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Steven Finizio, partner at WilmerHale, and Fan Yang, scholar-in- residence at WilmerHale, discuss CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co, Ltd v Lumos Solar LLC. In this case, a US Court of Appeals denied recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award issued by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).
The recognition and enforcement was denied on the ground that the Chinese language notice of arbitration was not proper notice under the New York Convention, despite the fact that that the objecting party received actual notice of the arbitration
and participated at the hearing.
In US court proceedings regarding the enforcement of a CIETAC arbitral award, the respondent, Lumos, succeeded in resisting the enforcement because the US courts found that:
On this basis, the US courts refused enforcement of the CIETAC award under article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention.
As described below, the parties’ agreements referred to CIETAC arbitration, although the arbitration was administered by the Shanghai International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (SHIAC) (for ease of reference, we refer to CIETAC
as the relevant institution).
CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co, Ld (CEEG), a Chinese company, and Lumos LLC, a US company, entered into a co-branding agreement (the Agreement), under which Lumos agreed to buy solar products from CEEG over a period of three years.
The Agreement contained a warranty provision, a stipulation that arbitration proceedings should be in English and a provision for CIETAC arbitration. Under the Agreement, details regarding individual orders were to be set forth in subsequent purchase
A dispute arose in connection with a subsequent sales contract (the Contract) between the parties. The Contract had a separate arbitration agreement from the Agreement. Unlike the Agreement, the arbitration agreement in the Contract did not stipulate
that arbitration proceedings should be in English—instead, it merely provided for the arbitration to be conducted in accordance with the CIETAC arbitration rules, which designate Chinese as the default language of the arbitration.
After a dispute arose between the parties, CEEG sent a notice of arbitration to CIETAC. On 4 April 2013, CIETAC forwarded the arbitration notice and other documents (all in Chinese) to Lumos. Up to the point at which Lumos was served with a Chinese
language notice of arbitration, the parties had communicated exclusively in English.
On 7 May 2013, Lumos’s CEO sent an email to CEEG, offering to settle the dispute. He also attached a copy of the Chinese documents Lumos had received from CIETAC and noted that Lumos could not understand the documents. CEEG’s counsel responded
in an email, explaining, among other things, that the documents were from CIETAC, that CEEG had commenced arbitration in China and recommending that Lumos retain counsel. Lumos made no effort to contact CIETAC at this point and, 20 days later,
on 27 May 2013, the arbitral tribunal was constituted without input from Lumos.
On 20 June 2013, a week prior to the scheduled arbitration, Lumos contacted the arbitral tribunal and requested an extension to prepare for its case. The tribunal granted the extension and rescheduled the hearing. Lumos participated in the arbitration
and presented its substantive arguments. The arbitration was conducted in Chinese.
The arbitral tribunal found that it had jurisdiction under the arbitration clause in the Contract, but not the Agreement, and that the Agreement did not fall within the scope of the arbitration and had no effect on the Contract. The arbitral tribunal
then found in favour of CEEG on the merits of its claim under the Contract. CEEG sought recognition and enforcement of the award at the US District Court for the District of Colorado, which granted Lumos’s motion to dismiss CEEG’s
application for enforcement with prejudice. CEEG appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit.
In rejecting CEEG’s appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit focused on two issues.
First, the court considered whether the Chinese language notice of arbitration complied with the ‘proper notice’ requirement under the New York Convention, art V(1)(b). The court applied a US due process standard to this question; in particular,
it asked whether the Chinese language notice of arbitration was ‘reasonably calculated to apprise’ Lumos of the proceedings.
The court concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the Chinese language notice was not ‘reasonably calculated’ to apprise Lumos of the arbitral proceedings in China. It relied on the facts that all previous communications between
the parties had been in English and the Contract stipulated that if its Chinese and English versions conflicted, the English version would prevail. Despite the fact that the arbitral tribunal had found the Agreement to be irrelevant to its jurisdiction
and the dispute, the court found that the Agreement memorialised the parties’ understanding that all interactions and dispute resolution proceedings would be in English.
The court gave little weight to CEEG’s argument that the Contract did not specify that any arbitration relating to it was to be in English and that, pursuant to the CIETAC Rules, the notice of arbitration was sent to Lumos by CIETAC, not CEEG.
It found that CEEG ‘could have moved for CIETAC to proceed in English’, and that ‘CEEG cannot avoid responsibility for insufficient notice by arguing that it assigned to a third party the duty to ensure that the notice was reasonably
calculated to apprise Lumos of the proceedings’.
Second, the court considered whether Lumos demonstrated prejudice from the Chinese language notice. The court found that the Chinese language notice deprived Lumos of the right to participate in appointing the arbitral tribunal, and that constituted
CEEG argued that Lumos was not prejudiced because Lumos received actual notice of the pending arbitration on 7 May 2013 when its counsel told Lumos’s CEO that CEEG had commenced arbitration and the Chinese documents were from CIETAC. CEEG also
noted that CIETAC did not formally appoint the tribunal until 20 days later. During that period, Lumos failed to contact CIETAC or to request that the appointment deadline be extended. CEEG argued that Lumos’s failure to appear in the proceedings
until 20 June 2013 evidenced that it was Lumos’s unreasonable inattentiveness and not the alleged insufficient notice that had caused Lumos not to participate in selecting the tribunal.
The court rejected CEEG’s arguments:
Having rejected CEEG’s arguments, the court agreed with the District Court that Lumos had met its heavy burden of demonstrating that the Chinese language notice had caused it ‘substantial prejudice’ because it prevented Lumos from
participating in appointing the arbitral tribunal. The court did so with little analysis, but it emphasised that:
Given that the use of ‘foreign’ languages (ie, languages that are not the native tongue of one of the parties) is almost inevitable in the context of international arbitration, arbitration-friendly, pro-enforcement and pro-recognition
courts typically reject arguments based on claims of prejudice due to the use of foreign languages in recognition proceedings under the New York Convention. (See, Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Ch26.05 [C]), 2d ed, 2014)
Moreover, the notice required by the New York Convention, art V(1)(b)is ‘proper’ notice, which is undefined by the Convention’s express terms. It is clear, however, that ‘proper notice’ does not mean the same form of
notice as that required in national court proceedings, but instead notice that is appropriate in the context of the parties’ contractual dispute resolution mechanism, including any applicable institutional arbitration rules. (See, Gary Born,
International Commercial Arbitration, Ch26.05 [C], 2d ed, 2014).
In this case, however, the court applied the test for notice used in US litigation. By applying the "reasonably calculated" test, the court focused only on CEEG's conduct. Thus, the court explained that, because its analysis was only whether CEEG's
notice was "reasonably calculated" to apprise Lumos of the arbitration, it did not consider whether Lumos should have known that the documents constituted notice. .After accepting the District Court’s finding that there was an understanding
that the parties’ dealings would be in English, the court found that a Chinese language notice violated that test. It did so despite the fact that the notice complied with the requirements of the institutional arbitration rules that the
parties had agreed to use, and did not violate any express requirements in the relevant contract. It also found that in the circumstances the onus was entirely on the (Chinese) party commencing the arbitration, and not on the (US) party that had
received notice in Chinese.
Other than accepting that District Court’s finding that Lumos was ‘diligent’ in looking for Chinese counsel, and that it was ‘surprisingly’ difficult to do so, the Court of Appeal made no comment as to why Lumos could
not have taken steps to have the notice translated before engaging Chinese counsel or otherwise could not have contacted the arbitral institution during the month after CEEG’s counsel told Lumos’s CEO that the documents were from CIETAC
and that CEEG had commenced arbitration.
While to some degree the court of appeal’s holding is limited by its acceptance of the District Court’s finding that the parties had an understanding that they would proceed in English, the decision is notable for the leeway the US courts
gave to the US party for failing to take any steps at all after it received the notice of arbitration from CIETAC and again after it was expressly told that the documents were a CIETAC notice of arbitration (other than to take a number of weeks
to retain Chinese counsel and finally to appear in the case a month later). Moreover, the US courts seemed to assume that Lumos could not communicate with CIETAC unless and until it retained Chinese counsel.
The US courts also effectively assumed that CEEG was not entitled to take the position that any arbitration under the Contract could proceed in Chinese (despite the lack of a provision specifying that English would apply). CEEG’s counsel in
fact told Lumos that CEEG’s view was that Chinese was the appropriate language given the silence in the Contract. If Lumos disagreed, the parties could have presented their differing views to CIETAC and, pursuant to CIETAC Rules, r 81(1),
CIETAC could have decided what language or languages would apply in this case. There is no indication in the court of appeal’s decision that Lumos objected to the arbitration itself taking place in Chinese or whether CIETAC or the tribunal
addressed such an objection. In the end, the arbitration proceeded in Chinese and Lumos participated. We are therefore left with a US court concluding that a Chinese language notice was improper for an arbitration that proceeded, otherwise properly
according to the agreed rules, in Chinese.
Typically, when courts address claims of improper notice under the New York Convention, the prejudice alleged is that the lack of proper notice prevented the party from participating at all in the proceedings or from having sufficient time to present
Here, there was no suggestion that the Chinese language notice deprived Lumos of a fair opportunity to present its case. Instead, the court concluded that the improper notice deprived Lumos of its opportunity to participate in the appointment of the
arbitral tribunal. Interestingly, while the court noted that it is a defense to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention, art V(1)(d) that the composition of the arbitral tribunal is not in accordance with the parties’
agreement, it did not conclude that this ground applied here. Rather, the court only addressed the improper notice claim under the New York Convention, art V(1)(b).
It is not at all clear that Lumos could demonstrate that the tribunal was not appointed in accordance with the parties’ agreement in order to invoke the New York Convention, art V(1)(d). When Lumos did not make an appearance at the outset of
the arbitration or otherwise ask for CIETAC to delay the appointment process, CIETAC appointed an arbitrator for Lumos in accordance with the CIETAC rules (and therefore arguably in accordance with the parties’ agreement). As a result of
conflating the issue of proper notice and the issue of participation in the appointment process the court:
Whether a party who did not participate in the appointment of the tribunal but otherwise participated in an arbitration, and does not allege that it was prevented from presenting its case, is sufficiently prejudiced to justify not enforcing a foreign
arbitral award against it is an interesting and potentially difficult question. However, by conflating the issues of notice and appointment, and providing only very brief analysis in support of its conclusions, the court’s decision does
not shed much light on that question or address whether participating in the full hearing should be considered in determining whether notice was proper under the New York Convention, art V(1)(b).
Two practical considerations to take away from the case are:
Even if the court’s conclusion here may be fact-specific and controversial, a party seeking to avoid enforceability concerns should be cautious about commencing an arbitration in a language other than that used between the parties (and may want
to consider using multiple languages, if the parties have used multiple language in their contracts and other dealings), at least in the absence of an express provision in the arbitration agreement specifying the language of the arbitration.
The views expressed by our Legal Analysis contributors are not necessarily those of the proprietor.
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