Coronavirus (COVID-19) business interruption test case—post-judgment analysis—construction, composite perils and causation

On 15 September 2020 the High Court handed down its judgment in the FCA’s business interruption (BI) insurance test case. Pamela Freeland and Sarah Irwin of Weightmans LLP, together with Edward Rushton and Cheryl Sue of the Lexis®PSL Insurance and Reinsurance team consider the judgment and its implications.

The case is The Financial Conduct Authority v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd and others (Hospitality Insurance Group Action and another intervening) [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm)

The FCA’s decision to represent the interests of policyholders against insurers was controversial but, it seems, has been vindicated in that the first instance judgment has substantially progressed the impasse facing policyholders and insurers alike. It is a credit to all concerned that this inaugural financial markets test case was progressed with such rapidity and rigour. The result, a carefully reasoned judgment running to some 160 pages, looks set to resolve many issues of principle that were impeding prompt and fair settlement of coronavirus (COVID-19) BI claims. It has been hailed as a victory for policyholders. It is for some, but only those with policies of a type that has been held to respond to the coronavirus outbreak. Policyholders with prevention of access extensions, for example, were less fortunate.

The decision also advances the law of insurance in relation to the nature of insured perils and causation of loss, as well as clarifying several issues of policy construction, common to many non-damage BI policies.

Questions of causation were at the forefront of all parties’ submissions because a common theme in insurers’ declinature of coronavirus BI claims was that, for any particular policyholder, its loss was not caused by the non-damage BI peril insured against but by other effects of the coronavirus outbreak in the UK, which were not insured.

Insurers have been criticised for allowing this situation to arise. In particular, they have been blamed for selling BI policies with wordings that are insufficiently clear.

That the coronavirus pandemic was ‘unprecedented’ is not a satisfactory answer to this. The scale of the pandemic was unprecedented in modern times but it was not unimaginable. Undoubtedly, there are lessons learned that will affect how BI policies are drafted in future. It is, however, unrealistic to lay all the blame on insurers or imperfect policy wordings.

This is because it was entirely reasonable for insurers to take the approach they did as it reflected the market’s settled understanding of the correct legal position in the light of Orient Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni General S.p.a. (UK Branch) Trading as Generali Global Risk [2010] EWHC 1186 (Comm) (notwithstanding academic criticism of it). Second-guessing a leading authority is the domain of lawyers and academics. For an insurer to take a different view prior to this test case would have been heretical. It would also have been profoundly uncommercial because reinsurers would inevitably have challenged any such settlement.

Causation and the importance of insured perils

Orient Express featured heavily in responding submissions in support of the contention that most policyholders would have suffered their loss anyway because of the effect of other causes that were not insured. Orient Express is the paradigm example of this approach to BI loss in English law—BI loss caused by damage to the insured property was distinguished from hurricane damage to the wider area, which was uninsured, notwithstanding that the damage to the hotel and the wider area had a common cause. Accordingly, the tribunal, applying the ‘but for’ test, concluded that the hotel would have suffered BI loss even if it had not itself been damaged because the damage to the surrounding area would have deterred its customers anyway.

Many thought the test case would turn on whether or not Orient Express was found to be correctly decided and, if it was, whether it fell to be distinguished (the FCA relying on, in particular, IFP&C Insurance Ltd (Publ) v Silversea Cruises Ltd, the Silver Cloud [2004] EWCA Civ 769). It transpired that the judges in the test case resolved every question of causation by applying principles of contractual construction, with the result that the causation section towards the end of the judgment was effectively an epilogue.

Construing the policy was undoubtedly the proper starting point.

The reason for this approach was made clear in the judgment—when one properly applies principles of construction to identify the relevant insured peril the causation issue falls away. In other words, if the insured peril is identified correctly, it makes scant difference whether a ‘but for’ test or a proximate cause test is applied. This should be true whether or not the nature of the peril is apt to affect a wide area or just the immediate vicinity.

Although Orient Express ultimately formed no part of the court’s reasoning in reaching its conclusions (and therefore the comments made on the decision are obiter), it seems clear that the precedent set by Orient Express (assuming it was in fact wrongly decided) was the primary cause of the impasse that the test case was brought to resolve. The fact that the decision is known only through the aperture of an unsuccessful appeal under s69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) probably also contributed to the length of time that passed before it became subject to judicial scrutiny once again.

If the analysis upon which Orient Express was decided is misconceived, where did it go awry and why did the appeal against it fail?

The answer, according to Lord Justice Flaux and Justice Butcher is that ‘there was a misidentification of the insured peril’.

The points on appeal in Orient Express were whether the ‘but for’ test was applicable and whether the trends clause in the policy should account only for loss caused by ‘damage’ (as defined) to the insured property, not to the surrounding area. There was no appeal of the tribunal’s conclusion that the relevant peril for BI cover was ‘damage’ to the insured property. It seems, therefore, that Mr Justice Hamblen was obliged to adopt the arbitration tribunal’s conclusion in this regard. It followed that testing causation and applying the trends clause required consideration of a counterfactual scenario in which the hotel suffered no hurricane damage despite the fact that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had wreaked havoc on the area all around it.

Counterfactuals are by their nature unreal. The extreme unreality of the counterfactuals produced by this approach, however, was perhaps a clue that something was amiss. In hindsight, it may also have been a clue as to why.

If this first instance decision in the test case is right, it seems that the fundamental error in both scenarios (Orient Express and coronavirus) was of construction. It was possibly the result of putting undue emphasis on defined terms and all the requirements of complicated insuring clauses, thereby overlooking the inherent connection that one should find between a correctly identified insured peril and the kind of losses it is apt to produce. As it was put at paragraph 526 of the judgment in the test case

‘If it had been recognised that the hurricanes were an integral part of the insured peril, the judge would have concluded that the policy wording did not compel such a remarkable answer’.

Wide area perils

Stepping back, extreme counterfactuals seem only to arise when the relevant insured peril affects an area significantly wider than just the insured premises. Hurricanes and infectious disease outbreak are examples of perils that might be expected, by their nature, to affect a wide area. Requirements in an insuring clause that a peril must operate within a specified area or at the insured premises serve to qualify when BI losses caused by an insured peril are covered. This is not the same as being part of the insured peril. If such non-operative requirements in an insuring clause are elevated as if they were part of the insured peril rather than merely ancillary to it, the resultant counterfactual will undermine the intended cover in proportion to the extent to which the wider area was impacted as compared with the insured premises. No such oddities arise in respect of perils that only affect the insured premises.

It is relevant here that the High Court determined that the outbreak of coronavirus throughout the UK was a single indivisible cause of both the Government’s response and responses of the public. Every coronavirus infection, therefore, is a part of that cause and it is not possible, the court held, to separate loss caused by the outbreak within a particular area from loss caused by the same outbreak, outside that area.

If insurers were correct in their analyses that proximity was part of the relevant perils, not merely an ancillary requirement for cover, it would be necessary to factor that element of the insured peril in the counterfactual analysis. To do so, however, would undermine the cover that was intended in respect of infectious disease outbreaks in any scenario in which the outbreak at the premises was part of a wider outbreak.

This was an important consideration in the court’s approach to construing the insured perils in the lead policies (paragraph 528):

‘In our view, the consequence which flows from the Orient Express decision, that the worse the fortuity which befalls the insured and the vicinity of the insured’s premises, the less the insurance responds, cannot have been intended.’

The court also had regard to the fact that many infectious diseases, by their nature, spread widely. This is true not only of coronavirus but also of several other named or notifiable diseases.

Taken together, these points informed the court’s conclusions as to the construction of the relevant insured perils in certain of the lead policies (see ‘disease clauses’ and ‘hybrid clauses’ below). In the judges’ view, the parties could not have intended to create cover for infectious disease outbreaks only to take it away again if the outbreak affects the wider area in which the insured premises are situated, as might ordinarily be expected, albeit not to the extent experienced in 2020.

The court adopted a similar approach in respect of each of the lead policies, analysing each in turn to identify the relevant (composite) insured peril. Its analysis varied as between different policies but the conclusion in each case was an insured peril comprising multiple elements. It is striking in this regard that the elements comprising each insured peril are all germane to the way in which the peril may cause BI. Qualifications such as proximity, which are not obviously integral to how the peril might cause a loss, may be a prerequisite to cover but do not import any further proximate causation requirement into the insured peril.

Key themes on policy construction

Flaux LJ and Butcher J were tasked with construing the wordings of 21 lead policies to ascertain the extent of the cover afforded by each policy with reference to the occurrence of coronavirus and the Government’s response to the pandemic. In so doing, the court decided whether each of the lead policies would or would not respond, in principle, to a claim for BI losses.

Throughout submissions, the parties divided the lead policies into three broad categories: disease clauses, prevention of access clauses; and hybrid clauses. Much time during submissions was spent by the parties on arguments as to the correct identification of the insured peril under each of the policies. While each policy must be considered on an individual basis and on their own wording, the court identified the composite insured perils for the three categories of policies as:

• Disease clauses: interruption or interference with the business following the occurrence of the notifiable disease within the defined radius of the premises (either one mile or 25 miles) or within the vicinity of the premises
• Prevention of access clauses: prevention or hindrance of access or use of the premises caused by action of the relevant authority due to an emergency/incident/event that could endanger human life or property
• Hybrid clauses: an inability to use the insured premises due to restrictions imposed by a public authority following an occurrence of a human infectious or contagious or notifiable disease

The FCA was largely successful in arguing that cover was available, in principle, under the majority of the disease clauses (six of the eight policies were found to respond), the court preferred insurers’ arguments in respect of the majority of prevention of access clauses.

‘Occurrence’ v ‘event’; ‘following’; and ‘manifested’

The majority of disease clauses (RSA 3, RSA 4, MS Amlin 1 and 2, and Argenta) included cover for BI losses following or as a result of an occurrence of a notifiable disease. A key consideration for the court was the interpretation of causal connectors used within the insuring clause to identify the composite insured peril. The court favoured the FCA’s argument that the word ‘following’, while requiring some causal connection, was intended to denote a looser causal link than proximate causation (paragraph 95). Similarly, ‘as a result of’ did not import a relationship of proximate causation within the definition of the insured peril, but instead required that the occurrence of the disease was an effective cause of the BI losses. This requirement was fulfilled in relation to the above clauses on the basis that the occurrence of coronavirus within the relevant radius or vicinity of the premises was ‘part of a wider picture which dictated the response of the authorities and the public which itself led to the business interruption or interference’ (paragraph 102) and that each occurrence of coronavirus across the country was ‘part of an indivisible cause’ which prompted the Government response (paragraph 165).

Although the court also found that the disease clause in QBE 1 would, in principle, respond to BI losses associated with coronavirus, it was held to provide narrower cover than the above disease clauses. While the use of ‘occurrence’ in the insuring clause did not require a case of coronavirus to have been diagnosed and would be satisfied if one person in the relevant area had been infected, the court applied a narrower definition to QBE 1’s wording which required the disease to have ‘manifested’ within the radius. The court held that a disease could not be said to have ‘manifested’ if a person was asymptomatic and had not been diagnosed (paragraph 224), placing a higher evidential burden on policyholders.

When considering the court’s interpretation of ‘occurrence’, it is important to note its assessment of alternative words used in the QBE 2 and QBE 3 disease clauses, which were found not to respond in principle. Somewhat conversely, the court found that, unlike ‘occurrence’, the use of the words ‘event’ and ‘incident’ in QBE 2 and QBE 3 denoted a particular occurrence of the disease within the specified radius. Other instances of the disease at different times and in different places would not constitute the same ‘event’ or ‘incident’, which denotes something that ‘happens at a particular time, at a particular place, in a particular way’ (paragraph 404).

Following the clause through, the court found that cover under both policies was too confining to extend to the consequences of occurrences of coronavirus outside of the specified radius. Cover was therefore limited to BI losses which resulted from the particular local incidence of coronavirus rather than the Government’s overall response to the collective cases of coronavirus across the country.

The same logic was applied to the definition of ‘incident’ in the prevention of access clauses in the Hiscox NDDA clause and MS Amlin 2 where ‘incident’, combined with only a one mile radius, confirmed that the clause was only intended to cover local incidents and that the clauses would not respond to BI losses caused by restrictions imposed in response to the national pandemic (paragraph 407).

In keeping with the interpretation of ‘incident’, the court held that an ‘emergency’ which was likely to endanger life in the vicinity of an insured premise similarly provides that cover must be narrow and localised and that ‘vicinity’, in these terms, could not extend to the entire country (paragraph 467) (RSA 2.1, RSA 2.2). Cover would only be provided if ‘it was an emergency by reason of coronavirus in the vicinity, in the sense of the neighbourhood, of the insured premises, as opposed to the country as a whole, which led to the actions or advice of the government’, which sets a high evidential bar for policyholders to meet. Similar findings were made in relation to the wordings of MS Amlin 1 and Zurich 1 and 2 which provide cover following ‘a danger or disturbance in the vicinity of the premises’.

A distinction can be drawn here between the court’s treatment of the prevention of access clauses and hybrid clauses. Hybrid clauses include some elements of both the disease clauses and prevention of access clauses, generally providing cover where restrictions are imposed following the occurrence of a notifiable disease. Under the prevention of access clauses, the court took the view that cover was intended to be local or narrow due to words like ‘incident’, ‘danger’ or ‘disturbance’ being used in the policies, which meant that the policies were intended to respond to local perils as opposed to a nationwide event/issue. However, this narrow application did not extend to the court’s analysis of the restrictions or denial of access policy wordings in the hybrid clauses where an ‘occurrence’ of a notifiable disease was again given a broad definition, capable of extending across the entire country. It is worth noting that these latter clauses each refer to ‘outbreaks’ or ‘notifiable diseases’ which, as in the disease clauses, prompted the court to infer a broader construction of the insuring clause in recognition that outbreaks of a notifiable disease are apt to affect a wider area.

The same logic continues with the court’s differing interpretation of ‘vicinity’ in the RSA 4 disease clause where, in contrast to the prevention of access clauses, ‘vicinity’ was given a much more generous definition with the court concluding again that an occurrence of the disease in the vicinity of an insured premises could extend to the entirety of the country. This distinction highlights the importance of defining terms and construing the parties’ intentions with reference to the wider policy wording.

‘Prevention’ v ‘hindrance’; and ‘access or use’

While the individual policy wordings of prevention of access and hybrid clauses must be considered individually, the court made a number of findings in more general terms on the meaning of prevention of access or use and hindrance or restriction of access or use. Specific consideration will need to be given to the precise words used as slight variations of terms may impact coverage. For example, MSA 3 was construed to provide wider cover than MSA 1 as it encompasses hindrance of access and use in addition to prevention of access and use. In contrast, Arch’s policy was limited to prevention of access and the court found that, with regard to this wording, only complete closure required by force of law would qualify as prevention.

The court made the following findings:

• prevention of access is not synonymous with hindrance of access. Difficulty in gaining access to premises was not prevention, but hindrance
• closure of premises is only ‘enforced’ and access is only ‘prevented’ by authority action where there is legal compulsion and any action by a relevant authority must have the force of law. Similarly, ‘restrictions imposed’ must be mandatory.
• ‘inability to use’ is not synonymous with hindrance of use as it ‘does not embrace any and every impairment of normal use’. There would not be an inability to use the premises merely because a policyholder could not use all of the premises, or due to a departure from normal use. Partial use could be sufficient to meet the threshold of ‘inability to use’ but this would involve a fact-sensitive assessment
• access to premises was not prevented if the business was not required to close by either the 21 or 26 March Regulations or by other force of law. If there were fewer workers than usual due to Government advice or social distancing exhortations, this was ‘due to general concern about the pandemic not due to any actions or advice of government preventing access’ (paragraph 335). However, social distancing measures could, depending on the facts, be said to satisfy a hindrance of use of the premises (paragraph 465).

Analysis of prevention of access clauses requires an assessment, not only of the specific terms of the insuring clause, but also consideration of the category of the policyholder’s business to determine when, and if, access was prevented as a result of Government intervention during the March lockdown.

For the purposes of the test case, the parties agreed to seven categories of businesses, with reference to the schedules to the 21 and 26 March Regulations. Where a policy required prevention of access to trigger cover, such qualifying prevention only occurred from the moment of closure of the business in accordance with either the advice of the Prime Minister on 20 March 2020 (if the policy wording included authority action and/or advice, such as Arch) or the 21 or 26 March Regulations (if the policy wording referred only to authority action, such as MSA 1).

Where businesses were not required to close by the Regulations, there is no qualifying prevention of access. For example, schools and nurseries were not required to close if they were permitted to remain open for the education of key worker children and vulnerable children. They did not, therefore, suffer a prevention of access.

Further, category 3 businesses (essential shops and businesses such as supermarkets and pharmacies) and category 5 businesses (professional service firms and construction/manufacturing) were not required to close by the Regulations and therefore could not be said to have suffered a ‘prevention’ of access. Further analysis would be required to consider whether any hindrance of access or prevention of use was suffered.

Prevalence and proving loss

The court’s analysis of disease clauses or hybrid clauses that require the occurrence of a notifiable or infectious disease with a specified proximity does not require the proximate element of the outbreak to itself be the proximate cause of loss. It is nonetheless necessary for policyholders to satisfy this requirement by providing evidence that at least one incident of coronavirus occurred within the relevant area.

The judgment in the test case provides some guidance as to how this might be achieved in practice. In particular, the court recognised that, as in Equitas Ltd v R&Q Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2009] EWHC 2787 (Comm), a policyholder may discharge its burden to show that its loss falls within the policy by showing that it does so on the balance of probabilities. This leaves the door open for policyholders to rely on statistics such as NHS death data or data from the Office of National Statistics to establish the likelihood that an infected person was within the relevant area, at the relevant time.

It is of course also open to policyholders to present evidence of specific incidents of infected persons being in the relevant area. This may include the nearby presence of a care home or hospital in which coronavirus deaths are known to have occurred. Alternatively, some business may be aware of specific customers who attended the premises in early March who soon thereafter tested positive for coronavirus.

It is helpful that the court has confirmed that these means of proving that the outbreak of coronavirus was present in the relevant policy area are valid in principle, but the judgment gives little guidance as to how policyholders might martial statistical data in practice. It does not preclude the use of methodologies such as averaging and application of an undercounting ratio to estimate the prevalence of the disease within a particular geographic area. The court could not, however, rule on the soundness or accuracy of such methodologies because to do so it would have required expert evidence, which was not adduced in the test case.

The practicalities of proving prevalence therefore remains an open issue. As it stands presently, it seems that reported cases will be the simplest way for policyholders to establish the presence of the disease. In the absence of reported cases in the relevant area, it seems that expert evidence may have to be adduced if policyholders are to succeed in providing the presence of the disease on the balance of probabilities by reference to statistical data.

There are certainly challenges ahead in this regard due, for example, the geographical mismatch between publicly available data and particular ‘relevant policy areas’. These problems ought, in principle, to be surmountable by means of proper analysis of all the data. To do so, however, may be possible for the likes of Equitas. Whether it is practical for SME policyholders to do so is another matter. Perhaps the FCA or the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), in consultation with insurers, can assist in this regard by providing a suitable roadmap for policyholders that is supported by expert statistical analysis, something which the FCA has indicated it will provide further guidance on in the Dear CEO letter it published on 18 September 2020 (which is referred to further below).

Prospects of an appeal

Before the judgment was handed down almost everybody anticipated it would be appealed, whatever the result. An appeal still seems likely, albeit somewhat less of a foregone conclusion given that, in the round, policyholders and insurers have both partially succeeded. Nevertheless, some policyholders and some insurers will be disappointed by the result. This means that the relatively united front that insurers have sustained so far may fragment as the insurers that succeeded part ways with those that did not.

Since the court at first instance was able to resolve all the causation issues by construing each of the relevant policies, it seems less likely that there will be an appeal that will affect all policies (as might have been the case had the decision been made following Orient Express or Silver Sea). This is good news as it means that, probably, the insurers and the FOS can start processing/resolving at least some claims immediately after the consequentials hearing on 2 October 2020.

From the perspective of policyholders, there seems to be little impediment to appealing unfavourable findings on construction that have a bearing on particular policy wordings. Whether the FCA is prepared to do this on their behalf even if the appeal has limited merit is another matter. Given the urgent need to pay valid claims, the FCA should be unwilling to appeal points that have poor prospects of success, even where the cost/benefit analysis from policyholders’ point of view may stack up. It will be interesting to see where the FCA draws the line. If the FCA is unwilling, it may be left to policyholders or policyholder action groups to progress an appeal.

For insurers, the merits of any appeal must be weighed against regulatory pressure and the further reputational damage they may suffer insofar as an unsuccessful appeal delays matters further. There is also the prospect of damages claims under the Enterprise Act if such steps are found to have unreasonably delayed settlement (see below). That said, the stakes may be sufficiently high for those insurers with high exposures to policies with disease clauses or hybrid clauses that the reputational risk is justified. Others, such as those who predominantly wrote policies with prevention of access triggers, may be happy to accept the result as it is.

As noted above, it is hard to conceive a ground of appeal that unsettles the court’s findings in respect of all policies. Much more likely are appeals and cross-appeals from certain insurers or groups of policyholders in relation to specific types of policy.

Insofar as any of the parties elect to appeal the first instance judgment it is expected that they will use the ‘leapfrog procedure’, whereby the appeal is heard by the Supreme Court immediately.

Interestingly, two of the Supreme Court judges who are best qualified to hear insurance cases were involved in deciding the Orient Express case in insurers’ favour, Mr Justice Leggatt was a member of the arbitral tribunal whose decision was appealed. Hamblen J was the judge who dismissed the appeal. If this key element of the decision is appealed, it will be a very interesting twist in this saga if it falls to Hamblen J and Leggatt J to decide whether Orient Express was correctly decided.

Damages for late payment

In addition to pressure from the FCA, insurers face additional pressure to settle valid claims insofar as possible due to the prospect of potential claims against them, potentially in excess of policy limits.

Section 28(1) of the Enterprise Act 2016 added section 13A into the Insurance Act 2015 (IA 2015), concerning additional damages for the late payment of insurance claim. The Hiscox Action Group has already suggested it will make claims under this section for additional losses its policyholders have suffered (see: Coronavirus (coronavirus)—Hiscox claimants to pursue case under Enterprise Act). IA 2015, s 13A states that a policyholder may claim damages for late payment of insurance claims, if claims are not paid within a ‘reasonable time’. Reasonableness will depend on the time to investigate and assess the claim. IA 2015, s 13A sets out some examples, including the type of insurance, the size and complexity of the claim, compliance with regulatory rules and guidance (which would include the 18 September 2020 Dear CEO letter) and factors outside of the insurer’s control.

On 18 September 2020, the FCA issued a ‘Dear CEO’ letter reiterating its guidance and expectations of payment of BI claims (see: LNB News 21/09/2020 99), emphasising claims should be settled as quickly as possible.

Additional damages may need to be accounted for by insurers who may have set reserves based on the sub-limits offered by the extensions in question. In addition, insurers will need to consider whether such additional claims may be covered under their reinsurance treaties. This may be problematic insofar as such additional alleged losses might be said to arise out of the insurer’s actions, rather than as a result of an insured loss.

Insurers may wish to consider interim payments to minimise any additional claims. Policyholders should bear in mind that the limitation period for the late payment of insurance claims is one year from the date which the insurer has paid all sums payable under IA 2015, s 13.

The prospect of damages claims for late payment may be of particular concern in respect of policyholders who have entered into, or are considering administration or insolvency proceedings. The administrator/liquidator may assign the claim to a third party, an insolvency office-holder. An insolvency office-holder’s primary duty is to recover the insolvent entity’s property, which includes insurance claims, and additional costs may be recoverable from the insurer.

The next steps for insurers

Policyholders and insurers alike are now faced with the challenge of applying the court’s decisions on construction to other wordings to consider whether a policy responds.

The FCA seems now to have acknowledged the difficulties insurers (particularly those who were not involved in the test case) face when analysing and assessing the outcome of the test case as against other policy wordings and without knowing if any aspects of the decision will be subject to an appeal. In its Dear CEO letter of 18 September 2020, the FCA acknowledged that some insurers may decide that they need to wait to see whether a specific point in the judgment will be appealed before updating policyholders on the next steps that will be taken.

The respite may be short however, once the nature and scope of any appeal is known (following the consequentials hearing on 2 October 2020) the FCA states that it expects insurers to identify and distinguish:

• policy wordings relevant to the test case that will not be affected by any appeal and;
• policy wordings relevant to the test case that may be affected by any appeal

For policy wordings in category (1), the FCA expects insurers to apply the relevant decision in the test case to deal with (and if need be) settle claims under those policies at the ‘earliest possible opportunity’. For policy wordings in category (2), the FCA expects insurers to do what they can to ensure that claims under those policies are as progressed insofar as possible in advance of the result of any appeal. Expectations are high and the task is by no means easy.

In addition, the analysis for insurers will also extend to any policy wordings for new business that have already been revised following the outbreak of coronavirus as any alterations to policy terms and conditions previously deemed suitable may need further revision as a result of the judgment.

The next steps for the FOS

The FOS is also taking stock of the decision in the test case but how it will progress BI complaints (as at the time of writing) remains to be seen. It may well follow the approach the FCA expects insurers to take following the consequentials hearing by identifying and distinguishing between the complaints it has received which relate to policies that may and may not be affected by any appeal(s). For those complaints relating to policies that may be affected by an appeal, the FOS may decide to hold off making any decisions until the outcome of the appeal is known, focusing on progressing and deciding on complaints relating to policies that are unlikely to be affected. This latter category may reduce in number without further recourse to the FOS if insurers and policyholders are able to agree matters between themselves by reference to the judgment, which would (helpfully) lower the backlog of cases to be decided upon. The FOS will still however face logistical and resourcing challenges to progress and resolve complaints relating to BI insurance.

For further information, see: Coronavirus (coronavirus) business interruption test case—pre-judgment analysis and the future of pandemic claims.

Conclusion

The priority now must be to progress the settlement of valid claims. This should be possible very soon after 2 October 2020, when we know what elements of the first instance judgment, if any, are to be appealed. This should enable law firms, insurers and the FOS to triage policies so that straightforward claims can be resolved without increasing the risk of insolvency or damages claims for late payment.

The lack of expert evidence in the test case meant that the court was unable to provide definitive guidance as to the soundness of the proposed methodologies for proving that there was an instance of a coronavirus infection in the relevant policy area. That the court has endorsed a statistical approach in principle, however, (following Equitas v R&Q) is helpful. We now look to the FCA to assist policyholders and insurers, not to mention the FOS, in dealing with these evidential matters in a practical and expeditious way.