A practical guide to the US Department of Justice's FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
Produced in partnership with Amanda Raad and Zaneta Wykowska
A practical guide to the US Department of Justice's FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy

The following Corporate Crime guidance note Produced in partnership with Amanda Raad and Zaneta Wykowska provides comprehensive and up to date legal information covering:

  • A practical guide to the US Department of Justice's FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
  • Presumption of declination
  • Co-operating credit in light of aggravating circumstances
  • Limited credit for co-operation and remediation without voluntary self-disclosure
  • Evaluation of self-disclosure, co-operation, and remediation

On 29 November 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced a new US Department of Justice (DOJ) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) Corporate Enforcement Policy (FCPA Policy) to ‘provide guidance and greater certainty’ for companies considering voluntary disclosures of potential violations of the FCPA. This Practice Note considers the FCPA Policy (sometimes called the Corporate Enforcement Policy) and should be read together with the US FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy—checklist.

The FCPA Policy was incorporated into the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) at § 9–47.120 and replaced the FCPA pilot enforcement program, which had been in place since March 2016.

The FCPA Policy rests on the same core principles as the pilot program: self-disclosure, full co-operation, and adequate remediation. For more information, see Practice Note: A practical guide to FCPA enforcement actions (US)—FCPA Pilot Program and the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy.

While the policy is largely a continuation of the pilot program, there are several key differences. While the pilot program encouraged self-disclosure in return for the possibility of incentives, the FCPA Policy sets forth clear guidelines for federal prosecutors to follow. Moreover, the revised policy includes what were described as ‘enhancements’ over the FCPA pilot program:

  1. first, companies who self-disclose, fully co-operate, and appropriately remediate are presumptively entitled to a declination, whereas the pilot program allowed the DOJ to consider a declination