Arbitration analysis: Antrix and Devas entered into a satellite-leasing agreement. Antrix terminated the agreement, citing its force majeure clause. Devas commenced arbitration proceedings against Antrix and subsequently was awarded $562.5min damages plus interest when the arbitral panel ruled unanimously that Antrix had breached the contract. Devas petitioned the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington to confirm the award, citing the arbitration exception to sovereign immunity as the basis for personal jurisdiction over Antrix under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f) and 1602-1611 [hereinafter the FSIA]. The FSIA establishes a default rule that foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless the action falls within one of the specific exceptions set out in the statute. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607. The FSIA prescribes the means of service for suits against a foreign state, political subdivision agency or instrumentality in Section 1608. The FSIA explicitly provides that personal jurisdiction will exist in cases brought against foreign states only if an exception to immunity in Section 1605 applies and service has been made under Section 1608. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Antrix moved to dismiss, arguing that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction. The District Court confirmed the award and entered a $1.29bn judgment against Antrix. Antrix appealed the District Court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking because Antrix lacked sufficient suit-related contacts with the United States, as required by Int’l Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945). Devas appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The Supreme Court held that under the FSIA personal jurisdiction over a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities exists when two requirements are met: (1) an exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities have been properly served in accordance with the FSIA. §1330(b). Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in imposing a third requirement that a plaintiff must also prove that the foreign state has made ‘minimum contacts’ with the United States sufficient to satisfy the standard personal jurisdictional test set forth in International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). In refusing to apply a third requirement, the Supreme Court provided that the FSIA’s jurisdiction requirements are limited to the plain text of the Act, creating a bright-line rule over foreign sovereign states. Written by Charles H Camp, president; Matthew Brajuka, Law Clerk; and Kale Wright, Law Clerk; Law Offices of Charles H Camp, PC, Washington, DC.