GLOSSARY
Abuse of process definition
What does Abuse of process mean?
There is an abuse of process where the prosecutor can be said to have manipulated or misused the rules of procedure or where inordinate delay has prejudiced the defendant to a situation where a fair trial is no longer possible.
In abuse of process applications it is the defence that bear the burden of establishing abuse on the balance of probabilities (Telford Justices, ex parte Badhan [1991] 2 QB 78). Where there has been a delay in proceedings, the question is whether the defendant can show that the delay means a fair trial is no longer possible. The procedure to be followed when making an application to stay proceedings on the grounds of abuse of process is contained the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction, para IV.36 and suggests the usual time to make this application is at the plea and case management hearing.
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Abuse of process procedure
For an explanation of when abuse of process applications may arise in criminal proceedings, see Practice Note: Abuse of process in criminal proceedings.The application procedure for making an abuse argument is governed by the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, SI 2020/759 (CrimPR) and directions in support of these rules are provided in the Criminal Practice Directions (CPD) at CPD I General matters 3C: Abuse of process applications. The burden of proof is on the applicant, on the balance of probabilities, to show that there has been some impropriety in the decision to prosecute or the manner in which the prosecution has been proceeded which means that either a fair trial is no longer possible or it is no longer fair to try the accused. Evidence can be called by both the defence and prosecution. The prosecution is under an obligation to disclose relevant unused material. The judge will make a determination on this evidence. Abuse of process arguments can be raised in the magistrates’ court. In Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court Ex parte Bennett, the House of Lords ruled that the magistrates’ jurisdiction to protect the court from abuse is restricted to matters affecting the trial of the accused, such as delay or manipulation of the court procedure. Any challenge of a ruling following an abuse argument in the magistrates’ court would
Judicial review of prosecution decisions
Judicial review is the process by which the lawfulness of the decisions, acts or omissions of public bodies are challenged in the High Court.Judicial review is not concerned with reviewing the merits of a decision but rather the decision-making process itself. It is a discretionary remedy. The High Court will only exercise its jurisdiction when it is proper to do so and it may decline to do so where there is an alternative remedy, see below: Availability of an alternative remedy. If successful, the High Court's remedies include making a quashing order (quashing the decision), a mandatory order (compelling the performance of an action) or a prohibiting order (preventing the performance of an action).Although it is possible to challenge a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, judicial review is a weapon of last resort. Availability of an alternative remedyAs the judgment of the High Court in R (on the application of AL) v SFO, XYZ Ltd, (applying the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners) makes clear, the factors which the court will take into account in deciding whether to entertain a judicial review include:•the nature of the alternative remedy NB whether it is a statutory remedy and whether it was the intention of
Multiple defendants
Multiple defendants This Practice Note looks at issues arising when multiple defendants (or co-defendants) are involved in domestic proceedings. It covers single lawyers representing all defendants, the level of co-operation required between the defendants, the extent to which one defendant can make a claim against another and how to add in new defendants. For general guidance on the contents and filing of the defence, see Practice Notes: Drafting the defence—formalities and Drafting the defence—drafting tips. Single lawyer Where there is no conflict of interest, a lawyer may agree to represent more than one defendant in a claim. Cooperating with other defendants Co-defendants should be represented by separate lawyers where there is a potential conflict of interest but, unless and until that conflict emerges, the parties may want to act together to: • present a defence that is coherent and in no way contradictory • save costs • avoid the risk of one defendant reaching an out of court settlement with the claimant, leaving other claimants bearing
Drafting the particulars of claim
Drafting the claim'>particulars of claim This Practice Note provides guidance on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the CPR. Depending on the court in which your matter is proceeding, you may also need to be mindful of additional provisions—see further below. This Practice Note provides guidance on drafting the particulars of claim. It should be read in conjunction with Practice Note: Drafting statements of case, which provides guidance on drafting statements of case in general, including formatting requirements, the need for a statement of truth, and electronic filing of statements of case. Particulars of claim—part of claim form or separate document? The particulars of claim can be included in the claim form or attached to the claim form as a separate document (CPR 7.4). If the particulars of claim are in a separate document they must either be served with the claim form, or within 14 days after service of the claim form; in any event, they must be served no later than the latest date for service of the claim form (CPR 7.4). In addition, the claim form must state that the particulars of claim will follow (CPR 16.2(2)). Particulars of claim served separately to the claim form must include the name of the court in which the claim is proceeding, the claim number, the title
Financial proceedings—conduct of the parties
Financial proceedings—conduct of the parties Conduct is a specific factor to be taken into account under section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) and Schedule 5, Part 5 to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004) at para 21(2)(g), if that conduct is such that it would ‘in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it’. Accordingly, statute specifically invites the court to consider the conduct of the parties as a factor when making a financial award. It is therefore tempting for the parties to list extensive details of each other’s bad behaviour: indeed, they are specifically invited to do so by Form E although with the proviso that bad behaviour or conduct will only be taken into account 'in very exceptional circumstances'. Clients may be keen to run conduct arguments. It is, however, rarely the case that conduct is relevant within financial order proceedings and robust advice should accordingly be given at the outset. The Law Society’s Family Law Protocol states that details of conduct by the other party should only be included in a Form E when that conduct is sufficiently exceptional to be relevant. The client should be advised of the views of courts on the inclusion of conduct and it should be explained why conduct is not usually
Patents tracker
Patents tracker This Practice Note is intended to be used to track the progress of judgments, legislative proposals and consultations related to patents. For archived items on patents, see Practice Note: Patents tracker [Archived]. Judgments—Supreme Court What's happening? When? Find out more Secretary of State for Health and another (Appellants) v Servier Laboratories Ltd and others (Respondents) [2021] UKSC 24 UKSC 2019/0172 2 July 2021: Supreme Court judgment delivered.14 April 2021: Supreme Court hearing.11 March 2020: permission to appeal to the Supreme Court granted.12 July 2019: Court of Appeal judgment delivered. Damages claim following injunction in patent proceedings This case concerns Servier’s enforcement of the UK designation of its patent for the alpha crystalline form of the tert-butylamine salt of perindopril (in particular by obtaining injunctions against other pharmaceutical companies) and the later finding that the patent was invalid.The Secretary of State for Health (SoS) buys drugs on behalf of the NHS. SoS argued that such conduct by Servier amounted to a making an unlawful profit by enforcement of the rights of a patented product in order to charge higher prices to the NHS. SoS failed at the High Court, the Court of Appeal and now at the Supreme Court in the UK to argue that Servier’s conduct was intentional, deceitful and caused economic damage
Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR)—update October 2020 [Archived]
rules'>Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR)—update October 2020 [Archived] ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. This Practice Note explains the key changes which were made to the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR) on 5 October 2020 when the old version of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, SI 2015/1490 were revoked and replaced by the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, SI 2020/759. The CrimPR have since been amended. The CrimPR govern the practice and procedure to be followed in all criminal courts in England and Wales including magistrates' courts, Crown Courts, Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) and in extradition appeal cases before the High Court. For further analysis of CrimPR, SI 2020/759, see News Analysis: An overview of the new Criminal Procedure Rules 2020. Reissue of the CrimPR The CrimPR are typically amended twice a year and the changes come into force on the first Monday of April or October annually. Each revision is made by a statutory instrument amending the current consolidated set of rules. The Criminal Procedure Rules Committee (CPRC) consolidate the CrimPR at five yearly intervals with the most recent consolidation exercise occurring on 5 October 2020 when CrimPR, SI 2015/1490 was revoked and replaced by CrimPR, SI 2020/759. The CrimPR, SI 2020/759 consolidate all CrimPR, SI 2015/1490, with the
CAT procedure for competition claims
CAT procedure for competition claims The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) is a specialist tribunal with the jurisdiction to hear competition damages actions, both stand-alone actions and follow-on actions (ie claims for damages which rely on a finding of infringement in a decision), and collective actions, both 'opt-in' and 'opt-out'. Under section 15 of the Enterprise Act 2002, the CAT is required to make rules with respect to proceedings before it; the current rules are the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (the CAT Rules), supported by the CAT's guide to proceedings. While stated to be based on the general philosophy of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), the CAT Rules are distinct and the CPR do not apply, save where specifically adopted under the CAT Rules or in certain circumstances in which they have been applied in practice where no express provision is made under the CAT Rules. A number of changes to the CAT's procedure for damages claims were introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 2015) and the 2015 CAT Rules, both of which came into force on 1 October 2015. The changes introduced include: • widening the jurisdiction of the CAT to include stand-alone actions for claims arising on or after 1 October 2015 as well as follow-on actions • changes to limitation, so that limitation periods for
Tort—the different types of tort
Tort—the different types of tort This Practice Note identifies the main torts (bar negligence and nuisance, which are covered elsewhere in our related content) and their key characteristics. Specifically: • trespass to land • trespass to the person • privacy/defamation • liability for animals • employers' liability • product liability • conversion and trespass to goods • misfeasance in public office • vicarious liability • accessory liability in tort • procurement liability in tort For practical guidance content on negligence, nuisance and breach of statutory duty claims, see: Tort and negligence claims—overview. For guidance on bringing and defending claims against professionals, see: Professional negligence claims—overview. The tort of trespass to land The tort of trespass to land is committed when a person (D) does an act, which causes entry into the land of another person (C) without permission or justification. It is not necessary for any harm to be caused to the land concerned for the tort to be committed. For there to be a trespass in tort, D must enter C’s land voluntarily (Stone v Smith). Any entry will suffice, no matter how trivial or small (Ellis v Loftus Iron). It is not necessary that D knows that they are committing a trespass. It is therefore possible to trespass accidentally, eg if D is
Non-party costs orders—guidelines
Non-party costs orders—guidelines This Practice Note sets out the power in section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (SCA 1981) that provides the court with a discretion to make a non-party costs order (NPCO) ie a costs order made by the court in favour of, or against, a person (third party) who is not a party to the proceedings. It sets out the approach laid down by the Court of Appeal in Deutsche Bank v Sebastian Holdings when dealing with the provisions in CPR 46.2 dealing. Guidance is provided as to the need for a third party needs to be warned about any potential application for an NPCO as well as the need to join the third party to the proceedings. The Practice Note then looks at what the court will consider and whether causation is required. The following Practice Notes may also be of interest: • Non-party costs orders—application • Non-party costs orders—company directors and shareholders • Non-party costs orders—funders • Non-party costs orders—solicitors • Non-party costs orders—others against whom they can be made What is a non-party costs order? This is a costs order made by the court in favour of, or against, a person who is not a party to the proceedings. Note: such persons are referred to in court
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Do trustees in bankruptcy have to disclose the sale price of a particular asset or assets in their report to creditors?
Do trustees in bankruptcy have to disclose the sale price of a particular asset or assets in their report to creditors? The general function and role of the trustee in bankruptcy (trustee) is to get in, realise and distribute the bankruptcy estate in accordance with sections 305–335 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986). The trustee's other major function is to review, adjudicate on and agree creditors' claims. For general guidance, see Practice Note: Roles, powers, functions and duties of a trustee in bankruptcy. A trustee’s reporting to creditors The Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (IR 2016), SI 2016/1024, Pt 18 deals with the reporting and remuneration of office-holders. In particular, IR 2016, SI 2016/1024, r 18.3 outlines what an
Can you bring a money claim and a claim for defrauding creditors in the same proceedings?
Can you bring a money claim and a claim for defrauding creditors in the same proceedings? The matters set out below deal only with the principle of bringing multiple claims in one set of proceedings from a CPR perspective—it does not address claims under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) which are outside the scope of the Dispute Resolution module. CPR 7.3 states: 'A claimant may use a single claim form to start all claims which can be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings.' Further,
We have several Financial Ombudsman Service cases where the initial assessor has ruled that the relevant investment was mis-sold and has issued guidance as to the calculation of the quantum of compensation, but has left it to the bank to make the actual calculation. However, the bank is simply refusing to engage. Is there anything we can do other than refer the matter back to the Ombudsman? By not responding, is the bank guilty of an abuse of process?
We have several service'>Financial Ombudsman Service cases where the initial assessor has ruled that the relevant investment was mis-sold and has issued guidance as to the calculation of the quantum of compensation, but has left it to the bank to make the actual calculation. However, the bank is simply refusing to engage. Is there anything we can do other than refer the matter back to the Ombudsman? By not responding, is the bank guilty of an abuse of process? We refer you, in general to Practice Notes: Financial Ombudsman Service—remedies, Financial Ombudsman Service—essentials, and The complaint-handling process of the Financial Ombudsman Service. DISP 3.5.4R in the FCA Handbook states that the initial assessment of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), sent to both parties, must set out the case handler’s reasons and a time limit within which either party must respond. If either party then indicates disagreement with the provisional assessment within that time limit, then the Ombudsman will proceed to making a final determination. If a firm does accept the initial assessment within the time limit given and does not do what it has agreed to do, then it may not be complying
Does a defendant have to pay fixed commencement costs and the issue fee if the debt is paid between the issue and service of proceedings?
Does a defendant have to pay fixed commencement costs and the issue fee if the debt is paid between the issue and service of proceedings? Once proceedings have started, section 51(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 applies. The effect of this is that, subject to any rules of court, the costs of and incidental to the proceedings are within the court’s discretion. Pursuant to CPR 7.2, proceedings are commenced for the purposes of the CPR and associated costs and procedural rules upon issue of the claim form. For further details, see: Starting a claim or counterclaim—overview. If the only claim is for a specified sum of money and the defendant pays the money claimed within 14 days after being served with the particulars of claim and the fixed
In a claim against an estate for monies owed under a child maintenance order representing unpaid maintenance payments going back more than six years, do the usual limitation periods apply or does the CSA or child maintenance service have any regulations relevant to this scenario?
In a claim against an estate for monies owed under a child maintenance order representing unpaid maintenance payments going back more than six years, do the usual limitation periods apply or does the CSA or child maintenance service have any regulations relevant to this scenario? This Q&A considers whether there is a limitation period that applies for the collection and enforcement of arrears of child maintenance. It specifically looks at arrears accrued under an arrangement with the child support agency (CSA) or child maintenance service (CMS), but also touches on arrears pursuant to an order under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). There are two means of enforcement under the Child Support Act 1991 (CSA 1991), either administrative orders such as deduction from earnings orders or lump sum deduction orders, or enforcement following a liability order. CSA 1991, s 33 provides for ‘liability orders’ which are granted by the CMS if a person falls into arrears in making their payments and a deduction from earnings order is inappropriate or has been made but has proved ineffective. This is the pre-requisite step for enforcement. In Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission v Mitchell the Court of Appeal considered whether the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980) applied to a claim for enforcement of child maintenance
What can a respondent named in the ET1 do if its name is not also in the early conciliation certificate but the tribunal nonetheless erroneously accepts the claim?
What can a respondent named in the ET1 do if its name is not also in the early conciliation certificate but the tribunal nonetheless erroneously accepts the claim? Where a claim is made to an employment tribunal to which early conciliation applies (see Practice Note: The early conciliation requirement—When the early conciliation requirement applies), the contents of the claim must comply with various specific requirements. One such requirement is that the name of the respondent on the claim form must be the same as the name of the prospective respondent on the early conciliation certificate. Failure to comply with such requirements can lead to a rejection of the claim by an employment judge. The relevant paragraphs and subparagraphs of rule 12 of the Employment Tribunal (ET) rules provide as follows: • the staff of the tribunal office shall refer a claim form to an Employment Judge if they consider that the claim, or part of it, may be one which institutes relevant proceedings and the name of the respondent on the claim form is not the same as the name of the prospective respondent on the early conciliation certificate to which the early conciliation number relates • the claim, or part of it, shall be rejected if the Judge considers that the claim, or part of it, is of a kind described in
Is it possible to annul a bankruptcy order where the petition debt was based on a VAT liability, but where HMRC has subsequently transferred the VAT registration from the bankrupt to his company?
Is it possible to annul a bankruptcy order where the petition debt was based on a VAT liability, but where HMRC has subsequently transferred the VAT registration from the bankrupt to his company? STOP PRESS: From 6 April 2017, the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 were revoked and replaced by the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (IR 2016), SI 2016/1024. The content in this Q&A may have been affected by this change. Annulment There are three grounds upon which the court can annul a bankruptcy order: • if it appears to the court that, on any grounds existing when the bankruptcy order was made, the order ought not to have been made (section 282(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986)) • if it appears to the court that, to the extent required by the rules, the bankruptcy debts and the expenses of the bankruptcy have all, since the making of the bankruptcy order, been either paid or secured to the satisfaction of the court (IA 1986, s 282(1)(b)) • where an undischarged bankrupt enters into an individual voluntary arrangements (IVA) with his creditors (IA 1986, s 261) This response will only consider annulment orders made under IA 1986, s
Is there a time limit for proceeding with the application for decree nisi in divorce proceedings?
Is there a time limit for proceeding with the application for decree nisi in divorce proceedings? The Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 7.19 provides that an application may be made to the court for it to consider the making of a decree nisi in the proceedings: • at any time after the time for filing the acknowledgment of service has expired, provided that no party has filed an acknowledgment of service indicating an intention to defend the case, and • in any other case, at any time after the time for filing an answer to every application for a matrimonial or civil partnership order made in the proceedings has expired FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955 therefore makes provision in respect of the timing for the earliest date for making the application for decree nisi, but does not make provision for the latest date by which it may be applied for. Application for decree nisi is made in form D84, which must be accompanied by a statement in standard form containing prescribed information: forms D80A–D80E. There is a separate form for each of the five facts that may be relied upon in section 1(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). The statement must be verified by a statement of truth. If the parties have cohabited since the date
A tenant is in rent arrears and the landlord is seeking to gain possession under section 8 mandatory grounds. The landlord will also be seeking to recover rent but would like the judgment to include the guarantor. Would a landlord be able to name a guarantor on possession proceedings or should a separate claim be made against the guarantor? Also can a landlord seek to gain just possession and later try to recover rent arrears or would this be seen as an abuse of process?
A tenant is in rent arrears and the landlord is seeking to gain possession under section 8 mandatory grounds. The landlord will also be seeking to recover rent but would like the judgment to include the guarantor. Would a landlord be able to name a guarantor on possession proceedings or should a separate claim be made against the guarantor? Also can a landlord seek to gain just possession and later try to recover rent arrears or would this be seen as an abuse of process? The landlord has taken the precaution of requiring a guarantor to whom recourse might be had in the event that the tenant fails to pay rent. In the scenario described the tenant is in default and it is assumed therefore that the guarantor is liable to make payment under the terms of the guarantee. In particular it is assumed that the any conditions for the guarantor's liability arising have been satisfied and that the guarantee is enforceable, either being supported by consideration or made by deed. The tenant is in breach of the covenant to pay rent This has two consequences: an order for possession and judgment for the arrears may be sought by the landlord. Assuming a valid notice has been served under section 8 of the Housing Act 1988, if it can be shown that both when it
Where an accident was recorded on CCTV, viewed by the defendant's employees and then deleted, how do I ensure that the defendant is sanctioned for abuse of process?
Where an accident was recorded on CCTV, viewed by the defendant's employees and then deleted, how do I ensure that the defendant is sanctioned for abuse of process? Disclosable documents: CPR PD 31B, para 7, which deals with the disclosure of electronic documents, expressly requires you to advise your client to preserve disclosable documents as soon as you have been instructed to deal with a dispute; where the claim has, or is likely to be, allocated to the multi-track (we assume that your case is a low value EL/PL claim but that liability is in dispute/it will not remain in the portal). In any event, putting in place processes whereby potentially disclosable documents are preserved is sensible where you would wish to have available to you any documents, which might affect the outcome of the case, where your client is obliged to disclose any documents, which are or have been under their control and where the court may take a dim view where documents are not disclosed because they were destroyed after litigation was contemplated. See: Disclosure—preserving documents for more information. In Earles v Barclays Bank, Judge Simon Brown QC confirmed the position so far as preservation of documents: • prior to the issue of proceedings there is no duty to preserve documents, but there may be cost sanctions if a party does not
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Construction weekly highlights—23 June 2022
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Dispute Resolution weekly highlights—23 June 2022
This week's edition of Dispute Resolution weekly highlights includes: analysis of a number of key DR developments and key judicial decisions including that of the Court of Appeal in Schofield v Smith (Rhino v Clyde & Co) (interpreting settlement agreements) and of the High Court in Axnoller v Brake (address for service and indemnity costs); dates for your diary; details of our most recently published content; and other information of general interest to dispute resolution practitioners.
Corporate Crime weekly highlights—23 June 2022
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Arbitration weekly highlights—23 June 2022
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Attempting to strike out a liquidators’ breach of duty claim (Re Mobigo Ltd)
Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The judgment of Insolvency and Companies Court (ICC) Judge Mullen in Re Mobigo Ltd deals with an unsuccessful attempt to strike out an application for misfeasance brought by one of the joint liquidators of Mobigo Ltd. Written by Edward Saunders, partner, and Stephen Baister, consultant, at Wedlake Bell LLP.
Abuse of process in international arbitration
Arbitration analysis: In Union of India v Reliance Industries Ltd and another, the English Commercial Court considered whether an arbitral tribunal was right to reject a party’s submission on the basis that it should have been raised earlier in the arbitration. The court agreed with the tribunal that it was an abuse of process for the submission to be made, when it could have been made earlier, and the court also said that the tribunal’s decision was in accordance with its duty under the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) to avoid unnecessary delay or expense in an arbitration. The tribunal’s award of US$111m was upheld. Ben Giaretta, partner and co-head of international arbitration at Fox Williams considers the implications of this decision.
Non-compliance with CrimPR does not render otherwise timely information a nullity (Barking v Argos Ltd)
Corporate Crime analysis: The court confirmed that, while offences must be charged within any applicable time limit for charging, the requirement that the charge must contain ‘such particulars of the conduct constituting the commission of the offence as to make clear what the prosecutor alleges against the defendant’, in Criminal Procedure Rule (CrimPR) 7.3(1)(b), did not require a statement from the prosecutor that the offence had been laid within the relevant time limit if the timing of the offence was not an element specified in the offence. The court confirmed that where the offence is validly laid within time, non-compliance with a requirement in the CrimPRs would not render an otherwise valid set of proceedings irregular, or a nullity. Written by Adam Craggs, partner at RPC.
Corporate Crime weekly highlights—16 June 2022
This week's edition of Corporate Crime weekly highlights includes analysis of the Law Commission’s long-awaited options paper on corporate criminal liability, the fallout from the Glencore resolutions & lessons learned, and government plans to increase capacity at the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI). We also include news of the sentencing of two individuals for fraud in connection with Global Forestry Investments following a successful Serious Fraud Office (SFO) prosecution and comments published by the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) reflecting on Grenfell Tower and industry progress five years later. All this, and more, in this week’s Corporate Crime highlights.
FTT decides evidence of knowledge of fraud was insufficient (Neegum Sheth and Sam Ghazi v HMRC)
Tax analysis: In Neegum Sheth and Sam Ghazi v HMRC, the First-tier Tax Tribunal (FTT) upheld the appellants’ appeal against Personal Liability Notices (PLN) issued by HMRC. HMRC suspected that the company, of which the appellants were officers, was involved in Missing Trader VAT fraud and issued an assessment for around £3m of output VAT (denying the application of the zero-rate to the cross-border movement of goods from the UK). The company went into liquidation and did not pay the tax demanded. However, HMRC has the power to transfer a penalty to officers of the company and did so here. The penalty in question was around £1.8m.
Tax weekly highlights—9 June 2022
This week's edition of Tax weekly highlights includes: (i) the EU General Court’s dismissal of the UK’s CFC rules State aid appeal, (ii) publication of the text of a new UK-Luxembourg double tax treaty, not yet in force, and (iii) the FTT decision in Haymarket Media that the sale of a property was not a transfer of a going concern for VAT purposes.
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