- Legal professional privilege and the processing of personal data (Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing)
- Original news
- What are the practical implications of this case?
- What issues did this case raise?
- The extent of the LPP exception under DPA 1998
- Free-standing right or 'collateral purpose'?
- Extent of obligations to search data
- What are the implications for practitioners? What will they need to be mindful of when advising in this area?
- Are there still any grey areas practitioners will need to watch out for? If so, how can they avoid any possible pitfalls?
IP & IT: What is the scope of the legal professional privilege (LPP) exception provided for under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998) and is the right of an individual to receive personal data following a subject access request (SAR) a free-standing right or a right limited by the purpose of the request? Ziva Robertson, partner, and Catrin Hughes, associate at McDermott, Will & Emery, examine the Court of Appeal’s consideration of these matters in Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing.
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