire a replacement car without entering into a credit hire agreement.

The Court of Appeal has reversed a decision awarding American Express summary judgment against a consumer. First, because it found that there was at least an arguable issue as to the validity of Amex's service of its Default Notice. Second, on the basis that it would not be fair to permit American Express to have its alternative argument (based on contractual termination) determined summarily given the manner in which this argument had only been raised and developed in appeal hearings after the initial summary judgment application. In so doing, Gross LJ made observations as to what is expected of parties when seeking summary judgment.

Claimant suffered injury to his back after hours of lifting and transporting equipment, during a stock take of his van. Employer had recently carried out risk assessments covering manual handling, but these had not addressed the risks in a stock take of inattention after a long period of work. Defendants criticised for failure to heed recommendation for mediation.

The Court of Appeal has held that when asked to consider an application for an anti-suit injunction a court has to undertake a two stage process. The first stage being an evaluative exercise on the evidence to determine whether there has been oppressive or vexatious conduct by the defendant and the second stage is whether, if such conduct is found, it is in the interests of justice to exercise its discretion to grant the injunctive relief sought. If an appeal is then brought against the grant of such relief the appeal court will be entitled to conduct a serious review of the evidence to ensure that the correct answer was reached in relation to the evaluation exercise. In this case it found that it had not and provided some valuable insights into the reasons why it reached that conclusion.

The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that the judge had erred in finding the claimant 100% responsible for a road traffic accident, where the defendant had been 60% responsible. Consideration was given to the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.