Planning analysis: In Richard Dixon v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council, the High Court dismissed a judicial review challenge to planning permission for a solar energy generating station on green belt land affecting the setting of a Grade II registered park and garden. The judge held that the local planning authority lawfully treated the heritage harm as less than substantial, was entitled to prefer mitigation by planting over removal or relocation of panels, and had not been required to reopen consultation following amended planting proposals or the introduction of the ‘grey belt’ concept in the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). The decision emphasises the breadth of planning judgment where heritage, landscape and policy considerations overlap.

PI & Clinical Negligence analysis: Her Honour Judge Claire Evans (sitting as a High Court Judge) refused the defendant’s application to approve the settlement. The court examined the principles of litigation and financial capacity, referencing caselaw such as Dunhill v Burgin and Coles v Perfect to determine the appropriateness of invoking the inherent jurisdiction. This case is unlike any other reported case in this area because the request for approval of the settlement was not made or supported by the claimant’s legal representatives. Written by Amy Rollings, barrister at Nine Chambers.

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: In this recent decision, the court examined claims under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) (transactions defrauding creditors) in a case which involved neither insolvency nor creditors. In anticipation of liability in respect of separate fraud litigation against him in the USA and, later, the UK (the Proceedings) a director/ shareholder, 'A', disposed of shares in a joint venture company (the Company) to his fellow shareholders (S and W) and to his wife in 2024 (the 2024 Transfer). Subsequently, in 2025 A's wife's shares were also transferred to S and W in return for a cash payment and other consideration (the 2025 Transfer). The claimants in the Proceedings (the Claimants) made an application on the basis that the share disposals were made with the aim of putting those assets beyond the Claimants' reach in the event that the claimants were successful in the Proceedings. A and the recipients of the disposals put forward a number of defences to the IA 1986, s 423 claims, which were carefully considered by Mr Simon Gleeson, sitting as a deputy High Court judge. Ultimately the 2024 Transfer was found to be reversible and S and W were divested of those shares. In respect of the 2025 Transfer it was held that the transfer did not represent an undervalue and so IA 1986, s 423 could not apply. The judge's analysis of the factual matrix, and application of the legislative overlay and extensive existing caselaw, very effectively restate the law in relation to IA 1986, s 423 and its proper interpretation. Written by Crispin Daly (partner) and Hannah Hooper (senior associate) at Howard Kennedy LLP.

Construction analysis: The Technology and Construction Court (TCC) enforced an adjudicator’s decision relating to claims under the Defective Premises Act 1972 (DPA 1972) on a site that was completed 20 years prior to the claim being brought. In doing so, it rejected arguments from the defendant contractor around clarity and crystallisation of the claim itself, that the adjudicator had no jurisdiction to decide a claim under the DPA 1972, inequality of arms in terms of documentation and that the adjudicator had failed to consider a defence in relation to an allegation of concealment.

Commercial analysis: The High Court has entertained the argument that an allegedly false statement contained in a draft disclosure letter produced during the course of transaction negotiations may have amounted to a misrepresentation. The decision follows an application for summary judgment and strike-out and so does not create binding precedent on the point. The case will proceed to a full trial. However, the judge’s comments are interesting and the ensuing decision, if a full trial takes place, will be one to watch. Dominic Sedghi, head of knowledge, Lois Horne, partner, and Tom Rose, partner, all at Macfarlanes LLP discuss the implication of the decision.

The most important rule is to be polite. If you are polite to everyone at all times, it is hard to go seriously wrong. The judge Make sure all mobile phones have been switched off before the judge comes in. Stand up when the judge enters the room: you will be reminded to do so in any event by the usher or the clerk. Bow to the judge when they come to the bench (their 'desk' at the front of the court). The judge will also bow. You should also bow when they stand up to leave the courtroom. The judge will usually indicate when they are ready for someone to address them at the start of the case. They will generally want to hear from the claimant’s advocate first. Addressing the judge For a list of the modes of address for the different levels of judiciary, see: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary—What do I call a judge? Stand up whenever you address the judge. Traditionally, the first person to do so should indicate who they represent,

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The High Court has annulled a bankruptcy order made in England against a debtor who had applied for his own bankruptcy, claiming UK domicile while residing in Austria. The joint trustees in bankruptcy sought annulment on the grounds that the debtor was domiciled in Austria (and so the English court lacked jurisdiction to make the bankruptcy order), and that the bankruptcy order served no practical purpose as the bankrupt’s assets were in Austria and could not be realised for UK creditors due to a lack of recognition by the Austrian courts. The High Court found that the debtor had not abandoned his UK domicile of origin, so jurisdiction to make the bankruptcy order was established. However, the court exercised its discretion to annul the bankruptcy order, concluding it ought not to have been made: the main assets were in Austria, Austrian law would not recognise the English bankruptcy, and UK creditors would be unfairly prejudiced by being unable to enforce their claims while non-UK creditors could. Written by Laura Newbery, legal director at Addleshaw Goddard LLP.

Following the publication by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) of the response to its consultation on ‘Implementing increases to selected court and tribunal fees’, the Court and Tribunal Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2024, SI 2024/476 has been issued detailing, amongst other things, the increase in court fees for certain civil proceedings. SI 2024/476, Sch 4 amends the Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008, SI 2008/1053 and applies an inflation-based increase of 10% to selected fees. The changes come into effect on 1 May 2024.

Following the publication by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) of the response to its consultation on 'Implementing increases to selected court and tribunal fees', the Court and Tribunal Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2024, SI 2024/476 has been issued detailing the increase in selected court and tribunal fees including in certain family proceedings and with increases also in relation to various court fees for civil proceedings.

Current court fees This Practice Note provides information on the key court fees payable for civil proceedings in the Court of Appeal, High Court and County Court, as set out in Civil Proceedings Fees Order, SI 2008/1053, Sch 1 (as amended). The majority of court fees for civil matters are contained in the Civil Proceedings Fees Order, SI 2008/1053, Sch 1, which is amended when any of the court fees in Schedule 1 to this SI are changed. Some civil proceedings fees are set out in other legislation, including Supreme Court fees—see Practice Note: Supreme Court—costs, fees and funding—on or after 2 December 2024. A full list of the court fees payable in civil proceedings is provided on GOV.UK—Fees in the Civil and Family Courts—full list (EX50A). A selection of the main fees payable in civil proceedings is also available on GOV.UK—Civil court fees (EX50). HMCTS has provided guidance on paying court fees, including assistance which is available for those who cannot afford to pay court fees—see: GOV.UK—Pay a civil or family court fee, get help

Court fees are payable in connection with the commencement of certain insolvency processes and during an insolvency process (usually in relation to defended proceedings against respondents commenced by insolvency practitioners). We set out below the current court fees that are payable in a variety of typical situations that will be encountered in insolvency matters. This Practice Note does not set out the court fees payable in respect of any claims issued under CPR 7 or CPR 8. The court fees payable are set out in the Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008, SI 2008/1053, as amended, the latest amendment being by the Court and Tribunal Fees (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2026, SI 2026/642 from 13 July 2026. The numbers in the left-hand columns of the tables below refer to the paragraph numbers contained in the Schedule to the Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008, SI 2008/1053. Cheques should be made payable to 'HM Courts & Tribunals Service' or 'HMCTS' and the court should be contacted in the event there is any doubt as to the fee payable. For

Planning analysis: In Barbican Quarter, the court dismissed a judicial review of the City of London Corporation’s grant of planning permission for the London Wall West redevelopment, addressing both environmental impact assessment (EIA) functional separation and demolition-avoidance policy. Mr Justice Fordham held that the authority breached regulation 64(2) of the EIA Regulations by failing to fully implement its document-segregation arrangements, but the breach was not vitiating because there was no improper access and the outcome would inevitably have been the same. The court also rejected arguments that Local Plan Policy CS15 created a presumption against demolition, confirming that demolition avoidance is one factor within a broader sustainability assessment. The decision highlights that failures in EIA separation procedures will not automatically invalidate permission absent material prejudice, and underlines the importance of evidence on actual impact and outcome.