This Practice Note relates to the compromise of pension disputes. It does not address issues relating to the compromise of debts arising under section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995 (PA 1995) (commonly known as Bradstock agreements); for further information on which, see Practice Note: Compromising section 75 debts—Bradstock agreements. Why compromise? It is increasingly common that parties attempt to resolve civil disputes through compromise rather than seeking a ruling of the court, tribunal or ombudsman, as the case may be, including in the trusts and commercial arenas. Pension disputes are no exception. A successful compromise can provide important advantages for all parties to a dispute, including: • cost savings • time savings • preserving confidentiality and market reputation • allowing greater flexibility and informality for affected parties than offered by formal methods of dispute resolution, and • sidestepping the risk of an unfavourable ruling, and the precedent and publicity it may attract Types of pension disputes It is important to recognise that pension disputes can take different forms, which

A key piece of pensions legislation is section 75 (and 75A) of the Pensions Act 1995 (PA 1995) and its underlying legislation, which collectively comprise what is commonly referred to as the ‘employer debt legislation’. Broadly speaking, the employer debt legislation provides that a statutory (non-priority) debt will be created in respect of an employer (or employers) participating in a registered defined benefit occupational pension scheme at a time when the scheme is underfunded on the buy-out basis upon the occurrence of one of three triggering events: • the scheme commencing wind-up • an insolvency event (as defined for the purposes of the legislation) occurring in relation to a participating employer, or • in the case of a multi-employer scheme, a participating employer ceasing to employ active members at a time when at least one other employer continues to do so (an ‘employment cessation event’) The statutory debt created under PA 1995, s 75 (a ‘section 75 debt’ or 'employer debt') is owed by the relevant employer to the pension scheme,

Construction analysis: Daniel Shaw examines the Court of Appeal’s decision in Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council, and its potential implications for construction litigation.

The Planning Act 2008 (PA 2008) introduced development consent orders (DCOs) for nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs). The regime provides for the grant of compulsory acquisition powers as part of the DCO, with no need to seek separate compulsory purchase order powers for such NSIPs. Note this applies in respect of development in England; for development in Wales, where compulsory acquisition is required for associated development under PA 2008, a separate compulsory purchase order will still need to be promoted. This Practice Note considers the attention that needs to be paid to the type of land interests which are to be subject to powers of compulsory acquisition, and sets out those categories of land that require special treatment from a compulsory acquisition perspective. In addition, this Practice Note considers the meaning of 'associated development' and the procedure where additional land (not included in the original DCO application) is identified as being required for compulsory acquisition. Crown land As with conventional compulsory purchase procedures, the position under PA 2008 remains that

Public bodies, such as local planning authorities, have compulsory purchase powers to enable them to carry out their statutory functions. A compulsory purchase order (CPO) is an order made by a public body under statutory powers to enable them to acquire land to carry out statutory functions, such as to develop land or construct road schemes.

CA 2006, ss 974–991 contains provisions enabling or requiring an offeror, following a takeover offer, to acquire offeree shares for which acceptances have not been received or given under the offer. Also referred to as squeeze-out rights (an offeror’s right to compulsorily purchase the shares of non-assenting shareholders) and sell-out rights (non-assenting shareholders’ rights to require the offeror to purchase their shares), in each case on the same terms as the offer. The exercise of squeeze-out rights is dependent on the offeror having acquired or contracted to acquire at least 90% of the shares to which the offer relates and, if relevant, at least 90% of the voting rights carried by such shares. A minority shareholder may exercise sell-out rights if the offeror acquires 90% of all the offeree shares (and not just those to which the offer relates). These statutory provisions apply to both public and private UK companies wherever there is a 'takeover offer' as defined by the CA 2006. There is no requirement for the offer to be regulated by the Code.

The Planning Act 2008 (PA 2008) introduced development consent orders (DCOs) for nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs). The regime provides for the grant of compulsory acquisition powers as part of the DCO, with no need to seek separate compulsory purchase order powers for such NSIPs (this applies in respect of development in England. For development in Wales, where compulsory acquisition is sought as part of an infrastructure consent application under the Infrastructure (Wales) Act 2024, compulsory acquisition is dealt with through the infrastructure consent order process. Different considerations may apply where development falls outside that regime). For further background, see Practice Note: Compulsory acquisition for NSIPs—introduction and principles. This Practice Note assumes that the decision to include powers of compulsory acquisition in the draft DCO has been made, and considers the draft compulsory acquisition provisions and supporting documentation for the DCO application, as well as the procedure on acceptance of the DCO application by the Examining Authority (ExA) under PA 2008 (ExA). See also Practice Notes: • Compulsory acquisition for NSIPs—introduction

The Planning Act 2008 (PA 2008) introduced development consent orders (DCOs) for nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs). The regime provides for the grant of compulsory acquisition powers as part of the DCO, with no need to seek separate compulsory purchase order powers for such NSIPs (this applies in respect of development in England. For development in Wales, where compulsory acquisition is required for associated development, a separate compulsory purchase order will still need to be promoted). This Practice Note considers the process of examination of the compulsory acquisition provisions by the Examining Authority for the DCO (ExA), the procedure once the Secretary of State has decided to make the DCO with compulsory acquisition powers, costs awards, implementing compulsory acquisition powers and material change applications. See also Practice Notes: • Compulsory acquisition for NSIPs—introduction and principles • Compulsory acquisition for NSIPs—application, draft DCO and supporting documentation • Compulsory Acquisition for NSIPs—special categories of land, associated development and additional land Process of examination and hearings Principally, the examination of

The Planning Act 2008 (PA 2008) introduced development consent orders (DCOs) for nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs). The regime provides for the grant of compulsory acquisition powers as part of the DCO, with no need to seek separate compulsory purchase order powers for such NSIPs (this applies in respect of development in England. For development in Wales, where compulsory acquisition is required for associated development, a separate compulsory purchase order will still need to be promoted). This Practice Note sets out the overall principles and considerations that an applicant should take into account in considering whether to seek powers of compulsory acquisition in its DCO application. See also Practice Notes: • Compulsory acquisition for NSIPs—application, draft DCO and supporting documentation • Compulsory acquisition for NSIPs—examination, making the DCO, costs, implementation and material change applications • Compulsory Acquisition for NSIPs—special categories of land, associated development and additional land • Rights of entry under section 53 of the Planning Act 2008 Relevant provisions of PA 2008 from a compulsory acquisition perspective and related regulations PA 2008,

This Practice Note covers the compulsory acquisition of a landlord's interest by the tenants of flats under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (LTA 1987), including discussion of the qualifying premises and tenants, and the acquisition order. Compulsory acquisition of landlord's interest An acquisition order under LTA 1987, Pt III, entitles certain long leasehold tenants of flats to compulsorily acquire their landlord’s interest in the building through a ‘nominated person’ if: • the landlord is in breach of an obligation owed to the applicant tenants under their leases relating to the management of the premises (including repair, maintenance, improvement or insurance), and the circumstances giving rise to that breach are likely to continue, or • both when the application is made and throughout the immediately preceding two-year period, an appointment under LTA 1987, Pt II of a person to act as manager of the premises has been in force, and that appointment was made by reason of an act or omission on the part of the landlord In either case, an

The following table summarises the thresholds that need to be met for an offeror to compulsorily purchase the shares of non-assenting shareholders (squeeze-out rights) and for non-assenting shareholders to require the offeror to purchase their shares (sell-out rights) following a takeover offer. For a more detailed note on the exercise of such rights, see Practice Note: Squeeze-outs and sell-outs: buying out minority shareholders. Description Squeeze-out rights Sell-out rights Source Threshold 90% in value of the shares to which the offer relates (or of the relevant class of shares to which the offer relates), andwhere the shares to which the offer relates are voting shares, 90% of the voting rights attached to such shares (or of the relevant class of shares to which the offer relates) 90% in value of all the shares in the offeree (or of the relevant

Disclosure notice under SOCPA 2005 Section 62(3)(a) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA 2005) enables the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) or an appropriate person to give a disclosure notice to an individual requiring them to answer questions with respect to a matter relevant to their investigation, this is also known as a compulsory interview under SOCPA 2005. An appropriate person means a constable, a National Crime Agency (NCA) officer or an officer of HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). A disclosure notice may be served on an individual if it appears that: • there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a relevant offence has been committed • the individual has information which relates to a matter relevant to the investigation of that offence, and • there are reasonable grounds for believing that information which may be provided by that person in compliance with a disclosure notice is likely to be of substantial value (whether or not by itself) to that investigation A relevant offence includes: • fraud offences • cheating the